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Quantitative ris~ analysis (QRA) is an integral and essential pan of ris~ analysis. which 
quantifi ... the risk of any unwanted e\'ents in industrial proteS'i fadlities_lIowever. the 
application of QRA in the in<!ustria l process facililY is slill limited. On~ major balTicr is 
handling uncertainties ,,'hile perfonning QRA using availab le tcchniqllCs. Other 
imponanl weaknesses include unreali"ic assumptions and the absence of a dynamic 
aspeci in QRA. These weaknesses undcnninc the credibililY and utililY dthe OUiput 
results from QRA 
Fault Tree Anal)'sis (FTA) an<! EWllt Tree Analysis (ETA) a", "'0 common and 
impot1al1t techniques of QRA for evaluating the likelihoods of unwanted occurrence •. 
Traditionally, both tcchniqllCs impose two major assumptions to simplify the analysis. 
The firslaSSUntption is ",1"led to the likelihood \'al""" of input events. and the second 
assumption isconcemed about inttrdepcndenceofevcnts (for ETAjor basic ...,\'cnt.(for 
FTA). ~TA and ETA both usc crisp probabi lities: however. to deal with uncertainties. the 
probabilitydiS1ributionsofli~clihoodsofinpute"entscan be assumed. These probability 
distribution, as well as the crisp probabilities arcoflen hard to come by. and even if 
",'ailable. they are subjected to different types of uncertain lies int!uding incompletencS'i 
(panial ignorance) and imprttision. Funhennore. both FTA and ETA assume that events 
(orbasic""",·ent<)areindepcndem.lnpractice,theseassumptionsareoflenunrealisticand 
introduce dnll1 and model uncertainlies while perfonning FTA and ETA 
Bow_lie analysis ha< recenlly gained popularity asanolher important te<:hniqllC for 
QRA. It can combine both ITA and ETA te<:hniques arid describe the total accident 
scenarios for an unwanted event. also called a critical e"ent (CE). in a common diagram 
wi tr. two pans: Ihe fLrst correspoods to a fa ult trcedefioing possible cause s Icad ing to the 
CE and theseoond represents annent tree to rc:ach poss ible conseql.lCnccs of the CE. 
Unfonunatciy. in spite of having this feat ure. the app licalion of bow-ticanalysisinQRA 
is still limi1cd to a g.--.phical rcPR'SC"ntation of causes and conscqucnces for the unwa nted 
To over<;ome the challenges ofQRA. this re>ear<;h explores uncenainty handling 
approaches for analyLing the fault tree and evcnt tree. which further extends to bow-tic 
w13lysis for dC"eloping a generic framework utilizing different tcchniques for QRA. 
First. fuzzy- and cvidence theory- based approaches have been developed to express the 
uncertainties related to dala and model inadequacy of input events (events or basic 
events) in FTA. ETA and !Jo",-tie analysis. Second. an updating inference comprised of 
another two approaches. fuzzy-bayesian and IAE (integrity of available evidence) 
approaches. has been developed 10 integrate the dynamic as~t in QRA. In addition to 
these approaches. a sensitivity analysis metllod has also been developed for bow-tie 
anal)'llis to id~ntify tlk: important risk oontributor.; and evaluate oorresponding risk 
reduclion 
Applications of the developed frnmeworks, appmocht.'S and updating inferences 
ha,'e bc;:en explored in four di!Terent illustrntive exwnples. The tirst cxwnple is the event 
lree analysis of an "LI'O releasc" where the likelihoods of different outcomes oflhe evem 
lree are detennined in an uncertain dala envinmment. In the s/"'Cond example, two 
separate sulH:xwnplcs. i,e" "faulltrce of a runaway reaction and "cvent tree of an LPO 
release" are considered to describe tlk: utility of the dewloped approaches in casc of d,,/a 
and model uncertainties. llle third example discusses the application of the developed 
frnmework and approaches for bow-tie analysis of the UP Texas city accident. In the final 
examplc.updatingapproacheshavebcenusedinthebow-tieanalysisoflUloffshore oil & 
gas procl'SS facility. In these examples. the likelihood of occurrence has been estimated 
for the unwanted eVCllt. critical eVCIlI and outcome evenlS. and the importanl risk 
contributors have bt~n also dctennined. The anal)'sis of these results helps to perfonn a 
5Y5tematic QRA in uncertain and dynamic condilions. and to meaSure lhe risk and likely 
losses associated witb an unwllntedoccUJTence for induslrial process facilit ie~ 
K~y",onh : Quantitative risk llIlalysis (QRA). uncertainty, interuepeoocrlCe, 
likelihoods. fault II'tt analysis (ITA). event tl'tt lUlal)'sis (ETA). fw.zy set. evidence 
thoory, Bow-tic. and updating 
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1.1 K;. k ~ nal}'.;" ofindu. tria l facili ly 
,\nindustrial process fa.:il ity comprises a numbocrofintcmctingelementslermcd usub-
systems, smallest·subsystems and components thai in unison assiS! the syslem to perfonn 
its main pu~. A sample flow diagram of a diesel hydro-I .... ater flare system is pr<,wided 
in Figure 1. 1 {hal demonstrales lhe interaC\;()(I between the different clements in a typica l 
indumial facili ty. Depeooing on the type of services. the facili{y (system)ca" bea 
nuclear plant. oi l & gas facil ity, chemica l plant, aemspace iooUSII")'. manufacluring 
fac il ilY or OIher industrial facility. Among lhese. the "ulnerabil it iesofnuclear, oil & gas 
and chemical p lants can be significantly higher since during the perioo of <If'Cmtion,lhese 
plants usually deal with ala'Xc iO\'entol")' of hazardous materials such as mdioac!i"e. 
flammable hydrocarbon, toxic and fugili.'e chemical compounds (em,,1 and L.ouvar, 
2002). Mon.",,,,,r .. most of Ihe lime , lhe process area of these industries is highly 
congested duc 10 complex pip ing systems, reaclon. and other SubsySlcms. ioc ludinghigh 
and low·pressure compression .. separation, slOrage, blending, and mixing units .. and 
neccssal")'componcntssuch as 1.2,J·way vah'~, rel iefvalvcs .. flang~,gaugCs.s<:nSOfS. 
and soon. "These openUing conditi()(ls can be highly vu lncrable. and an OCcurrctlCC ofa 
si ngle e.-ent such as fugitive emissions, toxic relcases .. or a vah'c ieakage m ayesealate 
diffcrenl ad\"crse ronsequcnces and entail m.Jjor losscs 10 the facility (Modarrcs, 20(6) 
T1It:cooS.,qucnccsofo;uchoo;currencuarcoflensevcrcandcxceedinglydamagingand 
destructive to people. environment. economy and nonnal operatin~ condition of the 
facility. 
t' igure 1.1: I'rocessflowdiagramofatypical industrial facility 
Col loquially any unwanted orunooircd oo;cum:nce in the facility is tenned as an 
iocident.IIa>.ardsgenerallyrcfcrlOtOOsecvcnlsthathavethc.potentialtocausean 
incident Or accidcnt. An occident is a resulting outcome of an occurrencc of a sin~lc 
incident or multip le incidents or .,·cnIS. Risk analysis is widely recognized as a 
systematic process to mooel th\: probable accident scenarios for the indumial faci lit yond 
quantify the losses and conseque""es in a mcasurcmentofrisk (Daneshkhah.2004). It 
has now become a common tenn which has various implicalions and is usually defined as 
a combination of!hc: likdihoodofoccurn:occ of an unl"an!wcI'cn! (acciden!)and its 
consequellCC$.Altemati,·ely,itcanal§Obc:def,ned ... i!h!hc:follo ... ingcxplarnO1ion. 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981)dcfinc Mrisk asa 5<'tofscenarios(occurn:nccs),c achof 
.... hichhasaprobability(likclihood)andconsequcoccsM • 
Kumnmotoand IIcnley(I996) dcfioc"risk as col lcctions of likelihoods and likely 
AlChE (2000)de!ines"risk as acombina!ion ofprobabilityofthc: occurn:occ and 
Cro .... 1 and lAl,,,,ar (2002)def,,,,, "risk as a probabilityofa haurd resul!ing in an 
A)'yub (2003) dcfines"ri,k asa characteristic of an unCCT1ain future and is ncither a 
characteristic oflhe presen! nor past. It results from a hazardouscvent or 5<'qucnce of 
h .... ,ardousc.-ents refcrn:d !o as causes and ifil occur.;, results in different ad,'crsc 
consequence." 
Bedford and Cook (2001) define "risk .... ilh 1 ... '0 panicular elements: hazard (a 
SOurce of danger) and ullcenointy(qWln!ilkd by probabili!y). 
Risk involycd ina potential accidcnt or inci<knl iscvalua!ed based on sys!e malic 
analysis which usually comprises a numbcrofs!eps including a dctaile<l qWllitatiH and 
quami!ati.,c eva lWllion (Modarrcs, 2006; Marko .... ski el ,,/ .. 2009). A detailed ri,k 
anal)'.i. is al .... ays dc.igncd 1o an ..... erlh"'" fundamental qucSlionsabou! a noccurn:nccin 
a facilily: (I) .... ha! can happcnand ... h),?(2) ... halarelhe likeliilood.1. and (J) .... ha !Sl"e 
Ihc: consequences? (MO<tarr.,s. 20(6). Four majorSlcps, namely: hazard identif,ca!ions, 
conSC<;Jucnce a!;Stssmenl. likclillood assessmenls and risk cMraclcrizalion have 10 be: 
conducltd in a comJll1:hcnsivc risir. anal)'sis illordcr 10 gel the anSw.r.; 10 lhese queslions 
(Fcrdous.2006).Figurel.2pro,·ilkslhelogicalconncclionbeIWttnthelSC'stepsforarisk 
analysis. In risk analysis. the firsc slcp.hazard idcnlification. idcnlifics thepotenlial 
evenlS or llazards tMt cause: an occident or incident to happen. The second slep. 
consequence assessment. defines lhe possib le outcomes along with the meawremenl of 
dcgreeofnegatin effecISOOse,,·td due 10 such outC{)lt1es. Tl>e third SlCp. likclillood 
assessment. provides an asseSllmenl of CXpe<:ltd frequency (rale of O<;CUITCIICC) or 
probability (chance ofocculTCnce) of occurrence of an occidenl as well as DUICon'" 
events. The firml step. risk characlerization evaluates the risk associatcdwit hanoccidem 
asa fUlICtion of its ConsequellCC and probabilily (or frequellCY) ofocculTC"",es. and 
prioritizcslhemajor50urccsofrisk. 
Flll ure l .2:S1cpsinrisir.analysis(Fcrdous.2006) 
O>apterl:lnII'OdocIIonaodoverview 
1.2 Signir",ance of risk ~ n a ly. i. 
An industrial facility can ne,'cr be: completely safe, and cannot be totally risk fltt. 
However. an appropriate risk analysis improves tht dcgrce ofinrn:rcnt safe tyand cnSun:s 
the maintenance of a risk level that is (l;' low <IS reaso"ably {Jruclimbie (ALAR!'). A 
study ofHS£(I9%) and Mansfield et ai.(I996) revealed that al"QUnd 80"/0 of industrial 
accidents stan from major or minor incidents during a [">I"OI:ess operation. T1Iepotential 
sourceoftht",incidentg includes risc:r or proces< leaks. fire. explosion. pipelin erupture. 
ycsscl rupture. chemical relea""ordesign faults ofa facility {I'ula. 2005 • Fcnlous2(06) 
Rapid industrialianioncan be a thre.t for increasing these sources ofris kyincidcntsand 
moreovcr. their inadequate control also increases the probability of OCCurrence of 
industrial accidents. Thcscarc reflected ina few industrial accident cxamplcs that have 
occurred in the last few decades. such as the Flixborough. England accidcnt. which COSI 
the livesof28 pcopic,thcwhole planl and many injurics;and the Bhopal In diaaccidcnl. 
which killed more than 2000 civilians and injured o"~r 20.000 (Crowl and L""var, 2002) 
A massivccxplosion inl'asadcna. TcxasonOcI. 23.1989. resulted in 23 fatalities. 314 
injuries, and capital loss ofo"er S71S million (Lees, 1996). On March 23. 2005, the 
Isomerization unit explosions of Uritish Petroleum, Texas City, killed 15 poople and 
injured over 170 persons (Ill'. 2005: Mogforn. 2005. CSU. 2007). In a recent acci dent. on 
August 10.2008. heavy explosions at the Sunrise propane storage facility, Toronto, 
causc:d2 peoples' dCalh.and 1000 people were cvacuated (CIlC.2008). T1Ie in"esligation 
tcam ofUP's Texas city explosion has revealed that the inappropriate le,'el indicator 
design of the Raflinate Splitter was one of the main contributors to this acddent 
CNpterl:lntroductiooandoYerview 
(Mogford. 2005.CSI1. 20tH). Similarly. the hi.toryofall pn:v;ous iodustrialaccidcnts 
clearly identifies that mostof1hescaccidcntsoccum:d ducto improper idcnt ilicationof 
risk conlributors and correlalions of these eoot,ibutors with an accident. However. the: 
calostrophie aceidcnts mentioned abo,'e rarely happen in an industrial facilily, bul minor 
incidcnlscommonlyoccuronadaytodayhasisandn:su l linmanyOCCU~lionalinjuries 
and illnesscs. and cost billions ofdollarse"ery year_An efl'e<.:live risk an alysis and safely 
management .u:alegy can easily n:SlriCI and miligalC Ihc occurrence of these types of 
aecidcntsforinduSlrialfocilities 
Peopielodayarevcrya ... -areofinduslri.1 risks •• od Ihere is prcssun: 10 de"cl opa 
systemalic melhodology for eSlima1ing financial and en"ironmemal risks. The uhimnte 
goal of any risk management plan is 10 conlrol risk as well as to prcvcntthe major Or 
minor ineidem. that occur in process fadl ities on a daily basis. In 2000. the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE. 2000)de"eloped guidclincs f orquanlitati"crisk 
analysis strntcgy for the chemical proccss industry. Now all developed counlries follow 
specilic guidelines for indumial safety to maintain risk below a desirabl e level (such as 
ALARP). Cro .... 1 and Louva, (2002) mentioned thaI mon: than 50 feilersl "'gulalion. of 
dc\"cJoped coumries are di",ctly n:laled 10 process safely. A few safety management 
organizalions such as lhe Occupational Safe'!), nod lIealth Administralion(OSHA).lhe 
Process Safety Management (PSM), the Environmcm.II'roteetion Agency (EPA) and the 
Risk Management Program (RMP) have generally worked to inlroduce the mitigatioo of 
industrial risk into lhe SIL (Safety Integrity L~"eI) Or LOI'A (Uiyer of I'roteetion 
Analysis) for federal or sUllc regulatiOflS (Ferduus, 2(06) 
I.J Riskanalysis mclhodology 
Risk analysis can be qualitat i,'c and quantitative. It estimates and pm:IiclS!ile risk 
3Ssociatodwithu"wantedevems.measuressocic!al risk. individua l r isk. po("ntial los. of 
life. probab il ity of an accident. and re liabil i!y of. system. Quali!.ltive evaluation is 
usually perfonnedatea,h s!.lgcofsys!cmdcveiopment !O identify the p<lSsible hazards 
with relevant causes. Most of the traditional qualitati,'" evaluation methods. c.g. HAZOP 
(Hazard and Operabil ity Study). Functional Hazard Analysis. Safety Review. Chediisl 
Analysis. Rdative Ranking. -What-ir' Analysis. Preliminary HIl1.ard Analysis (PHA). 
and Fa ilure Modes and Effects Analysis. are descriptive and generally used for 
identifying possib le system haz.ards (Wang. 2004; Modarres. 2(06). Nonnally tilese 
m.,thoosa", used in preparation forconSctjucrn:canal)'sis or fai lure frequern:yanalysis 
modeling of the risk analysis process. and also when a more detai led study is not required 
(Hauptmanns. 1988; Lees. t996. 2(05). Afier identifying lhe possiblc hazar<l scenarios of 
a system. tile principal task of risk analysis is 10 dctennillC the logical causes and 
eons.:q""rn:esforthe idcnliffed halllrd scenarios and to evaluate the risk i naquantitative 
manncr for the unwantede"ents 
Quanti!.ltive risk analysis (QRA) for a proccss system can e ithcr be dctcnnini slicor 
probabilistic (Wang. 2004. Ferdous 2006. 2(09).11>e detennini,!ic metOOds focus on 
consequence asscssment (such as "'"OfsHase scenario analysis). while the probabilistic 
approaches considcr both frequcncyand cOllscquence. The probabilistic approach of 
QRA c"aloates risk for an industrial f""il ity in tenns of its numeric~1 evaluation of 
conscquenccsand frequcncicsofan accidcnt or an incidcnt. Probabilistic dala and 
infonnatioo about the possible hazard sccNltios of an accident are the main required 
panlmeter!l of probabilistic QRA. The final QUtc"'"" ofQRA isa nu~rical evaluation of 
them'el3l1 facility in tenns of calculating the probability ofoccum:nccs ofpo1cntial 
huardsand theircontrit>utions towards risk 
A variety oftechniQucs inc luding Faull Tr« Analysis. (HAj. E"enl Tree Analysis 
(ETA). Cause-Consequcnce Analysis (CCAj. l luman Reliability Analys;s (IlRAjand the 
lateslte<:hniquc. "Bow-lic"analysis havel:>ttn u~ in QRA 10 perfonn riskanalys;. 
(CCI'S. 1992; Lees. 1996. Badreddin-e and Amar. 2010). This lhesi s focuses on 
;mprove~nlsinlheevaluationstnlt.&yoffaultt"",.e,·enltrecandbow_liediagramsfor 
quanlilllt;'·c lrealment of risk anal)·si •. Brief m·en-;e".,. of FTA. ETA and bo,,·ti<: 
analysis are fH"t"scnlcd in different seclions and chapters ofthi. thesis. Some funda~ntals 
aboul FTA ETA and bo""lie anal)'sis Ic<:hniqucs ha,'c mn described ;n the following 
scclions.TlM:cnlu3Iionandanalysi.SlnltcgyoftheSClechniqoxsisdiscusscdin 
Chaptcr2. 
1.4 FTA. ":TA and Bow_lie u al)"," 
FfA. ETA and bow_tie analysis at" diagrammatic mdhods and ."tcnsi,·ely used for 
investisatinS tilt polential risk of events. cspecially where proccss SIIfety and risk 
management is a major concern (J.: umamolo and Henley. 1996; CM!>"!". 1999; Crowl and 
Louvar.2000: Ltts. 2005: Modam:s.2006: Badreddincand Amar. 201Oj. An event tree 
construction stans with an unwanted CHnt. SUl:h as an initiating event. and .... "Or"ks 
forwardstoi\Sconsequcnccs;whe",asafaulttrttstansw;thanunwantcdcvcnt(top-
event) and worl<s backwards to its causes (llaasi. 1965: Vcsely el IIi .. 1981: . laup1manns. 
1980. 1988; AICh£ 2000; Andrew. and Ounneu 2000). In lhe bow-lie diagram. lhe 
inilialing evenland un'-',anlwncnl are lied 10 a singlc common event. and thecauscs and 
conSC<Juence5 of such an e,'cnt are pre""nlcd onlhe lef'tand right sides oflhe diagrnm 
(Cockskoti. 2005; Che"reau fl (II .. 2006; Duijm. 2009: Markowski "I (II .. 2009; 
Badreddine and Amor. 2010). The quantitative evaluation of ETA estimatcs the 
likelihood (f"",UCncyOf probabilityofoccumnce)ofpossibleoutc""",s for the initiatin 10 
event. On lhe other hand. ITA quantitatively J1lCasures the lihlihood (probability of 
OCCUITt:occ) of the unwantcd cvcnt. a. well Il'i the contribution ofdiffe",nt cau ""S10 lhal 
event. Like FT A and ETA. bow-tie analysis estimates the likelihood of o<:cum:occ of 
outcome events in an inlegratw way with lhe de"clopmcnl of a logical relationship 
among the cau"". and consequences of an occum:rn;e in the industrial facility 
(Markowski e/ ", .. 2009; Uadreddine and Amor. 2010), In QRA. the following basic 
lcnnioologies are used \0 perform ~~rA.I:."'A and bow.tie analysis in the risk evaluation 
I.U lIas ictermino logy 
Initia tin g c>'c nt: Any unwanted. unexpected or undesired ennt (e.g .. 
e<Jui~nt failure. human error or a proI:css upset. toxic or flammable release) rerns \0 
theinili.tingcventfortheeventtrtt. 
[ >'cnts: The eventS followinl> the initiating ncnt are termed as precursor evenu. or 
somclimestcrmcd only as the ncnts for the e>'crlt tn:e (e.g .• ignition.cxplosion. relcasc 
drifling) 
OlapterI: IntnxllJl1lonandoYer\llew 
OUtC<:l meeHnlS: Thepossiblceffc<:\s.,sccnariosoroulcomcsofan inilialingcvc nl.are 
klKlwn as oulcome c>'cnts (e.g .. fireball. vapourdoud. explosions) 
TOfH"'eot: The unwanted event that is placed al the top in a fault tn:e. and funher 
analy>:ed to findlhe basic causes. is known as the top-event 
Ilasic~'-cnl : The basic causcs Ihat are nol furtherdevcloped or defined are klKlwn as 
basic'e,'cnls (e.g .• equipment orcompooncnls failure. human failure, external e>'ent). It 
represcntsthebasiccauscsforlhefaulttn:e 
Inlern, ed iale f:n nU: Anc,'cnt in the fault trtt thaI can be funherdcvcl opcdbybasic-
C ritical c\'C nt~: The initiating and unwanted e>'ent is commonly tenned as a crilical 
event in thc how_tie analysis 
Input \'\'1'0 ": ilow'lie analysis uscs a common lenn "input events" 10 describe lhe 
causes and consequences fora critical e>'ent 
For simplicity. instead of using basic-e"ent and event for FTA and ETA. 
reSpeclively. he",-,eforth in Ihe lexllhe common lenn "evenl" is used. unless slated 
1.4.2 Clu llcnges In FlA, r,TA and Ilow_tie anal),,;, 
ETA uscs Ihe combinalion ofC\'ents and their probability 10 eval..ate fre'l'-ICncy or 
probabilit)' of occurre"",e of possible outcome events following Ihe inilialing event, 
whereas FTA uses Ihe sequence and Ihe probability of bask-evenlS 10 estimate 
probabilily ofa top-evem. In hoW-IiI' anal),.i", Ihe probability ofcom:sponding inpul 
events in thc fault tree andcvenl tree part are crnployed to detennine the probabilil)' 0 f 
thecriticale"~ntandoutcomee"cnts.aswellaslheconlrib\ltionofiopuleventsleading 
Common lechniques in ORA oftcn mak~ lwo major assumplions in order 10 
simplify lhe ri,k ~,'alu"tion 'trategy of lhe industrial facility. First. the probability t>f 
occurrence for the basic_eve'tts. events or input e"cnts is assumed 10 be crisp and 
precisely kN)wn (Vese ly <""t .. 1981;CMPT. 1999: Sadiq cl"t .. 2008). Sccorldly. the 
interdependencies among all kinds of input c,'cntS in FlA. ETA or bow-tie are 
independent (CMPT. 1999: Lee. 2005. Moda"" ... 2006: Sadiq~' "I .. 2008). In p<UClicc. 
becau-<eofvarianl failure modes. design faulls. poor understanding offailurl: 
mechanisms. as well as the vagueness of system phenomena. il is often dimcult. if nOt 
impossible. to acquire precisc probability data forlhe industrial co mponcnls(Sawycrand 
Rao. 1994: Lin and Wang.I997: Wu. 2004: Yuhu. and DaLao. 2005). Somelimes il is N)t 
even easy to accumulate the data nl all for every component. Further. particularly for an 
industriai process facility. ilisnotnccessarilytfUClhallherclalionsi1ipsamongt hccvcnls 
.reindependent(Fersonelu/ .. 2004;Sadiqela/,,2008). 
ThC5c<Jpeoflhc prescntr<:scar<:h involves resolving the nbove mentioned chnllenges 10 
carryouta rcliablc OM. It indudcs: 
Rcla.~ing Ihe assumplions rdated 10 Ihe assignn1<:nl of crisp likelihood and 
rela\ionskipsindiITcrenll<:ckniqucsofQRA,TlIefirstassumplionisrela\edto 
the dara uncenainty. while the second a5'illmplion i5 related 10 the deperukncy 
," model uncertainly, TlIcse assumptions limil lhe applicalioo of ORA 10 on ly 
Chapter I: IntnlductIon and overview 
lwo specific condilion~: firstly. when 'enough' data about a ,omponen\'s 
failureore~en"sOl:currem:cal1:available.andsecondly.whenlhesubsyslems 
andcomponenlSaclindependenllyinanindustrialsyslem. 
Rdaxing lhelraditional assumplions in lhe bow-tie analysis. u.ow-tie a nalysis 
inherits the assumptions of FTA and ETA. These include the e~ent's 
independence and d<,/{j unccnainty. 
iii. Introducing the dynami, asp«! in QRA, The traditional QRA ~ilher using 
bow_tie or FfA and ETA is unable 10 updale lhe risk "ilh lime as new 
evi<kn~orinformalionbecomc:sa"ailablc 
IV. Introducing fuay and evidence Ihw<y based formulations to handle 
un<:enainties in QRA. The traditional QRA is onen challen¥ed "ith subj«tive 
and incomplete information.leadingtonn unreliable risk estimate. FUlZyset 
lheory helps to o~ercome subje<:tive uncenainty in the information. whereas 
nidcnce theory helps to O~ercome incompleteness in the information. Thus. 
useoflheseformulationscnhan<:eso\'erall reliabilityofthe risk cSlimatc. 
The o\'e",11 obje<:li~e of the research is twofold: first. 10 address different kinds of 
uncenainlies in quantilative risk analysis. and second. to condu,t dy ... mic risk analysis. 
In order 10 achieve this. this research c~plorc:s the methodologies and approaches for 
d wacteri'.ation ofunccnainlieS.making useofcxpcn koowledgefor lhe missingdala. 
andin<:orporatingthedynamieasp«1 
More~recifically,lhe:rc!>Can:hhaSlhe:foliowingobjecti"es 
[l[ 10 do,-dop a quantitati,e f","",wor!< for addressing the: ~ncettllinly issues in 
FTA and lolA. 'mi. inch"ks' 
Ik,'dop"",nl of a fuzzy-based approach and evidonce lhrory-bosed 
approach to deal with thed"wuncel1ainty. 
deHlopmentofempirical equations to define interdc:pcndcnlrclalionship5 
among the evenlS or bosic-evenlS durillg aroalysis in ordcr 10 a<ldress lhe: 
mo.klorl/e"""t/<'tlCyuncertainly. 
(2)10 develop a f",mewoll< for oow-lie analysi~. which includes 
de"elopment of. qualitative framewor!< for construcling a bo"-lie 
diagram lorcpresenl stlUCturallinkagesamongcau!>Csandconsequences 
of an occurrence. 
dovelopment of a quantitative framewort: for analYling the: bow-tie ullder 
deve{opmt"nlofa systematic !>Cllsitivity analysis approach to predict alld 
;dentifythemost important inpule"enlsasriskconlriootors. 
(3) to develop BII up<!ating infc"'r>ee for ",v;s;ngalld improving ear!ier nnalysis 
with 1lc:1Icr confidence by ir>eorporaling new induslrial data or infonnalion 
into the analysis. 
[4) to domonslrnle lhe ~Iility of the: de,'eI"""d approache:s and met!>odolOjties in 
illdu~lrialawlicationthroullhiliustrativeexamplesorca!>Cstudies. 
OI;lpter1: !ntrodllCtlonaodOYer\'leW 
f'rotot)'lJe cOOlflUler codes are programmed in the Excel and MA TLAB 
environment to demonstrate the applicabilit}, of the developed approachc. using 
illustrative examples. An electronic "pper>di~ with all de,'eloped ,imulati (ln code. and 
analysisre,ult' is added at the end of this thesis. The ultimate goal of this rcscarch is to 
de"elop a standard ORA tool through a compute r paclagc 3nd to guide decision makers 
tow.,d morc fom,"1 and more robust analy,i, to prevent mioor incident. and major 
accidents. and n:duce risk inan industrial facility 
A manuscriptbascd thesis has bot:cn written to describe the entire work oflhe dc.'eloped 
research. hcombincs four manuscripts in four di/fcrcnt chapters (i.e" Chapters). 4. 5 
and 6) following the thesis writing guideline. appro,'ed by Memorial Uni.'ersit)' of 
Ncwf(lundland. 'The logical c(lnnections betw"",nthe four chapters are provided. a.the 
lim two manuscript., puhli.hed in lwo diIT""'nt journals. individually assist 10 achie,'e 
lhe first obje<:ti.'e of the thesis: and the lasllWo manuscripts .• uhminoo 10 lWO different 
journals.scpanltciyhclploachic,'ethcsecondaodthiruobjecti,'csofthcIhe.is.The ca", 
sludies<iescrihcd in each manuscripl individually ass i,tt(la<:hicvc the fourth obje<:l i.·c of 
the thcsi •. The (lrganizati(lnal structure of the entire thesi. i •• ho wn in Figure I.Jandthe 
(l'·crvicw (lfdiffcrcnt chapters is discussed hereafier: 
Cha l)l~r I introduces a broad ovcr.'iew of risk analy.is. ils methodol(lgies. their 
signil1cance and the current pra~tices. Basic definitions and assumptions for trdd itional 
te<:hniques of ORA are also discus",d, Finally. the current challenges in ORA are 
discus",dand the ",,,,an:h obje<:tives are laid out. 
Ch!!pterl:lrtrodudlooandOYe'Vlew 
"iRu~ I J:~iSO<lani>:al;on 
Chapter 2 pro~id(s adis..:ussion ofunctrtain!y n:la!N issuc:s in !hecon!(x! of!hc 
techniques used in QRA. espe<:ially FTA. ETA and bow"tic analysis. Tl>c n:ccllllitenl1un: 
n:~ie",'soo available !e<:hni<]ucsand mc!liods an: alsodiscu,sed. 
O\aeter I: Introduction and overview 
Ch~ I'ler J, ChMl'lU 4, ChMl'ler 5 and Chapter 6 comprise four diffen:nt n:sean:h 
pap.:!'S which individually explon: (he frameW(Jn;s. methodologies. and approaches to 
handle uncertainty. and integrllle lhed)namic a5p.:C1S in FTA. ETA and OOw·tie analysis 
Two of these pap.:rs. have already be<.:n published and others ha,'c be<.:n submil1l'<l for 
~blicationinintemational joumals. 
Re,,.,urcirp«po:r/ 
Handling data uncertainties in e,'cnt tree anal)'sis (2009). Pro<.:ess Safely alld 
EnviroomentProtl'<:1ion.S7(S):pp.283- 292 
Re...,,,rchpup'·rl 
Fault and Event Tn:e analyses for process systems risk analysis: uncertainly 
handling fomlUlalions (2011), Risk analysis: an international journal. 31(1) 
1'1'.86·107. 
Analy>:ing systemsafcty and risk5 under uncertainty using a oow-tiediagram :an 
in"'lvativcapproach. Pror.:cssSafetyand Environm.:nt Pl'Olcction(submincd fora 
joumal publication. Novcmber. 2010) 
Handlin~andurdatingunccrtaininformalioninoow-{ieanalysis , Joumalof Loss 
Pre,'cntioninthePror.:esslndustrics(acecpled) 




ofdiffen:m Sleps in~ol,'ed in traditional FTA. ETA and bow-tie anal)";' in ",llUioo to 
porfonning QRA for an industrial f""ilily. The second section discusses the type. of 
unccnainty inmlvcd al var;"". stages ofQKA using ~TA. ",A and bo"'I;e analysis. 
VariQtlsfonnulationsto handle unccrtaintyare Blsodcscribed. Finally pros and conS of 
diff~"'ntu""enaintyformulationsan:reviewed 
FTA. ETA and oo",·I;e analysis Ill ... " been extens;,-cly use<! ... imponanl technique. of 
QRA for developing graphical relationships of difTerem causes. conse,!""""es and 
unwanted events that may lead 10 accidents in thc industrial facility (AIChE. 2000; 
Ferdous 2006. Kalantamia. 2(09). These IeChniqu". help 10 millimile risl; assodaled 
"';Ih thcscllCcidents. Fault lrcc and eVent trtt develop graphical modelsofcauS.llli OIl and 
consequences for the unwanlW eventS (AlehE. 2000: Moda=s. 20(6). wh~",u the bow> 
tieannlysisgocsonestepfunhcranddevdopsan inlcgraledlogicalslruclurcfrom causc:s 
10 consequer.:cs (Cochholl. 2005; Markowski t/ul .• 20(9). Tllc Fundamcnlalslode>'eiop 
and perfQf1ll tllese techniques f()l" indu~trial fociliti~s are di:;cu~ in tile follo ... ing 
sections. 
2.2.1 FTAlechnique 
Haasl el ,,/, (1965) pl"<lp<JSed tile FTA tec~nique and applied it (0 a ... ide variely of 
problems including industrial safcty and reliability assessmcn1. Since tllen th cappliea(iQrl 
of ITA has prolifcrated in CVtry sector. especially ",lIere safcty and risk analysis o f 
process systems an: majorcon<:ems. FTA technique: comprises tile following steps: 
1. Fuulllr~e tkwlopm<!nI: A f.ult tree builds graphical relationships among the c,'cnts 
and all ullmllllede"ent using logic gates.'-lie unwamed event. termed a ·1Op-evem·. 
is placed at tile ape~ of llie tree. Toxic chemical or flammable ilKS release. fire. 
c~plosion. component rupture and ma lfunction are a fe ..... e~amples of a top-c,·en1. 
Ikginninll "ith the top-c,·cnt. the events and tile intenTIcdiate c,'ents are 
hicran:hically pla.ccdat dilTcn:nt k"ds until tile required level ofdctail is rea.chW. 
The intcntCliQrls betwccn tile top-cvent and the 0111e1 e"cnts {e.g., l:Iasio;;-e'·cnlS. 
intermediate (vcnts) are usually e.~pressed using tile ~AND" Of "OR" gate (Vcselcy 
d. ,,/ .. 1981). The evcntsan: ploced at the boItom of the tree. andlhe intemlediate 
c,'cnts. "'hich Can be ful1l1er dcvclo-ped using the combinations ofe,'cnts Of gBle 
C"tnts. are pla.cw ;n belwccn, A s;mplined fault tl'« diagram of a re.Clor shut down 
system is shown ill Figure2.1 (AIChE,2000). 
Figun:2. I:Faultlreediagramofareaclors"uldownsystem 
2 Qua/italj,-e I:WIIUlIIU",: This i<knlifin failure modes and "ta~eSI lin~s in a fault tree. 
T .. " failu", mode refers to tlte minimal cutsets (MeSs) .... "ic" a", a combination of 
OOsicc\lenls(BE).ands"o"·SlheshorieSI palh .... -aylhal leads 10 lite 101''''' witt. Top-
down aPr""",,h and bouom·up approach are two simplified algorithms gencrally 
prefem:d 10 <!clem,inc the MCSs for • simple fault tree (Hauplmanns, 1988; 
Kumamoto and Henley. 1996; B",ford and Cook. 2001). The MCSs using the top-
do ... n algorithm for the fault tree diagram are shown in Table 2.1 
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3. Quantitalive evaluatioo: 0wntillllll'e 1"'(111«111",.: Tnoditiooally. crisp probability 
,-alues are used to <Iete""ioe the probahility of the tOCK"eol basW OfIlhe stroctu~ of 
the fault lree from boUom 10 to!H'vent (Lawely. 1980: AIChE. 2(00). Equations 2.1 
and 2.2 an: used to evaluate the "OR" and "AND~ gate Dpenoti(}lls. n:spttti'·ely. For 
lhefnulttn:esho","ioFigun:2.I.theto!H"-ent prubabilily(P~)isestimatwlobe 
0.191. 10 lKIdiliOfl. the quao\i\.ative evalualioo also helps to nonk MCSs for a fau Illtee 
(Vesdey 1'1 al" 1981. 
l'm - I- D (I-I'/lf~ ) (2.1) 
(2.2) 
1.1.1 ETA'''''hnique 
f'rous.<!; syscems in nudur and chem;"'al industries Usc ETA to evaluate the dfe<:liveness 
ofillslalled pruteclivesysccmsand toooe""ill<: the possibi<;,efTe<:ls ill cascof f.il un: 
(Ramzao <:1 al .. 2007). RausmussclI (1 975).nd Arendt ( 1986) usW ETA in pre·incidclll 
20 
andpost- incidcntapplicationsforihep!'Ol:ess faci lity. The follo"'ingstcps are usually 
usrotopcrformETAinprocesssysteons' 
I t.\-en/ lree U;>w/op"ww: Cuntrary to the fault tree. event tree construction starts with 
the initiating e,-cnt and proceeds unt il it reaches the fina i consequences. I! is simpicr 
than the fauittree. sil1(c inSICadofusins logic gates. the initiating e'cntuses 
dicootomy (I'rinciple of Exduded MidJlc) i,e .• successlfailure.trudfalseoryeslno. 
10 propagate thee"ents' conscqucnces in differcnt bninchesofthe tree (AIChE. 2 000; 
Lee •. 2005). An example of an event tree diagram for a flammable gas release is 
soown in Figure 2_2 
2. QU{I/iUII;l-e 6'''/1<(11;'''1: The indi"idual paths that are followed by the different 
branches identifythc possible outcome events fora particular ini tiatingevenl, Fortht 
initiatinge,'ent, Ihc qualilali"e c"aluation categorizes the credible con$Cquence as a 
prccursore,'cn1 at differenl bninch points and Ihepossib iccffcc1asnnoutcom eevenl 
al the end point ufthe evcn1 tree. This evaluation hclpslO reoosni2. theadJi1ionai 
safety sySlems requircmcnt fora process f3Cilily to achieve lower. targe1 00 likelihood 
of occurrence of an unto,,'aroevent. Thcqualilali,·. analysis fQr the flammablesas 
relcasc event tree is summari200 in Table 2.2. 
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T~h le 2.2: Q~alitati"e analysis of flammable gas release event tree 
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3. Qulln/ila/i'" e'"lIlua/inn: Quantitati"e e"aluation e:;timates the f...,,,uency of an 
ootcoone e,'cnl and ranh Ihe conse"uence se"erilyofooIComc: events for an eVen t 
1m:. Like Ihe ITA. 1M dcunninislic approach in !:"A also uses crisp dlna for Ihe 
event. probability (pm:ursor events) to calculate the f...,,,uency ofoutcomc events 
using Equalion 2.J. Based On probabililiesassigned in Figure 2.2. Ihc fm:jucncy of 
oulcomc evcnlS iscalculalcd (fablc 2.3). 
(2.3) 
T~hlf' 2.3: Outcome e"cnts' fm:jucncy ofnammable gas release e,'cnl tree 
I' ... qw~n<y 
Explosi(H'l 
1Jo"'-fie MnMly.i. 'e<:hnique 
Since lhe early nineties. bow-tic analysis has becO<ne a "'ell accepted Ie<:hni"uc. 
especial ly when the Royal DutchiShell Group de,'ck>ped it for the PiperAlphadisastcr 
(RI'S. 2(09). Cu""ntly. thi s technique has i)ttn used asa constructi,'c risk management 
tool in many industrial facilities (\}janous and FievcL. 2006: Duijm. 2009: UadrNdil\l: 
and Amor. 2010). 1l\( inlcrest in usin~ lhe bow-lie concept is increasing daily since the 
un""anlcd conseq .... ncn of an initiated accident can be picloriallyanaly>:ed fromlhe root 
causes of such an occurrence. A briefrevkw ofthe bo",··tk techniq .... is provided below. 
I. Bow-lie tk,·e/opmen/: The bow_tie diagram i~ de"doped for a critical event A 
complele scenario from basic reasons 10 probable OUtcOffiCS of the critical c,'cnt i. 
SUllclurro in IWO parts of lhe diagl1lm. The lell side of the diagram repre""nlS bllSic 
causcsofoccum:nce whereas the right side repre""nts the possiblecon""ll>ences. A 





2. £m/um;on: A Fault tree model i. used to analyze the len part of the bo ... ·li( diagram. 
which ba~ically dcscribcsthe various paraliclar>d ""IlICntial combination. of fault •• 
f.ilure~ and CrTOfS (cau"",) resulting in the occum:nce of a crilical (top) event. In 
order to represent the possible consequence~. Ihe event lree model is used to analyze 
the right part of the diagram (Mar1<owski fl 01 .• 2009: Badreddine and Amol. 2010) 
Once the bo ... ·tic has been constructed. the quantitative evalualion is subsc<:jl>ently 
carried out with the equations and operations used in F"TA and ETA. Assuming the 
iOOepcn.dern;e of basic causes. the MCSs based evaluation use~ Equations 2.4-2.6 to 




In the .bo~e equation~ NC is tke total number of MCS~ (C) and m i~ total number of 
oulcomec,-ems(OE)ofthebow.tie 
2.3 UncerfainfyinQKA 
2.3. 1 TytJ"S"rune<:r1ailltie:s 
FTA. ETA aOO Bow-tie nllalysis are imponant techniques used to pcrfQnn QRA. T1>e 
cred ibililyoflhesetechniqucsisexlremdyimporlanl.TI-ri.,),lraditionallyassumeallinput 
variables (e,g __ basic e'en!s, c~ents or input e~cnlS) are crisp Or detcnninislic aOO don'l 
consider inlerdepcOOer>eies among variables. The point estimate of risk can be quite 
consc",.tivc(precautionaryprinciple)(l lammoOOsetal., 1994). In practice, an industrial 
facility has a large numocr of components. sub-s)'s(cms. s)'stems and con!ro l mechanisms 
which may lead to UI>I'erlain(ies in the fl/'Cdic(ion of outcome cvents. aOO they are 
",~sentedasdifTerentende,'entsforthebow_tiediagram _ Si milarly.thclOp-c"cntor 
theeriticalcycnl inafaultlrcemayoccurduc(olargenurni:>ersofcombinatior>soffailure 
mooes and components involving two or It1OI'e even(S. Therefore. the likelihoods of 
occ~rrenCe of the critical e"ent or outcome event, may rnndomly change It\:conling to the 
behaviourofproce"component, or tne nature nfunwante<l e"cnts. Moreovc r.especially 
in the ear ly des ign stage of process systems. whenst"tisti,"1 data fnrthe events are not 
avai lable. the e~tJCrts' koowledge or c~l"'ri~nce is nften used alternati\'e ly. 
Uncertainty i. suchan una"nidableand ine\'ilabletenn in risk analy sisthatitollen 
challenges the credibility and utility nf nutput results from ORA (Abrnh.amsson. 2002). 
Withoutanappropriatedefinitionandclassificationof~ncertaintiesin,'ol;.e<Iin difTcrent 
stages ofQRA. the prnctical use of the nutput results in absol ute tenns becomes limited. 
Broadly. u""crtaimies are ctassif>e<I as two type~ aleMury (or stochastic) and epi,/cmic 
(nr knowledge-based) uncertainly (Apostolakis. 1990: Thacker el al,. 2003: Helton. 20M: 
Dancshkhah. 2004: Ayyub and Klir. 2006). The most important disti""tinn between these 
twn t)'pesof uncertninty i.that alealory uncertainty means the obje.:ti\'c Or stochastic 
uncertainty ,,-hieh may occur due to the naturnl variation or rnndomness or inherent 
variability nf thc system (Agarwal e/ ul .• 20M). Aleutory uncertainty is irreducible 
(AbrnhamSSQn. 2002), £pislemic uncertainty. on the other hand. refers to SUbjective or 
knowledge-based ullcertainty. that may arise due to incompleteness and imprecision 
(Ilaraldi and Zio. 2008). Epi.'I~mk un~crtainty can be red..ccd by co lle.:ting mOre data 
and kr\(lwlcd~c (Abrahamsson. 2002), Sinee the likelihoods and t~ interdependence 
alllO/lg the input e"ents are ollen mis~ing and depend On e~perts' judgments. both 
"Iedlory and epis/emic uncertainty can appear in the FTA. ETA and bow-tie analysis. 
2.3.2 Un~rt~ in ty·b>Ul'd rormu l a(io ns 
Characteri7.ation. rel}n'scntation. propagation. and interpretation are the key factors 10 
fonnulatc the uncertainty for ORA (Hammonds eI al .. 1994. Fcrtlous 2009). The 
uncertni nty fonnulation assists the risk analysis 10 rropagateamlanal yzetheuncertainty. 
and estimatcs the cffccl ufdata error inlhc final resuh (likcl ii1ood ofa critic aleventand 
oulpute,'cnts).Severalte<;hniqucsha"ebei:ndevelOlX'dlOfonnulatClhcunceruintyfor 
risk analysis. which are summarized in Table 2.4 (Wilcox ami Anub. 2003). Some of 
thesc.especiallyeviOcocell\t.'()ry.ha,'enol beenlesledmuchon FTA. ETA and bow-lic 
.na l >'sis(Fcrdous~laI..2009b. 201 1). Them.in focus of lhis siudy i!to ulilize fuzzysct 
theory.nd evidence lheory for addressing and handling the uncertainties in FlA. ETA 
and bow·tie analys is 
Mon te Carlo Simulation (MCS). based on rrobabil ily lheory has been used 
cxlensive lyincharnclcrizingthealwloryuncertaimic.(Sureshelal .• l996. Vose. 2008) 
Thislechniqucsom<;timcscxlcnd.l to "highcrordcr MCS" for addressing both tYlX'sof 
uflCcrtaintics in QRA (Baraldi and Zio. 2008). The ooter loop of "higher order MCS" 
~cncratcs random samples to address cpiMemic uncertainty. whereas the inner loop 
generates random samples to charactcri:te lJleatory uncertlJ;nly for the uncertain input 
parnmeters (Kaoe, a/ .. 2007). Besidcs probability tht,ory. fuzzy scts and cvidcoce theory 
have recently been used in many engineering applications. especially where expert 
k""wl~dge is I}n'ferred as an alternative to define the input parameters (Cheng. 2000; 
Sen1ZandFerson. 2002;Wilcoxar.dAyyub.2003;llaeela/ .. 2004;Agarwal~'lJ/ .. 2004; 









Unc~ rlai n ly u alYl is in QRA 
TH hnlqu .. 
Probabilitylhwry 
Evidoncetheo!y(randomselS) 
Fuzzy set lheo!y 
Ev;defo;;etheo!ylr.mdomSCIS) 
Info-gaptheo!y 
In a comprehensi,-e risk analysis. the (l1~mm'Y and f/';£I~mi~ unceruinty can he funher 
classified inlQ three more different sutKalcgories. "hich are inlroduced al different 
stages ofthc analysis (Mari<o,,-d:i n al .. 20(9). According to lhe sources and na lures of 
tile unccnainty. three sutK31cgorics include tima uncertllinty. mo<kl unccrtllinty Dnd 
'I",,/iryunccrtllimy (Abnihamssoo. 2002; Mari<owski ~I al" 20(9). Table 2.5 provides 
detailed dCSl:ripcions of tile .. three categories of unceruinly. Qualiry uI\Ccnainty is 
sometimes defined as rompl~lc""$$ urIC.nainly and is usually introduced due 10 lhe 
incompiclcandincomprel\ensivcevalualionofhalards.Tlled"wandmo<kluncenainlies 
are reSfl"Cti"ely k""wnas/",I"l"'lI'luandtkp"",/en<yunccnainly, "hichari,Seduc to 
insufficicnt or missing dala and cooside .... tion of invalid or unrealislicaSliump t;on5(e.g" 
independenl). A rttursi,·c cfTor1 is usually n:quirro "hen performing Ille HAZOP. 
IIAZID. and FMEi\ to redoc. 'IU/Jlity uncenainly;n risk analysis (Skdton. 19'97; AIChE. 
2000; Crowl and l..Qtlvar, 2002). At this stage. a poinl neWs 10 he durro; thaI the 
redoction or minimi'.ation ofqU(Jlity uncenainly for risk analysis is flOl an importanl 
concern for this Ihesis. [)ala and "">lId Ulltertllinty in FTA. ETA and flow.ti. allalysis 
are IWO majorconcems in Ihisslooy. Several fonnulalionsaoo Itchniqucs 10 deal wilb 
Ihcse Iypcs of ullCcrtain(ies ba<'c bttn dc<'clopcd so far. v.bich are discussed belo win(he 
followingsc<:(ions 
Table 2.3: Source ofunccnainlY in risk ana lysis 
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The fail ure and (he occurrcr.:e probabi!itiesof inpulc,'cnlS in FTA. ETA and OOw·li. 
analysis al"<' diflkult 10 measul"<' and accurocy in Ib(,irestimates is oflen questionable 
because 'enough' data are oflen hamtoacquil"<'. 1lle probabililyaoo fuzzy se(tbcor;es 
havebcen used in the last fewd«ades toover.:omc lhe situation efT«tively. Though the 
techniques are capable of addressing random or subjective u",-,ertainty in a limited 
comext. these are unable to handle the intcrdcpendcnt relationsnips. which may exist 10 
anyextent!xtweenthebasic-events.e,·cntsorinputc,·cnts 
1.4.1.1 Probuh#ifyl lwN}" 
Probability thcory is the most common t«hnique. To avoid the mathematical complexity 
in the ",13I)"lical methods of probabi lity theory. Monte Carlo $imulati{ll1 has I"l'ferably 
bcenusedlOoodressuncenaintiesduetorarxiomnessinthecstimatcsofinputparameters 
(e.g .• event. probability) (Hammonds ~I ,,/ .• 1994: Abrahamsson. 2002; Wilco~ and 
Ayyub.2003: Vose. 20(8). OrdinaryMCS u,,",s three basic steps: i)detine the prohabil ity 
density function (I'DI') for uncenain parameters. ii) generate the random sample from the 
selected PDF. and iii) usc lhe generated random sample in the model 10 produce the PDF 
for the outpul (Hammonds el ,,/., 1994;Vose, 20(8). In Figure 2.4. the uncertainly 
nnal)"Sisusing MCS is schematieally descrilxd 
Hauptmanns (1988) provided an MCS methodology for faull tree analy.is 
Kumamoto and lIenley ( 1996) also demonslrated a few examples ofunccnainty analy sis 
in FTA using MCS. Similarly. Sure,h fl ,,/. (1996) addressed the data u",-,cnainlies (event 
probabilily) and nnalYLed the fa ul t tree using MCS. Haraldi and Zio (2008) demonstrated 
lhc useofMCS in ETA. 
ptJfforurlCcrtainqlllmtiti~'S 
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."igure 2.4: UrlCertaimyan:Jly.i.u.ingMCS 
1.4.1.1 F~u.rserlhe"ry 
Zadeh (1965) first inlrod""cd Ihe COrlCcpt of fuzzy set, and ,irlCeihen lhousanilsof 
~pcrs and books ha ,'c been published to describe its application. Among them. Ross 
(1995.2004). and Ayyub and Klir(2006) espt'cialiy clabor~ted the discussion of fuzzy 
sel theory for engineering "!'Plications. Other works that include Kenarangui (1991): 
1I.ive".elal. (I999):Huang~l,d.(2001).andWilcoxandAY)'ub(2003)alsoanemptedlO 
exploit fuzzy set theofy in ETA. Thcy used fuzzy numbers to uprt'ss the event's 
probability and used the: e>:1<'nsion l'''incil'/~ 10 dclennillC' lhe f~quency of lhe outcome 
evenlS. Tanaka n al. (1933). Misra and Weber (1990). S;ngcr(I990). Sa",'crand Roo 
(1994). Suresh 1.'1 (II. (1996). and Wilco.~ and Ayyub (2003) used fuzzy set Iheory 10 
define the probability of eventS and an"IYLe lhe fa ult 1= usinl! fU7-ZY arithmetic 
operations. 
Cock~li (2005). Diaoous and FiCvCl (2006). and Duijm (2009) described Hnd 
dc\"eloped lhe probabiliS!ic model for bow-tic analysis. This model Iw:lp:slo miligaleand 
dcfineand miti~atethepathwaysofan a.ccidcntoccum:nce by evaluating the likelihoods 
in a crisp boundary. Marko",ski e/ "I. (2009) attempted 10 exploit fuuy logic for the 
bow-tic analysis. "hich is limited to only capluring subjecti\"e uncertainty .aoo unable to 
charoctcrize uncertainty due to inconsiS!cnt. incomplete and connicting data as well as 
the intcrocpendcnce of input e,'ents in QRAlechniques. Baderddinc and Amor(2010) 
proposed a probabilistic dynamic model for bow_tie anal)'sis 10 study the impact of 
diffcrenl inpulevcntsofbow-tic to limit thi: occum:nccof thi: top-event (so c allederiti,al 
event) and also 10 rroucethe se"erity of its conscquc:nccs in amon: rcalistic and d) 'namic 
Fuuysett~ryisablctoltddn:s/llheuncenaintieslhatarcinducedduelO 
subjccti"C and qualitative expertjudKJ1lt:nts. TIw: imprecision (vag""nc5S) in t heeSlimalc 
is expressed using a fuzzy number. which can have. triangular or trapezoidal 
ffiCmbership function. T1Ie fuuy "umbers arc used in fuay arilhmetic operations 10 
propagate uncert.ainticsand obtain the fuzzy number for an output .,'.nl. UncertainlY 
analysis using lhe fuzzy numbc:rs for an oUlpul nenl P_ foll'l"'inglheRisk - junclion 
( P, .P"P, ) issoown in Figure 2.5. 
Fuzzy numbc:rs for uncertain quanlilics 





Iksides probabilily liIeQry and fuzzy Klthtof)'.evidc"""c Ihcory has been used in risk 
analysis (GUlh. 1991; Liu ~I 0/ .. 2005; Ayyub .00 Klir. 20(6). Thc moIi,'alion for lhe 
dc,'clop""'nt of Ihis liIeQry wliS 10 CharnCICriu lhe u"""crtainly caused by par1ial 
0!apter2: Uter.ttun! review 
ignorance. knowledge deficicncy or incoosistcncy aboot a s)5tem provided by dilfcrcnl 
expens (Sadiq c/1I1 .. 2006: Wangt'l nl .• 2(06). Ullliketraditional probabililyllleory. 
evidcncetlleoryconsi!lcrsthc.ubjecli,'epl'Obabi!itiesassigroWbyanexpcnasevidence 
andallocatcsthcm tothccotrespondingsubselSofapowerset.'fhcunas.igncdmllsdue 
to unknown information is assigned asa mass for ignorance subset (1L1 opposed to the 
Baycsian approach tllaldistribulcs mis.ingevidence in remaining disjoin ted subscts).Thc: 
imponantfe.turesofcvidence!heoryare: 
Individual bclief. from diffe."nt 5Qtlrces can beuprcsscd through tbe probability 
mass funclion that may bear incomplctcncs. from partialtofulligr>orancc. 
A belief interval (a boundary of probability eslimation) can be oblained for each 
uncenain parameter. and 
Bias from a spccific 5Qtlrcc can be avoided and confliclS arnong diffcrcnt sources 
can be rcsol,'cdthrough a beliefS\ru<;ture(Scntz and Fcrson.2002). 
Evidence theory generalizes classical probability theory through a beliefinte .... ·al 
con5lru<;ted by assigning upper and lowcr boonds for probabilities (Guth. 1991).11 uses 
four basic corulitucnts: frlllne'ifdiscernmtnl (FOD): basicprob<,bilityw:siglll",ml (bl'''' ): 
lklitj measure (Bef). and I'I<lu.ibility measure (I'f) to characterize the qU/llity of 
unceruinty. such as probabililyofbasic...,,-ent •• cventsor inputevenl$ (Sad iqflal .. 
20(6). 'fhc theory also includes reasoning based 011 the rule ofcOIllbinatioo ofdegrccs of 
bcliefaccordinglodiffercnlevidence. 
Fora gi,-en FOD, (D) in Figure 2.6. bl'd (mass) is distriooted o,'er the Sl:tO fall possible 
subsclSofD: the po"'erset ofDand "-rincn 2u. The unassiglKd mass. calculated b~ 1- m 
(p)-m(~p), isassigrICdtotrocbclicfmassfortrocignorancesubset 
D - {p. ~p) l)I,I1Orance 
2 <I _ ~null ~I. p. -'1'. (1'. ~p)l subset 
figure 2.6: Fo""ulatiooofuncenaint~ using evidence theory 
1.4.1.4 Comp<lriwniljdiff"nnlllrrorij!5 
l1Ie pros and consofdifTerent uncenaint~ fo""ulations are summari1.cd in Tablt 2.6 
Ilowe'·er. the traditional method is highl~ dcsiml in ITA. ETA and bow-tie anal~sis 
since the anal~sis comple~it~. input dat.a requirement. and analysis time are minimum for 
this method and the method is also wdl ttl:ccpu:d (AIChE. 2000: Abral\amsson. 2002). 
Thetrnditional method is irlCapable of handling any kind of data urlCcnainty. "hich most 
of troc time provides an unn:liablt analysis for FfAlETNBow-tie analysis (Yang and 
Sumki. 1995: Abrahamsson. 2002). Pmbability theory is the most common method to 
address random uncenainties (VOSl:. 2008: Ren CUi" 20(9). 1I0,,-e,·(r. this requires 
suffICient empirical infonnmion 10 derive troc I'Of. for the inputs (Hammonds "/ 01 .. 
199~: Wilcox and Ayyub. 2003: Abrahamsson. 2002: Chojnacki. 2005. Fenlous. 20(9) 
MOretH'er. the classical MCS frarnc",-ork cannot differentiate random and subjective 
uncenaintic. in the uncenainty analysis (Bemiss. 2001: AbraMmsson, 2002). Us ing 
fuuy sct theory aoo evidence theory. unccrlaimy analysis can be performed "ith 
subje.:ti>'cly assigned fuzzy numbers aoo basic probability assignment§ (bplJS) by the 
e~peru (Wiloo~ aoo Ayyub. 2003. FC'fdous. 2(09). The fuzzy numbers are sufficient to 
address the subjecti"e uneen"inty. "hen the empirical infOl'mation is sparse or 
completcly unanilablc for the uncenainpannnctcrs(Cllojnadi.200S: Rene ,"1..2009: 
and Fcrdous. 2006. 2009). Unlike probability and fU7-ZY set theory. the bptJ in cvidcncc 
theory i. apprupriate to repll'SCnl unceruinty as§()(;aled "ilh ig,nornnce and 
incornplctcl>eS1l of expert koowle<lge. and able to generali7.C the o"erall uncertainty ina 
belicfintc,,'al (Uae efal .. 20<»; Cllojnacki. 2005). In SQrnec"",,s. the fuzzy arithmetic 
andcvidcncc theory-bascd formulations are stili oot weli-<kf'ned. "hich often limits their 














'hble 2.6: Comparison ofditTerenllheorics 
ProholHtily r .>:<yJd r.,·idu<~ 
tb~.,. t~ ... .,. Ib ... .,. 
'l; Ltost .... irtd; 1: Mo<Iet'aI<ty <ltsirt<l; I: l1iRhlydesired 
2 .... 2 Ikpendency un""rtain ly 
The independence a~umplM;.n might be cQf1~enient. but it is rIOI always realistic for nA. 
ETA and bow-tie analysis in ORA (Ferson. d, al .. 2(04). Vesely el "I. (1981) s!>owed 
se,'cral examples of FTA "here Ihe ennts are not generally independent. 11«: 
dependency among the differenl C"enlS may be positiHly or rlCg.li,ciy co""laled. In 
order 10 define various bnds ofC"cnl interdependencies. Ferson "1 al. (2004) used the 
Frank copula. whcre ... Li (2007)pruposed adepcndcncy factor based fUlZy approach 10 
address lhe dependency uncen"imy. Pearson co",,13lioo is used in Fr~nk copula lhal 
describes Ihe full range of dependencies i.e .. from perf~'C1 dependence to opposi le 
dependence (Sadiq fl "1.2008). Li's melhod uses fuzzy numbers 10 define lhe 
dcpeOOencyfaCloramonglheevenls(Li.2007). 
2.5 Updating risk a n a l)'~is 
Thc dynamic aspe<:1 in risk anal)"i, i,a fairly newconccpl and has bttome an inlegral 
pan ofquanlilalive risk analysis. This ,pecial fealure pruvidcsan inference in ORA 10 
updalelhcanal)'sisrttursivclyconsidcrin8theknow~geordnlaof.noccu"",,«,inlhe 
induSlrial fadlilyasa funclM;.n of lime (Kalantamia c/a/ .. 2009 and 2010; Vangel "I .. 
2010). Updating risk analysi. basically refers 10 Ihi. dynamic fealure of risk analysi. 
which has Ihe ability to n:vise lhe likelihoods assessment of QRA "hen new expcn 
kno"lcdge or new daw bttome a~ailablc (Vang el "I .. 2010). The probability of basic_ 
e,'cnlS. evenlS and inpul e\'ems in nA. ETA and bow-tie analysis dynamically changes 
every time s'nee the failun: of comJJ<>Mnts and subsystems in an industrial f~cility Can 
occur randomly. and thcaccidenlescalatioo f.ctors change frequemly (Kalanla mi.tlal .. 
2009 and 2010). In a real lime risk an.lysis. lhe probabililies for the inPUI e,'ems in 
differenl QRA lechniques mllSI be Updaled "ilh available new koo"ledGe. n.e resulting 
analysis auained after using Ihc updaled probabililies is refcrred IOU posIeriorrist. 
analysis. Bayes' IIM:0rcm in EqUJlion 2.7 use.lhe lradilional probability lhwry for 
conlinuallyupdalingwlM:ne,·crnewdalaaccumul'le(Sandarandlladoux.I99I;Bedfard 
.ndCook 2001; Modarres. 2006; V""". 2008; Yang n al., 2010). TIM: common difficulty 
of 11M: Bayes' lheorem lies in 11M: nonnalizingcon.lanl. the dcoominalor of Equalion 2.7. 
"hichisrequiredlobeinlegralcdm·.ravaliddomainoflhe unccnainp"ramelersbeing. 
cSlim.le<J (V""". 2008). Sd<"Cling a prior conjugale for a given POF allows lhe 
.implificalionofcharacleril.inglheresultingposteriordistrib\llion.wilhoullhenccessity 
ofpcrfonningany imcgralionsor complicale<J malhemalics(Fink. 1997; Ferson 2005) 
However. Ihis limils the nexibilily of implemenling Bayes lheorem for using othcr kinds 
ofPDFslhalarecxdudcd fromconjugalc prior families {fink, 1997; ferson 2005). 




(dip) is lite likelillOOd function based 00 re.1 limc: data J. 
2.6 Proposedframe>Oorb 
The "hilllter order MCS~ can be used 10 deal wilh both "Iem"". and el'iMemk 
unceruinlie. separa lciy (001 discussed in Ihis slooy) only "hen sufficienl data arc 
available 10 distinguish both types ofunceruinlic. IIsing I'DFs. lIowe,·er. il may be 
ChaQl;er2:Uteraturerev!ew 
possibl~ to chal1lcteri7.~ PDF for a/ealory uncertainly. bul chal1lcterizing l'OFs for 
Cl'i,'lemic uncertainly is nol a trivial task (Barnldi and Zio. 20(8). Fuzzy selS and 
cvidcrn;e theory can deal wilhlhcselimilations. lnChaptersJthcfundamentalsofthese 
IWO theories are presented. The on-going research aims to inlcgrntelhese IWO lheQries 
(fU7.zyset Iheoryand e,' idcncelheory)to charalerizeditfcrcntkindsofuncertaintiesin 
FTA and ETA for the process system. To deal "'ilh dulu uncenainty. fuzzy sellh-eory i. 
employed to deal wilhlinguistic/subjeccivcuncen.aincieswhi lccvitkncclheoryisusedl0 
handle ignorance. incompitteness and inconsistency in expen knowledge. It alSQ 
proposes a dependency coefficient co deal with ,/,·pt'tuit'rK}' urn;enainty in FTA. ETA Dnd 
bow_citatlaly.i •. Funher. updating inferences inlcgruloowith fuzzy"ndevidern;etheQf)' 
arc used to explore the dynamic aSIX"'t in ITA. ETA and bow-tic anal}'sis. 
Four frame",ork •. i.e .. ETA ",ilh urn;enainly. FfA and ETA wich uncerta inly. Bow-
lieanalysis. and updating risk estimale in bow_tie analysis have been developed in the 
following four chapten Co develop urn;enaincy and dynamic risk analysis_base<.! 
melhodology fur ORA. Each chapter has been published as a paper and comprises a 
specific task as sho,,-n in Figure 2.7. The conlcnls ofche chaIKen"", focused on Ihc 
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CHAPTER 3 
Handling Dala Uncerla inlies in Evcnt Tree Analysis 
Rcfaul Ferdous. Faisal Khan. Kehan Sadiq'. I'aul Amyouc' and Brian Vei tch 
F"""hyofE". il'>teli ... ""AwtitdSC;.".,.,.M""""".tU"i ..... ~y. 
'SdoootofF.nJil'>telin"TheUni.· .... hyofl:lri'i ... Cotuml>i.Ol. ... >& .... 
' D< ..... mrn1o(I'n><euE"lIin«rini .... AWlitdSCirnce.OaI"""' .. Uni • ..m.y 
Till: manuscript de"eloped for Ihis chaptcr pro~ides an utcnsi.·c rc.icw of different types 
and sources ofuncen.ainties. and tl>eoricsto handle the uncen.aintiesfor I::TA. Based on 
the ",view. a quantitati,'c r"'mtwork with two different approact.e. has IM,,,n de"doped 
for handling d<llo uncertainty in ETA. A , 'ersion of this manuscript has been published in 
'he Journ<lI ofProa~ Safety aoo Em'iromIN,n',,/ Proleclion. 
The co-autOOrs. Drs Khan. Sadiq. Amyotte and Veitch. motivated the prir.ci",,1 
author. Refaul Ferdous. lode.-eiopth<: rcscarch 00 the entitled topic andlll:lped him 10 
conceptualize the tcchniques and ti1eories I.'ailable for this topic. The p ,inci""lautllor 
conducted an e~tensi"e literature review and dcveloped till: overall concepts and 
f",,",,work. and identified the limitations and challenges in current te<:hlliqucs. In 
addition. III: also carried out a case study to <kroonstrate till: utility of till: <kvcloped 
approaclll:s and frnmc,,'ork in an industrial example. and wrotc a manuscript for this 
topic. l1Ic co-autOOrs rcvjc"'w till: approaches and manuscript. and pro~ided the 
""""cssary suggestions and comments for till: manuscript 
Abstract 
E~ent Tree Analysis (ETA) is an established risk analysis technique to assess likelihood 
{in. probabilistic context) of an accident. Theobjecti>'e data available toeSlimate the 
likelihood is often missing (or sparse) •• nd e ,'en if a ,·ailable. is subjected to 
incompleteness (pani.1 ignorance) and imprecision (vagueness), Witl>out addressing 
incompleteness and impr«ision in the .,'ailable data, ETA and subsequent risk analysis 
give a false impression of pr«ision and correcmess that uoo.,nnir.es the m'erall 
credibility of the process. This pal)l'r expl~s two approaches to address data 
uncertainties. namely. fuuy sets.nd evidence theory •• nd compares the results with 
Monte Carlo simulations. A fU7~'based appmlIch is used for handling impn:<:ision and 
subjectivity. whereas evidence the<:><y is used for handling inconsistent, incomplete and 
conflicting data. Application of these approaches in ETA i. demonstrated using a 
exampleofnn LI'G releasc r.eara processing facil ity, 
Kc,.lO'onb: Data unccna intics. fUlly-based approach, evidence theOf)'. e>ent tree 
analysis, and MoniC CarlosimulaliOlls 
E~.nt Tree Analy~i~ (ETA) represenl~ a logic combination of various ev.nl~ Ihal may 
foll(,,,, from an initialing e"enl ( • . g .• an occident evenl suth as LPG release). The 
initi atin~cvcnlofthctrecusesdic~lomouscondition~,i.e .. succeso/failure(Irue/fa lseor 
yeo/no) 10 propagate the c>'cnl conscquo:nce in different branches of lhe lree (A IChE. 
2000: Lec,,2005),Each indi"idual palhlhal is follo"cdbylhedifferc nlbrdrIChcs 
eventual ly identifies lhe possible outcome events ~ia de~eloping an evenl-conscquencc 
model. In risk analy,i., the e~.nt-conscquence model and the outcome eventS an: 
"",cc"i>'ely used in pre-incident applicat ion. 10 examine the incidcnt precursors and 
posl-incidenlapplicalion, and 10 idcnlify lhe possible ha7.ards (wtcome e"enls) for an 
acddenlal ennt (CMPT, 1999; AIChE, 2(00) 
Qualil.aliveanalysis in an."enllrec identit1es the possible nutcnme e.-entsofan 
inilialin" event. "hereas quanlilal;>'. anal y~i~ eSlimates Ihe nutcnme event probability or 
frequency (likelihood) fnrlhelrec. Tradilionally. quantil.alivc analy.i'nfan eventlrec 
use. crisp probabi lit ie. nfe ... nts tne.timalC the outcome ,,'ent probabi lityor fn'qucncy 
{Kcnarangui. 1991: I.cc:s. 200S: Fcrdous. 2006). In practice, ilisdimcullandexpensi~e 
10 obl.ain prec ise eSl imales nf.,'ent probabil ity be<:ause in a majnrity of eases these 
estimate. are the resuhnfanexpen',limilcdknowlcd"e, incomplete infonnation, poor 
quali ty data or imperfc'Cl imerprC1alionofafa ilurcmcchanism,1lJCseunavo iiliobleissues 
impart u""enainlic. in the ETA and make Ihe enlin: risk anal),sis process less credible for 
de.:ision-making, 
OIapter3: Haodllng data uncertainlie'i in EvenI;T=AI\;!IysIs 
In a ge .... ral taxonomy ofuocer1aioty. a/~aloryand episremic untcftainties are the 
major ciasscs (Thackerel a/,. 2003;AY)'ub,'lul .. 20(6). Aleatory uoccr1ainty accounts 
foroatural variation or randomne .. in the Ixhaviorofa systcm and in the caSC of data 
a,'ailab ilily, probability.based approaches arc: found to 00 the ooslch oice (Agarn'al c/a/,. 
20(4). On the other hand. cpistcmic ullCcrlaintyaccounts for ambiguity and "n~ucocss 
that arises duc 10 iocomplele""" and impre<:ision. Todes(ribeuIlCCfta inlicsininpul<iala 
(i,e .. even! likelil>ood) and propagale lhem through "'A. probabil ity·based approaches 
such as Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) ha,'e been traditionally used (Uae <'I ", .• 20(4) 
This appo:>a<.:h requires sufficiem empirical information to derive probabilily densily 
functions (I'DFs) of the inpul dala. which arc ~cncrally not available (Wilcox el ill .. 
2003). As an aitcn>ativc to objccti,'c data. expert knowledge/judgme nt is used. espc<:ial ly 
when the data colle<:lion is either difficuil or ,'cry expensive (Ro'Gvist. 2003) 
Expert judgments are qualitative/linguislic in nalure and may suffer from 
h>consistcncy if lack of consensus among "arious c~perts arises. The classical 
probabilistic framcwoO; is not very effecti"e 10 deal with vague or incompklcl 
inconsistenl concepts (Druschcl el al .. 20(6). Abrnhamsson (2002). Thackerel a 1. (2003) 
and Wikoxe/al. (200J) discussed methods to handlcunccl1lIinties in expenjudgntent 
and to intcrprctthent fortl;e purposeofconductingrisk ana lysis. Fuzzy sets and evidence 
tn.cory ha>'( pro"cn effective and efficient in handli ng these lypeS of un ceria in lies 
(Cheng. 2000; SenlZnal., 2002; Wilcox cl "I .. 2003; Baeel ,,/ .. 2004; Agarwal e/a/ .. 
2004; AY)'ube/al.. 2(06). 
Thc: main focusoflhis pIIptT iSlodcscribedilTen:nllyptSofuncertainlies in ETA using 
approaches such as fuzzy".,1 m..-ory and c,'idcncc !heo<y. "hcn:!hc: former iscmployoo 10 
handle incomplele/partial ignorance ofe~pen kno"iedge (Figure 3.1). To dcmonwale (he 
applicability oflhese approaches. a ease sHldy for LPG relcase is ,,","isiloo (Lees. 20(5) 
~;""<>f~.<>r<,.." .. probabiliIY 
in . Ir~ .. in, -Su« ... -and·Fai l"",-in"p"·"" 
or.d_n,,·.rdbnnch_i.·<ly 
Fig ureJ. I: Fral'l'lt""OI'k for ETA undtrlrncertainly 
Olap4:er3:HandlirlSldatauncertaintiesOlEventTreeAnatyst:! 
3.2 Fuzzysc'lhoory 
ladeh (1965) lirst introduccdji<:;y.5Clsinhispioncering"'wk ..... hcre heargu edlhal 
probabililyalone is insufficienllo rerrcscnl all lypcsofullCcnainlies because it lacked 
IneabililY 10nK>dcl human COTlCcplualiz.ationsoflhercal world. Fuzzy·ba se<.!approaches 
inlroduce robuslllCss into systems by allowing a certain amount of impre<:isiOll to exist. 
Ihus paving!h<: way to rep",scnthuman linguistic !ermsa, fuzzyse!s, hedge s,predicates 
and quan!ificrs (Rivern ,'/a/ .• 1999). Ouring the last-45 years Ih<: success offU7.7.y·base<.! 
systemshasled[(}lh<:irgene"' l acceptanceinvariousengitlttrin~disciplines. 
FU7.1.y logic provides a language .... ilhsynta .• ar.dscmanlicslotranslalCqualilative 
koowledge/judgmenls into numerical reasoning. In many cngi"""ring problems. Ihc 
information about lhe probabil ities of various risk items is voguely ktlQwn or assessed 
The Icrm oompUling"'ilh ... o,dshas been introduce<l ladeh (1996) 10 explain the IlQtion 
of",asonin~linguisticallyrnther!hanwith numericalquanti!ies 
Fuay·bas.,d approaches help in add...,ssingdcliciencies inherent in binary 10 gie. 
They cfTc"Clively deal with im~eci,ion Iha! arise, due to subjecti,·ity/va~ucnc ... and are 
h<:lpful to propagale uncenainties throu~hout Ihe risk analysis and de<:isiOfl·making 
proce ... Fuzzy.based apl'f"O'lches a .... a ~ene"'lized fonn of inlerval anal~'sis use<.! 10 
add...,ss uncertain or im~ecise information. A fuzzy number dcscribes thc relationship 
belween an uncertain quantity I' (e.g .. event probabilily) and a membership funclion )1. 
whichran~csbel""eenOand I.A fu.lzysd is an exlcnsion of the !rndilional se! lheory (in 
whichI' is eilher a member or 51:1 P or tIQl) SO !hal I' can be a member ofse! P "i!h a 
certain dcgre.: of membe",hip I'. Any .hape of a fuzzy number is possible. but the 
Chapterl:HandlioQdllta~InEventTree.o.na/y5i$ 
selcctedshapcshouldbejustiliedbyanilableinformatioo(ifiti!loormal.boundedar.d 
coo>·ex). c;.,,,,,,,,lIy. triangulnr or lra""midal fU7.zy numbers (TI'N or ZFN) are used for 
rel""se,uinglingui~lic,·ariablcs(Kcnnra"gui.I99I:Ri,'craandllan:>n.1m) 
The follo ... ing sub-section~ describe the steps to analyze: an e,'cnt t= using fuay 
set thCOO)'. In the proposro approach. the subjecti\'( judgment of e~ent probability i~ 
assumed linguistic and described using a TFN. The fuuy prooobilities of initiating are 
then used 10 eSlimale the outcomc c>'cnt probability Ihal is also estimated as a fuzzy 
number. The fuzzy·based approach used for Io,A comprises the following three sleps: 
I. def,,,,, c>'cm probabilily using TfNs. 
2. detcrmincoutcomenentprobabililyasaTFN.and 
3. defuzzify OUlCome e>'enl frequency as a crisp number (point estimate) 
Ex""ns prefer 10 usc: linguistic cxpressioos(such as lik/y.probt,bl.,. improbt,ble) ra ther 
IhannumcricalcxpressionstojuslifYlhcprobt,bili/)'of anevenl(AY)'ubCltll .• 20(6). An 
upcrl's linguiSlic judgmenl is as~i8rlCd a TFN. A typical TFN for an uncertain quantity 
(e,g_. evenl probabilily) i. sho ... n in Figure 3.2. The TFN i. a .'ector(p,./, ... pi) thaI 
represcms the minimum. most likely and ma~imum values of e"enl lIfOoobilily. whereu 
the a-cul Ie"el is a deg.ree of 'rlCmbership /1, . For a TFN. ""'Sled imeTVals ;,~ can be 
ge"",ratedby irlC",mentally changing the a-cut lcvels"" follows: 
;""'.2 .. (J. I) 
" 
TFNor ••• nlprOOobi lity 
.' igure3.2:TFNtorepresen!e,·entprobability 
Thc: present study used ~ight qualitati"e ~radcs reprrsented by TFNs (Figure 3.3) to 
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fisureJ.J: MnppinglinguiSlic "ariablcson fuzzy scale 
3.2.2I>ctermine oulron,ee,·enlprobHbilit,-HSM TFN (fuzzy numl)('r) 
Membership fuoction (Pp) e[O. II of. TFN represents uncertainly in the: event 
probability (Li. 2007). The (l-<:uts are used 10 detennine fuzzy inlc ..... ls (i.e .• n~sted 
inll"1"\'als in a fuzzy number) "ith. ""'mbership gradc (p,) grealeror equal to the a-<:u t 
value (Wikox "I ul., 2(1))). In a TI'N. tM membel'5hip function UK. 1M follo ... in" 
relalionship10 detent1ine tM interval atlhe t:M:ulle~eI' 
(3.2) 
fuzzyarithmetic"l"'rationsareuscdtodetcnt1inctheoutcomeewmprobabiliIY • 
... hich is baKd on 1M e:rle"si""I''';ncipie (Ri'·craf/(II .. 1999). Anaitcmali vemcthoda-
cuI font1ulolio:>o is also use;:l in fUl.zyarilhmelic for simplifying the analysis (Lai d ul .. 
1993; Siler.'luI .. 2005; Li.2007).ln ",A. the membership function (jt. ) repre"'nting 
Ihedegrttofunccrlaintyinc"CnlprobabililycancilherbclhesamcordilTerent for 1M 
c'-cnIS in a sp«iflc palh. This siudy useS Iwo melhods. 1M ,."",Iom a-cu/ and pred"fined 
a-cUi. 10 describe llIe", situations for ETA. The former method use. tile .. :rlt'n5;on 
,,,.incil"e Dnd the Inter method use. a,,:uI font1ulation to calculale tM outcome e~ent 
probability. ETA ~mially mJuires 1 .... 0 openuions. mulliplkation and addition. 10 
cakulatetMoutcomeevcnlprobabilily(Ri"eraellll., 1999). For cven\ probabil ities P, 
and 1', (repre"'nted by Iwo TFN.), 1M fuzzy arithmetic "I"'rntions of tM'" moo method. 
T~b '" J. I : Fuay arithmetic for event tree analy.i. 
[(p, "Pj.min{).Ip,(p,).).I P1 (p,ml, 
[(p, + p,.min{).I p, (p,).).I"(Pj)J)[. 
(PnxPlL'PIR"P"RI 
1'1. +1'"- (Pn'P1L.I'IR 'P1RI 
P.· P.P .· P 
I I J 2 
P. · P.p, . P 
, I J 1 
3.2.3 l)~f\lZ1,ifr outcome ennt frequ enc)' M~. crisp lIumber (point ... tim ~ l~j 
Defuuification transforms a fu7.ZY number inlOa criS!' ' ·aluc(Klire/<lI .• 20lH). Many 
defuzzification mcthodsareavailable in the liteF~ture(C.g .. Klirudl .. 20Ot; Ro ... 2004j. 
Theweightedavcragemcthod isacomputationallycfficientmethod(R()SS,2004; Khanet 
d/ .. 2005). The foliowing "'Iuation is USl-d fordefu1,ziticalion ofou\cofm (>'Cnt 
probabilityorfrequcllty 
(3.3) 
3.3 .:vidcnce Ih<'<lI')'(E,-idcnl ia l r~a.nninll) 
Mul\ip leexpen (multi..:xpcn) knowledge can provide more reliable information for an 
obscrn\ion (e.g .. an cvCnt probabi lity) than a si ngle expen. The kno"ledg eand 
igrlOrJncccanr>Ot bcabsolule.arcsocialiyconstrucledand negotiated (A)'yub. 2 0(1). and 
ollen suffer from incompleteness and conflict. These uncertainties in knowledge 
acquisition can be minimized through a proper "gg.rcglnion process that leads to 
consensus and an agreement in mUlt;""xpens kno,,·ledsc 
Event tn. ... analysis tnkes into account the degn:e of ignorance anddeg.rce of 
disaSn...,mcnt (conflicts). while agg.rcgating expen knowledge from multiple sources. A 
Bayesian approach and evidence theory arc widely kr>Own in risk ana lysis for Ih is 
purpose and play an imponanl rolc in the managcmcnt ufuncelUlinties. cspeci al lywherc 
multi..,xpenknowledge is desired in a <lecision·making process (Yang e' fll .. 20(4).Thc 
Bayesian approach is ba""d on probability throo-y; it 8sgregalc§dala ,,'itoo...t 
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differentiatins aleatory and cpistcmic uncertai ntics. MOfCover. it requires priori 
information which sometimes limits its af'Plication to updatins existins information 
(Sadiq t'l a/.. 20(6). T1>crefore. when the iSnorance or conflicts are sisnifu.:antly hiSh. a 
Baycsiannpproachmaynot~perlyasgresatcmulti-expertknowlcdge.Evidcncctheory 
addresses these issllCs effc..:tivdy and is able to combine muhi-expen koowlcdge by 
taking into accou nt ignorance and conflicts through a beliefslructure (Lcf evrecl. ,,/ .. 
2002: Bae t/u/ .• 2004: Sadiq c/"i .. 20(6) 
E\"idcncctheorywasfjrst~poscdbyDempstcr(I967.1%8)and latercxtendcdby 
Shafer ( 1976). This theory is also called Dempster·ShaferThcory (DS1) (Scntz"1 ,,/ .• 
2002: Li. 2(07) . DST usell thm: t>asic ~rametcrs. i.e .. bu.;-;c probubjbty uss;g"meft( 
(bflO1). fkUeJmeasure (Bd). and Plausibility measure (Pf) to characterize the ut>Certainty 
in a beliefstruetu", (Cheng. 2000: Lefev", el ai .• 2002; Bae ",,,1 .• 2(04). The belief 
strueturereprcscntsacominoous interval (!J.eliej.p/o,,;·ibilityj in which trucprot>ability 
may lie. 1\ narrow belief structure indicates more pre.:ise prot>abilitics. The main 
contribution of DST is a combination rule to aggregate multi-expert knowledge acoording 
10theirindividual degnxsofbclief. 
In evidence the<lry.fro"", oJdiscernm~m a is defined as a set of mutually excius ;,'c 
clements that allow having a tOlal of 2"" subsets in a powersct (P). where 101 is the 
c(miin"lity ofaJm.me "Jdiscemmrnt. For example. if IJ ~ IT. Fl . then the power sct (P) 
includes four subsets. i.e .• {<P(a null sct). {T). {Fl. and {T. F)).as the cardinality is 
two. The Following discussion builds the fundamentals ofDST that are used in this study. 
The iJasic ",ob<,bility assignment (bpa). sometimes known as belief mass. is 
denoted h~ m(p.). The bpa reJmscnts Ihe proportion of knowledge 10 every SUbsel (P.) of 
power SCI (P)such IhaLthe sumoflhe proportion is I. Thefocalelemt>nts. i.e .. p , ~ I'with 
m(p,»O.collc.:livclyrcprcscnllheacquircdknm,lcdgcfromexpocnelicilation. The bp<' 
can bech.rncterized by the following equation.: 
m( p; ).......,. [0,1] ;m(IJI ) ;O ; ~>(Pi ) - l 
Pjo;; r 
(3.4) 
The be/ifJUlef) measure. sometimes termed as lower bound for a sctp, . is defined 
astilc sumofall the bp<1S of the propocrsubsetsp.ofthe set of interest",. i.e .. p. s; p,.The 
rciationbclwttnbp<,andbelieJlIWtlSureiswritlenu: 
BeI { p;) = L m{Pk) 
Pl O;; P, 
(3.5) 
The uppocrbound i.e .• the pluusibility (PI) meaSure foraSClp, is thc summati onof 
bpasoflhe"'tsp,tru.linterseclwilhthesetofintere'l.p,i.e .. p, n p, ~<P,Therefore,the 
1'/(1';)= L IIl (Pk ) (3.6) 
" tf"o p; -- <1> 
J.J.l Ruleurcornbin a lioon - rn Mkinginferences 
The knowledge obtained from mullirle expocn. requires aggregation to be u",dfo ruseful 
£1' A. The combination rules allow aggregating the individual beliefs of multi~xpocrts. 
The most common combination rule was first proposed by Dempster & Shafer (OS), 
which is also known as Ihe DS combination rule. Many mod iflcalions of the OS rule of 
combination ha,'c been I'Cpo!1cd. Thc most commoo modifications includc Yagtr. Smets. 
In.gaki. Duoois and l'mdc. Zhang. Murphy, and more n.""emly Dc",," nnd Smanmdachc 
(Sadiq eru/ .. 2(06). IJe!lliled discussions on thcsc rules un !)e found in [)e;.C" an d 
Smarandache(21JO.') 
In this study. DSand Yagcrcombination ruics are discussed in dctail and compared 
in the LPG e"emU'" case study. To comhine multi-cxpe" knowledgc. combination rules 
uscthefoliowingortoogonalsum(Equation3.7) 
..... $ m. (J.7) 
where the symool 8> represems operamr of combination 
The DS combination rule uses a normalizing factor (I -k) to de,-elop an ag reementamong 
the acquin...! knowlcdSt from multiple sources. and ignore: all conflicting e,-idenee 
through ""rma/i:at;"", Assuming tflat 1"'-' knowledge sou",cs are indcpendent. Ihis 
combination rule uses AND.type operators (product) (Sadiq d al.. 2(06). For example, 
ift"'-' m, (j,~) and m1 (p.) are two sets ofe,-idencc for tbe same e~ent collected from two 
irnkpocndcntsou",es. the OS combination rule usc, the follow ing rclation tocombirn:thc 




an event and k meaSureS the degree ofronjlici bct"een lhe IWO expcns, "hich iJ 
delennine<lhylhefaclor' 
k; LnI,(Pa)nl2(Pb ) 
",, " "b "' </> 
¥agercombin.tionrulc: 
Zadeh (1984) pointcd Out that the OS combinJtion rule yields countcrin tuiti" cresultsand 
exhibits thc numerical instability if conflict is large among the SOure.S (Sentz ot aI., 
2002). To resol,'e this issue. Yager(1987) proposed an extensionoflhe combination rule 
The modific-d combin.tion rule is similar to the OS combination rule except Ihat it 
assigns conflicting mass 10 be f"lnofignorance 0 insleadofnomlalization .llo"e,·er. in 
no (o.-Iess) conflicting cascs. the Vagcrcombination rule (Equation 3.9) exhibits similar 
Lm,(pu)~m ' (Pb)+k 
P"n Pb"' P; 




In ETA. ditTcrenl cxpcns can provide Ihe probability of an e,'ent.and each expcn 
uscs hislher b.:lief Or kno"'lcdge 10 justify the asscssmcntthat may be incomplete and be 
in conflict with tl\c others. In an evidential rcasoningframewo.-k. f"lnial igoo rancerefcrs 
10 assigning probability mass to jrome ()f di"""f:mmcnl. i.e .• {T. Fl. The confl ict among 
the sources is handle<:l through combination rules as discusscd aoovc. TIlCfollowin8sub. 
sectionsdescribc: t flestcpstoanaly~eanc,·cnttrt...,using.videmialtheory 
I"raditionallytheoutcomesofevcnttrecsaredicootomous. i.e .. IT! nnd IF}. Therefore 
tfleframf 'if,/iscemme,,/ D is {T. F\ that leads to four sub",iS in a power set (I') that 
includes {ft>. {T}.{F}.{T.FJl. 
J.J.4 Assignmenl of bpas for the e,'cnl 
1"hc bp<lsorbc:lidmass for each individual event is acquircd from the diffcrentsources 
Exp licitiy. the assigned b,,(LI" rcprescnts the degrecofcxpo:rt bc:liefforcach su bsct.and 
implic itly. it represents thcwtal evidence to ciarify thce"cnt probabi lity. Fore~amplc.nn 
expert may rcport that the occurrence probability of an e\"cnt is 80% true and 10"/. false 
Mathematically. this can be: written as m(IT)) '" 0.11. m(IF)) - 0.1 and m({T. F)) - 0.1. 
because.m({T.F)) "' I-m({T})-m(IF)). 
J.J.S Knowl('dge~ggregaliun lodcfinee.-entprobMbilily 
TIlC reduOOantimowledge from diffe",nl sourcn is aggregated using eitl\cr DS (Equati On 
3.11) or Yager (Equalion 3.9) combination rules. Un l i~e the DS combination rule. the 
Yager combination ru le docs oot rely on non-conflicting evid.",",. Ii. ... (1-4)1 10 
nonnal i7.e the joint c>'iJenee (Sadiq c/ al .. 20(6) . Thus. fora high conflict case (i.e .• 
higher 4 va lue), the Yager combinalion rule gi"es more stable aOO robust resulu than tl\c 
DScombinalion rule. In tl\c case ofa hig/lcr degrcc of conflict (t). the Yager ruteQf 
combinalionisprefcm:d. 
Now. ~onsidcr aOOlhcr expert report of the same e,'em prvbability "ith m({TI) . 
0.6. m«(F)) · 0.3 and m(lT. FD - 0.1. These two independenl assessme nlS for the same 
e'ent (an be ~ombincd using lr.c DS and Yager combination rules (Table 3,2). The be lief 
structure for the truc probability of the e,'cnt obtained by DS and Yager combination 
rules art [0.89. 0,9] and [0 .62.0,93 ). "'"pl'Ctively. 
TabIe J.2:E\'i!lcoce(ombinationforignitionSQUrteprvbab ility 
1'1 1" 
ITI ITI ..o,48 {Tlo(l,08 
If I "' - 0,06 (F)..o.OJ IFl ooO.OI 




"" .J (Yagcr) 
J.3 .6 Iklwf"ruclu .... and ~&,H "Iim~ tinn fnr outcome eHnb 
The imerval ootained from the Ix:lie!andp/aus;bilitymeasurtsgi,'c. t"" bel ief struc tu", 
of expert knowledge , The belief structure tnkes into account I"" ignor~llCc and (o nnicts 
in mult i-expertknowlcdgcaoo providcsa range for the event probability. "lk,"estimate 
gi,'c, a point estimate in belief structure (simi lar 10 dcfulZification). "hich can be 
estim.tcd by the following equation 
bl!l ( P) = L ~ 
f' r;;, p; [ Pi [ (3.10) 
"-herelP,j is the c.rdin.lity(numbcrofelementsj in the set pi. In the c ominuationof 
tl\o: previous example. the "beCestimate forthctrue probabilityoblained from the DS 
rule combination can bc cakulatc-d.s: 
hel(P) = m({IT }) + m({:F }) = ~+ o.~14 _ O.H97 
The denominators"I"and"2"rcprcsent the cardinality in the respecti. '.subsets 
LPG is a hiGhly nammable gas. Any signifkant amount of LPG release may lead to fire 
and e,'plosion in Ihe presence of an ignition SOuree. To demonstrate the proposed 
approaches. a case study ofLf'(] release ala Dctcl"8ent Alkylate Plam (DAP). "hich was 
earl ier reponed by Lccs(200S1. isre·visited (Figure 3,41 _ This study reviSt.-d the event 
tree and constructed the tree staned from an initiating e,'emofa I.rge LPG reicase. The 
released LPG on ignition may cause either an explosion or fireball in the vicinity of the 
reicasepoim. Thee .• plosion<;ausesthe,'aporcioudasanoutcome. If there is no ignition. 
then the release drifts towards the DAP and may cause a delayed explosion at the DAP. 
"hich also causes another vapor cloud depending on the winddire<:tion. From the L PG 
release point. the LPG vapor may drifl in 5ome0lherdire<:tion if there is no e .• plosion .1 
tho: DAP. Four e,'ents are idcntitled: ignition. c .• plosion. "ind to DAP. and a dcl.yed 
explosion at DAP. It was assumed that these " 'eots are mutually exclusive. and the event 
probabilities are propagatcd into tho: different brnnches of the tltt. Each brnnch gene rates 
a path that may kad toa specific outcome.,-ent. 
Chi!oter3:HandfrlQdata<JOOertaiotlesioEventTreeAnatysi:; 
1.o1t'!1:!;C I I ~ition I [,pIooion I Wind'olJ"r l o.l·)::'~~~ 1 Oul.., .... 
p," ~~:t~ 
==-____ P, Ii ::!.V= ... 
..... , 
FigureJ.4:EvenllrecforLPG",lcasc 
For the case study of LPG release in the vicinityoflhe DAP. fi,'c possiblt 0 "Icome 
cvenlS "ere idcnti fic'<l,Assuminglhee,'entsa.., independent: the probabi lityofapalhor 
an OUlcomec,'cnl iscalc"latcd by multiplying the probabil itiesassociate<J "ith this pat h 
Equation3.11 isagencra l cquationtoc.lculate theoutcomeenntfrequer><:ic •. ~,inthis 
equaliondcnolcslherrequcr><:yforlhcinilialinge\'entandoulcomeevents. 
(3.11) 
In addilion to the proposed approaches (fUlZy-based and evidence thcory). Monte 
Carlo simulations (Iraditional ur><:.I1ainty ana l,'sis) arod a dctcrminislic approach 
(trad it ional crisp nna lysis) were also perfonned for ETA of LPG release 
J .... I [)eterministicMpproa~h 
This !mditional approach providcs a quick analysis and UseS crisp probabi li lies in e&eh 
brnnch orpalh oflhcevem lree. It uses Equation 3.1 1 to calculate Ihe Outcome event 
frequen<:y for the e,'enl lree. I)ased on assigned probabilili ~s (Figure 3.4) Ihe OulCQnle 
e"cnl frequen<:ies for LPG release are cakulatcd ...... hich arC crisp numbers (Tablc 3,3). 
Table 3.3: Outcome c,-enl frequency Oflhc LPG release CVCnl1r<:C 
3"'.2 MCS-bwsed a pprowch 
MonIC Carlo Simulalion (MCS) is one of In.: moSI common tcchnique. for probability-
based uncerta inly ana lysis (Abrahamsson. 2002). It is based on random sampling from 
predefined PDh (in our Mudy. I'iangular shape PDFs are used similar to TFNs). We used 
5000 itcralionsto obtaio PDFsoflheoutcomeevems.11IefrequcnciesforlheQUICQole 
ev~nts ..... e.., ,aleulated using lO<juatiQn 3.11. The 90"/0 confidence inte ..... ls for all 
OUlcome events of the LPG c,·ent lree are summarized in Table 3.4. This approach 
aSliumeslhalunccnainlicsariseonlyduclo.-~ndomncssinlheocculTCn<:eofevenlS. 
Table J.~ : Outcome <,·ent freq""ncy by MCS-base<! approach 
9'O%<o"lid~n« inl~I"\'. 1 
Upp",lJoulld (.ISO% ) 
fU7,Zy_bll~1I1}P"",ch 
Tl>en:\';se<.!eventtrtt .. ;thfu>zy);nllu;sticvariablesisiliustratedinFi8Un: 3,5. This 
approach uscs tM t .. 'o different methods. namely. predt:fi""" a .. ul and random a .. ullo 
perfonnfuzzyarilhmetic. 
r-------- P, A ~=f 
figureJ.S:E,·enttree .. ithlinlluisckfuuy,·ariables 
J.4.J. 1 Pred~fined a...ul 
In Ihis melhod, a preferred a...,ul level (i.e .. a pre-dellned membership fuolClion) is 
mai nta ined throtl8h all the evenlS. The probabilities for the outcome c\enlS are lhen 
eSlimaled usin8 a...,ul based fuzzy fonnulation ( I"able 3.1). For example. Ih epalhleading 
to the oulCOmc c>'ent ··A'·. shown in Figure 3.5. is follo .. 'C:d by two evenlS. TIle 
probabilities of tMse two e>'ents are linlluistically exprt"sscd and assumed to be "Very 
Improbable" and "Very Probable", These two variabks all: a§signed TFNs (based on 
Figure 3.)), and then the lFN for oulcome event "A" is calculated. 'The TFNs of the 
Chapter 3: HandlirlQ data lJ:lCertlIintles In Event Tree Anafysis 
input nents and outcome event "A" for Ihe LPG release ncnl 1m: are shown in Fi~ure 
3,6. AI a specific a..:ul 1"'01 . the TFN for the outcome e.'enls is dcfu7.zifiOO to obtain the 
crisp probability for lhe e.'ent. Table 3.5 provides the defu7.1,ifiOO frequenciesofOlltcome 
e.'entsforlhe LI'(] release event tree 
I'igureJ.6:0uIComecvenlprobabil ilyfor"A" 
T~blc J.5: IkfUll.ified outcome " 'ent f",quency of LPG release " 'ent trtt 
6.I3SE.06 S.SS4E.(lS 2.284£.06 ],027E.(l7 SA06£..06 
6.075E-06 5.548£..05 H195E-06 2577E·07 S.2JSE.06 
6.0JOE.()6 S.S4JE-05 1.91SE.06 2,2I7E·07 S.I06E.06 
6.000E.06 5.S40E-05 
S.98SE.()6 S.SJ9E-OS 
S.984E.()6 S.5)9E-05 1.496E.()6 1.616[·07 4.971E.06 
In this method. the membership functions (Jlp) fOT the ovents in a path"TC changed 
randomly (as with MCS). The OIltCome evcnt probability that is follo .. 'OO by this path is 
calculated u~ing fuzzy arithm.:tic. An e~ample for this ca>e is shown in Figure 3.7. In the 
same way. the outcome c~en1 frequencies for the e'cnlln..., are ~stimated using Equation 
3.1 1. Fordemonstrationpu'l"'scs. lhefuay inte!"\lal forlhe outcome event s" IJ"i s shown 
in Figure 3.8 
'1m :: ~'A 
.. 
U.0735 OIJ.lS 0.10330.150.1! 0.955 
figurc J .7: 0utco mee,·cnlproba bilityfor· ·A·· 
5.45E~5 5.65£-05 
Oulcomcevenlfreque""y 
Fig u .... J .8: FU7.zy intervals fo<out oomeeve,u"IJ" 
JA.-l[videncelheory_bMKd approach 
Tab1e J.6 provides evidcncc oblaincd from Iwounbiased and ioocpeooentexpens. 11M: 
bel ief Slruelun: for 11M: OUlcome e,·entS ofLl'G release is provided in Table 3.7. 11M: 
belicfstructuresoblail\Cdforlhcoutcomec'·ent··B"·b~usin8bolhcombinalio-n rules all: 
combination rule pro,·ides a largcr bc:licf Struelure for 11M: OUtcome CYent ··If' than 11M: DS 
combination rule 
TMb~J.6: Differem expert's knowledge fore,cnts 
Ignition 0.60.3 0.1 
Explosio-n 0.1 
Wind to IlAP 
Ignition Explosion at I)AP 0.8~ 
TMbk:J.7: [)elief structure fortlK:outcomeevcms 
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3.5 Summary a nd ~onclu~;'-'n! 
Uncertainty in lo,A .rise. due to subjectivity. incompleteness (panial illnorance) or 
inronsistcncy in acqu in,d knowledllc of c,·cnt probabilitiu. Tf..., prOp<:>Sed framewori< 
(Figurc 3.1) uses twodifTcrem approacf...,s. fUlZy·based and cvidcnce theory. to add reo;s 
difTerent type. of uncertain lies that are not generally addresscde .• pli<:itly u sinllthe 
available 8M'roachcs. The trnditional approach for ETA is dctcnninistic and does not 
considcrany kind ofuncertaimy in the analysis. If the PDf. arc ·reasonably known' . 
MCS can be the best approach to estimate and propagate uncertainties. especia lly 2D· 
MCS which can deal with aleatOf)' and cpiSlemic uncertainties separately (not discussed 
in this study). Risk ana lysis generally requ ire. eXP\'rt knowledge. as PDF. and crisp 
cSlimates ofe.'cnt probabilitin are unknown or partially known. Ncither the dctermini5l.ic 
awroach nor the MCS-based approach effectively deals with this kindofurn:crtaint y. 
In the fuz:zy_ba~ approach, the TFNs are assigll<'d to linguistic and subjccti~e 
judgment of expert knowledge using a membership furn:!;on !-'p. The p"d"fined a-<w 
method uscs intervals based on 3 pn:definN membership Itvd in performing fuzzy 
arithmetic. whereas ",m/om a-<ul uscs fuzzy intc!'\'als basN on random sdtttion of 
men>bcrships for Inc cvcnlS in a spc<:ific path 
Inthecvidencetheory-base<Japproa\:h.thcbp(L,' areassignedlodefinethcdeg,rtt 
of ignorance and belief of expcn knowledge to clarify event probab iliti es.The 
irn:omplele and inconsistent bt'll'S from multiple WIlrees are combined by using 
combination rules of e"idern:c lheory. The Yager combination rule }'idds more robust 
resullS in the context of having high conniets in the SQurecs. Consequently. Ihis rule 
provides morc appropriate results forl:."TA underurn:ertaimy. leading 10 lower v aluesfor 
the ~1i4 measure and higher nlues for the plausibifity m.'(lSure compared to the OS 
A comparali,'e vicw ofdiffcrenl approaches used to obtain the frequency forlhe 
outcome event ··B·· is shown in Table J.8. The p<!rc~nlagt' devi(l{ion (0) in lhe results is 
e.timated using a ··base value of c.'cn ts probability". The ··base value of c.·cnts 
probability"· rercrs totnc probabilily ofnenl. Ihal do nol include any deviation while 
analyzing the event tree for U'G release. For example. if 10% deviation is introduced in 
the initialinge.'cnt probability(LI'G rclcase event In.-c:) in thc easc 0 fll",dctcrmin;stic 
approach. appro.~;mately 9 % deviation in lhe frequency of the outcome event "B·· ;5 
obscrved.lnconlraSI.lhefuzzy·basedapproachgives!TlOll:robuslrc:Sulls. i.e .• -o.OOJ % 
devialion for the ... me (Hl"I. ) deviation in initialing c,'enl probability. The MeS-based 
approach yields -0.8 % deviation f!>rthe same scenario. Theevidentc throry_ba.sc-d 
approoch yields -.{i % deviation in estimating frequccncy for the ... me even\. It is 
cmphasizcd.ho .... ·ncr.lhatc .. idenc(lhcoryoccounIS forexpertigROranccindefininglhe 
C\·cnlprobabilily."hichcannolbedeah .... ithusinglheolherapproochcs 
Table J.8: ESlimalcddeviation in tl\c final rcsuils bydiffen:nlapproacl\cs 
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Two aspects of the proposed approachescoold be furtherexplorcd in In. fuwn:.Firsl. 
Iheassumplionof·indcprndcncc·arnongcvcnts isoflcnunrc:al iS1i<:.andcanbehandltd 
using ·fU7.q measures' or extensions of the DS rule of combinations. Se<;ond. the 
possibilityofdealing ..... ilhsubjcctiviW(usingfuzzy·bascdapproa.ch).ndinoomplcteness 
(evidcntt theory) as a single fonnulatioo (h)'brid soft computing methods. e.g .• Fuzzy-
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CHAPTER 4 
Fault and Event Tree Amdyscs for Process Systems 
Risk Analysis: Uncertainty Handling Formulations 
Refaul Ferdous.Fais.a1 Khan, Rehan Sadi'l'. I'aul Amyotte'aoo Ilrian Veitch 
In the first few SCCliOflSof the manuscript. the traditional assumpcionsaJ\d techniques 
along "ilh the 35§OCiah:d u...certainty iss"",, in ETA and FTA are diSf.'ussW. l1Ie 
subsequent ""';';Qnl describe the development of proposed approaches to overcome the 
current limil.81iQns and ur.ceruinly issues for FTA and ETA. A version of this 
manuscripl hasll.lready been published in lheJoUmillojRiskAn<,/),sis 
All authors workftl lU a lum in de"cloping (he research and manuscript for this 
chapter. 'r1leprinciplllaulhorconceptualil.cdtfleproblcm bascd on an exlensi,'c lite ralure 
review. aOOde,-eloped the framework and approacl~s for ETA and FTA .... i,h the help of 
the other tcam mcmbers.l1le application ofille developed approaches has also il«11 
illuslnncdbylheprincipalauthot"throoghtwoscparateilldustrialc.amples. 
1lIcco-authocoi. Dt(.j Khan. Sadiq. AlllyOlle and Veitch. surervise<J and cril;cally 
rc"iewed tl!e approaches and theirapplicatioo totheproc~SIi facilily.1lIcy also provided 




Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is a systematic approach for evaluating likelihood. 
con~uences. and risk ofadversc events. ORA ba ... ..J 011 E.'ent (ETA) and Fault Trtt 
Analy.5<'s (FfA) employs two basic ass umptiOlls. The first assumptiOll is related to 
like lihood "alues of input events. and tn.: """ond assumption is re~ardin~ 
interdependence among tilt: ncnts (for ETA) or basic-e"ents (for FTA), Traditionally 
ITA and ETA both use crisp probabilities; however. to deal with uncertainties. the 
probability distributions of inpm e.'cnt likelil>oods are assumed. These probability 
distributions are often hard to come by and ncn if a'·ailablt. they are subject to 
incompleteness (partial ignol1lncc) and imprecision, Futthermore. both ITA and ETA 
assume that evenls(or bas;c-e"cnlS) are indcpcr.dcnt.ln prnclice. these twoassumplions 
arc often unrealistic 
This atticle focuses un handling uncerta inty in a QRA framewori: ofa process 
system. Fuv;ysctlheoryandtvidtncethcory.reuscdlodescribetheuncertainti (sinthe 
input event likelihoods. A method bascdon adepcndency coemciem is uscd to express 
interdependencies of events (or basic-cvents) in ETA and FTA. To demonstrate the 
approach. IWO case sludic'Sare discusscd . 
Keyword.: Quami\ativc risk analysis (ORA). uncert:Jinly. interdependence. likelihoods. 
fau lt tree analysis (FTA) and e~cnl tIU analysis (ETA). 
Pnxess systems in chemical engineering II«' infamous for fugitive emissions. toxic 
~leases. fi~ and explosions. and operation disruplions. 11K:se incidents have 
considerable potemial to cause an accident and incur cnvironmental and propeny 
damage. economic loss. sickncss. injury or death of woo..el'S in the vicinity. QRA is a 
systematic appruach that intcgrntcs quantitati,-e informalion aboUI an incidenl and 
provides detailed analysis that helps to minimize Ihe likelihood ofoccumcnce a ndrtduec:s 
ils a(h~ conSC<lucnccs. QRA for process .ystems is a difficult task as the faiiu~s of 
compoocnl3and the cOnSC<lucncc:5ofan incident are randomly varied from procc:5Sto 
proccss. Funhcr. fora process system comprised ofthousandsofcomponcnts and SICPS, i I 
is difficult to acquin: the quantitative infonnation for all components (Fenlous ~I ,,/., 
200(8). Finally, the interdependencies of various components an: not known and an: 
generally assu"",d 10 bc independenl for the purposcofsimplicity. 
Event Tree Analysis (£TA)and Fault trtt Analysis (FTA) are twO distinct "",Ihods 
forQRA that de,'clop a iogical relationmipamonglhceHnts icading to an accident and 
estimnle the risk associated with the accident. 11K: tenn ~event"' is frequcntly used in 
place of the lenn Maccident" in the analyses of fault trttS and e,'ent lree' for QRA 
(Spooge, 1999). ETA is a technique used 10 describe the consequences of an e,ent 
(initiating e"ent) artd estimate the likelihoods (frequency) of possible outcomes of the 
evenl. FTA rep<1:scnts basic causes of OCcurTCIlCe of an unwant«l event and estimatc:5 the 
likelihood (probabilily) 8S well as the contribution ofdifTcn:nt causes leading 10 Ihe 
un,,'anted e'·ent. In FTA. the basic causes are lent\C1J basic e,·enls. and the unwamed 
eventiscaliedthelopevent(1 13lIsl.l%5:VeselyetaL, 1981:lIauptmanns.1980, 1988). 
Kumamoto "nd Henl ey (19%) provide a detailed description of fauit tree de"clopment 
and "naly~is fora prl)\:ess sy~tem 
In the e,'entlree, the unwanled event is named as an inili.ling c,'ent. aOO Ihe 
follow_up consequen<;es are lermed as eVents or safely barriers (AIChE. 2000). The I:.""'TA 
represenls the dichotomous conditions (e.g .. suceessl failure. lruelf al",oryeslno)oflhe 
iniliating untillh. subsequent c\"ents Icad 10 the final oulrome events (AIChE, 2000: 
Andrew> and Dunnell. 2000. Ferdous cl 1.11 .. 2009b). AICh£ (2000) and Lees (2005) 
provide a detailed procedure for constl"lK"tinS aOO analYling the ETA for a process 
system. 
EYent and faultlre"s help to COoo""l lhe QRA forproce<>ssySlemsbase<lonlwo 
major assumplions (Spougc. 1m). Firslly.lhe likeliOOod ofe"ents or basic -<:'·cnuis 
assumed lobe cX""laoo precisely known. which isnol very often lrue due 10 inherenl 
urn:ertainlies in data colleclion and defining Ihe rclalionshipsof., 'entsor basic-<:vents 
SadiQ el al .• 2008. Ferdoos el al .• 2009.), M"",,,,cr. because of "arianl failure modes. 
design faults. poor understanding of failure mechanisms. as well as the vaguern:ss of 
syslem phenomena, it is often difficu ll to predicl the ""quir<:d ~obabilily of basic-
ewnts/" 'ents precisely (Yuhua aOO Datao, 2005). Sttondly. the interdependencies of 
evenlsorbasic-<:v.nts in an ev.nl lree or fa ull tree are assumed 10 be indepe ndent.which 
is oflen an inaccurnleassumption (Ferson e' "I .. 2(l('»). These Iwoassumptions indeed 
misreprcse nl lheaClua l proccsssystem behaviorsaoo impanlwodifTercnIIYP'-"'0flhe 
uncenainty. namely d"",am:erUl;myand dep.",d;>nt:y UlK"I'rill;nty, while perfo rmingche 
QRA using FfA and ETA, In an auempl to cin:um.'cnt the ,1<,,,, uno:r1ailt", in risk 
analysis. a num~r ofrncan:h worb ha"e ~en de"doped by Tanaka ~I al. (1983); Misra 
and Web<:r ( I 990);Sin~er(I990); Kenaran~ui(I99I): Sa .... yerand Rao (1994);Sureshel 
a/. (1996); Ri\'eraand Baron (1999); Huang~lal. (2001): Wilcox and Ayyub. (2003); 
Yuhua and DaU\O (2005) and Ferdous <'I ai, (2009a. 2009b) to fadlilale the 
accommodation of expert judgment! kno .... l~dge in quantifkation of the likelihood of the 
basic-eventslevent. for QRA. Sadiq <'I {Ii (2008). Ferson <:/ "I, (2004) and Li (201)7) 
proposed metllOd. 10 describe the dt'~nd<:ncy ,,,,certainty among the bask-eventsl e"cnt •. 
FUlly-basctlandc,'idencetheory·bascdfonnulation.havei)eenproposcdand 
developed to addrccss data and dependency uncertaintie. in FfA and !:.'A. The 
inlerdependencies among the events (or bask-e.'ents) a", described by incorporating a 
dependencycodfocicnlintothcfulzy-andevidem:etht."OI')'·bascdfonnulation.forFfN 
ETA. Expert judgment! kno .... ledge Can be usctl 10 quantify the unknown or panially 
kno .... nlikelihoodanddcpeodencycocfficicntoftheeycnls(orbasic-e'·ent.). 
The tradilional fault and e,'enl trees can ~ analy~ed eilher deicnninislically or 
probabiliSlicaliy. The detenniniS1k approach uses the criSf! probability of event. (or 
bask-events) and deicnnines Ihe probabi lity of the top-cvenl and lhe r"'quency of 
outcome evenl. in lhe fault and (\'Cnt trtts. rcc'p«ti"eiy. The probabilistic approach 
l",alS lhe cri", probability as a random variabk and describ<:s um:ertainly using 
probability density functions (I'OF) (Sunil N m .. 1996; Wilcox and Ayyub. 2003; and 
2009b). Tradi tionally. the probabilislic approach U!ie' Monte Carl<:> 
Simulation (MCS) to address the rnndom uncertainty in the inputs (i . ~ .• probability of 
basic"" '~nts or ev~ms) and propagate the unc~inty for the outputs (Abr1Ihamsson. 
2(02 ). "The I'DFsforlheinpulScanhederivedfl'QmhiSlorical infonnalion. btJI all: often 
rail: es.pe<.:ially "hen lhe process syscem is compriscd of lhousands ofcomponcnls 
(Kenarangui.I99I) 
WilhanassumplionlhatlhecHnls(orbasic-evcnlsJareindcpcndcnt.delcnninislie 
and probab;listic approaches usc 1he C<lua1ions in Table 4.1 10 analyzc the fauit a ndcvcnt 
t"", •. P,del>Olestheprobabililyof'- (i ml.2.3 ... II)e,'ents(orbasic-e,·enlS).P,. undP_ 
rcspccli"e!ydel>Olcs 1he "OR"and "AND"gate operations. al\d 1. del>OCcs the frcqucncy 
for1heinilialingncn1andtheoulcomccvents. 
TMbk4. 1: Equations use. in tradilional FTA al\d ETA 
Two e~amplcs an c,'enl tree for "LPG Il:lcasc" (Figull: 4.1) and a fault 1ree for 
'"RUnaWaYrl:3Ction··(Figure4.2)-arl:considertdtoiliuscralelheuscofdclenninisc~al\d 
probabilistic approaches inQRA for the proct"ss system. "The evental\d fault trees for 
lhese1wocxarnplc.""Cll:carlicrscudicdIl:sp«li,'ciyin Lees (2005) and Ske110n (1997). 
~delennin;slkapproachprovides.quickanalysisif t heprobab;lilicsall:kl>O"·n 
occuralely(f'erdouse'"/.' 2009b). Based on ossigned probahilitics (Figull: 4.1 and Table 
4.2).lhefrequcncyof oulromcc,-cnl.for"U 'Greleasc:eventtmo"aootheprobabilityof 
lop-eVnltfor .. Runa .... lIy"'actionfauhtrec .. a"'cakulat«ia.crispvalucs(TabIe4.)).In 
the probabili$lic app"""h. triangular PDFs are ai;SumW 10 perfonn MCS (N • SOOO 
iterations)aoothePDFsforlheoulcomCCHnIS· frequcncynndthetop-e,-entprobability 
are dClcnnined oo!iCd On Ihis assumption. The 9<W. confide"",e interval . for lhe OU1Come 
c,·cnts of lhe .. L!'G c,'cnt I,..,.,·· and IOIH',-.nt of··Runaway reaction faull tree·· are 
wmmari7.«iinTabIc4.4andFigure4,3.re5pe<:tively. 
Figu.t " . I : E>'cntl,..,.,forLPGreleasc 
Fil(ure4,2: Fauillrccforrunawayreaclioninarcaclor 
Table 4,2: Basic-cvents causing lhc runaway n:aclion 
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Table ~A: Frequency dolonninalion ofwlcomc ovonlS using MCS 
lo .... roound Upptroound (50" ptrr ... llrj 
(5" ptrtt • • il.) (' 5· ptrttn.ilr) 
CI\ap!l!f4: FT"& ET"forprocess systems risk aMlysis: uncertalntyhandllngformoladons 
o_~~f---------~--
"M ! ::f------£ 
~· igure -I.J: 90% c<mt1derll'( inlerval for lop-<:~ent probability 
Uucerr>li nry in FT A wn,1 t:T A 
FTA and ETA require: probabilily data ofcvenl' (orbasic--ev~nls)as inputs rocondutta 
comprchcn~i,"e ORA for a jlrOCess system. Sirll'c most ofrhe time the crisp dara os we ll 
as PDh are rarely a"ailable for a ll events and bas ic--evcnls. expert's judgmentl 
knowle..Jgc are ofien employed as an altematiw to the oojccti,-e dara (Yuhua and DarBO. 
2005). Two types of urll'crtainlies. name ly ul~<uury un" el'i"lemjc UI,eerlUimies. an: 
ysuallyaddress..-.j "'hilc using rhe expert's know-ledge inQRA Thacker and 11 uysc:.200J; 
Ayyuband Klir.2006; Fuoousc/(I/ .. 2009b). A/euluryum:erlUjnly is a naturnl n riation. 
rnnoomness or hereroge"l'iry of a physical system. It can be well described using 
probabilistic methods ifenoughexperimenral data are available 10 support the analysis 
(Agarwal e/ ,d_. 20(4)- Epj.>'l~mk unc~rt"jnty "'cans ambigu ity and vagueness, igflOlllnee, 
knowledge deficiency, or impm:i,ioo in syslcm bthaviors, 
InORA,ilisimportan1lochal'llclerize,re~sent,andpropagaletheuncertainty 
accul'lItely in order I(} get a reliable .nalysi., Ii",,-.ver, w~n the input PDF. are 
'reasonably known', MCS can b.: u><.'<Ilo cSli",.lc and propag.le the uncertainties, 
especially IWO dimensional MCS which can cffectiwly deal "ith both "I~atory lmd 
cp;olnn;c u",'erla;nt;n (oot diseussed here) (Ilamldi and Z"', 2(08). Ifkno"ledge is 
limitedfordcfiniliMoflhcl'DFs,prubabilislicnpproachesmighlnotbtthebtstcimice 
10 handlc lhc ur\Ccr1llinty in ORA (Drusehelel"/. 2(06). In addition. tile independence 
assumption of ."enlS (or NS;c-c"cnls) might be com'cnient 10 simplify the ~TA or ETA. 
howcveritisnolalwaystruefora l lca~s(Fersonel"I" 2(04),This assumplion in fact is 
adding other kind of uneertainty. i.e .• Ihe del'.!tIlM.u:y 'mcenah>l)', during the analyses, 
Vesely., ai, (1981) sho"" several cases ofl'TA in wilen: the independent assump1ions of 
basic-c,'cnIS are not valid, 
FUlZysctand.vidcncc Iheoriesha\'C rccen1ly be.;,n used in ",anyengincering 
applications"hcrcc~pertkno"l.d8eis.mployeda,ana l lemativetocrisp data or PDFs 
(Sadiq 4'/ ai, 2008. Wilcox and An-ub, 2003; [I...., da/., 2004: Agarwal ./,,/ .. 2004; 
Ayyuband Klir. 20(6), Fuzzy ... 1 theory is used to add", .. the subjectivily in expert 
judgment. Whereas, the ev idence lh<.-ory is more prompd)' employed in hand ling lhe 
uoccrtainty arise duc to ignorance, conl1ict and incomp!tlcinfannalion, I lladdilionlO 
describe tile del'nulency unC4'rllljnfy among lhe basic-cvcnts in FTA, Fcrson cl ai, (2004) 
described the Frank copula and F=hct's limit Forkno"-ndcpendcoc)"lh. I'carson 
eom:lalion in Frank eopula dcscribes the full rangCl)fdepel'k.icncics: i.e .. frompcrf«1 
dependence to optlOSitc deP<'ndencc (Sadiq .'1 (11.,2008). U (2001) proposed D 
Ikpel'k.ic,ICY factQ< based fuoy spproach to addrc:ss the dcp.:ndencics in pcrf<lm1ingrisk 
analysis. Li(2001)u5Csfuuynumbcrstodcfinethedepcmlcncy factQ<amotlgl:oasic_ 
In Ih,s article. lhe probabililics of c"~nts (or basic-evcnts) and their dependency 
",..,fficients arc: Irc:ated as fuzzy numbers or I'1NIS. which an: derived through expert 
koowledge.FU7-'lysetandnidcncclhroriesai<>ng"ithdependcncycocfficicntBreused 
10 explore the dil'it and dl!(ltmd .. ",y uII(;<:r/w'nly in lo,N ~-rA. The fuzzy numbers in 
fuzzy set thoory describc linguislic and subjecti,'c uncertainly "hilcbjNIS incv idcn<;c 
theQry are used to handle igooranc ... incompleteness and incon,istcn<;y in upert 
koo"lcdge. A generic framework isslmwn in Figure 4.4 illustraling the use of fuzzy set 
thooryal'k.i <'viden<;c theory tollandlc tWI) different kindsl)ful1C<:rluinlws in FTA and 
ETA.Thefollo"ingscctionsdcscribcthefuzzysetthcc.ryandtheevide",",elhoorywilh 
respcct to handling uncertainlics. 
4A FUUYJClthKlry 
Zadeh (19M) introducetl fuzzy SCtS Ihal JIa,'c recently been applied where probability 
tlteo<y alone ,,-as fOlloo insufficient to represent all typcs ofuncer\.ainlics. Fuzzysct 
thcofy is flexible in describing linguislic terms a. fuzzy scu, hedges. predicatC'S 300 
qU3ntifiers(KhanaooSadiq.200S). Fuzzy sct thcc.ry is.nutensionoftraditi"",,1set 
tlteo<y, "hieh rel"\'sents imprecise ,'alues as fuzzy numbers.nd chan>etcrizes the 
uneertaill1yusingacontinuousmcmbcrshipfulICtion(p). 
1'""''''"'O'"'."''"-.. ~'.o'"''-~ I Ih<wp· ... ""'"',bwke •• "'"lO< lhtf""lIrrtt I 
". ull I,to d~wklpm~nl htol I,to dt.'dopm tO I 
I pu:~~::~u~~!: II ~=~=;=~ 
. D<fin i "~ tht _urrrn«prOOob;lily ... dtht 
;"'trdtl't"'itncit.of ... ",bwic< ... """ilh 
fuur"um"". 
. Det ..... in;nklhe f","Y numl>tr> of the 
ootoorn<<\'.n" lUId t""r~<,,, 
• D<fuuif}'inkthtOUtoonlt •• '<n,," frtq"""'Y 
lUId'helOp-< .... t'. ~;I;ry 





Figure 4.4: Fr~mework ror fT A and ETA under unCtrtainly 
Fuuy numbers an: used to describc tile nglKnc:ss and subjectivity innl"'njudgrncnl 
through a rdationship between tile un<:enain quantity p (e,g .• event or bask eVent 
probability) and a rncmbcrship fUr>Ction)/that may range betwttn 0 and I. Any shape of 
a fu:ay number is possible. but the selectc'(i shape should be justified by available 
information (but it should be ",,""al. bounded and wn.·e~). Gcnc:rally. triangular or 
trapc:r.oidal fuzzy numbers (TfN or ZFN) are used for rePfC'senting linguistic variabln 
(Kcmmlngui. 1991; EI-lraki andOdoom. 1998; Ri\'Cra and Baron. 1999; Cheng. 2000). In 
this study. we used triangular fuzzy numbers (fFN) in "hich tile fuzzy imenial • ...., 
deri"ed using ll"",utS. Figure 4.S show. a TFN ill "hich fuzzy inte .... ·als are estimatcd 
using Equation 4.1. The ' ·alues pt. p .... nd p. l>olow rel""scnllhe minimum. most likely 
and ma.~imum values. respectivciy. in an interval PO" 
Pa'" [p,+ a(p ,,- p , }p.- a(p.- p .. )] (4. 1) 
Fuuysctthooryuscstheful:l.yarithmcticQf)Crationsbascdona-cutformulationto 
maniptllate fU7.7.Y numbers (Lai el al .. 1993; Siler and Buckley. 200S; U. 2007) 
Tradition.1 fuzzy orithrnctic Qf)Cralions assume that the evenlS (or basic-cvcnlS) are 
independent and use equations in Tablc 4.S for faultt"",andevenIUttanaIYKs(c.g .• 
Tanaka el II/. 1983;Laielal.. 1993; Misra and Weber. 1990; Ri"crannd Baron, 1999; 
Kenarangui. 1991; Singer. 1990; Sawyer and Rao. 1994; Sureshela/ .. I996 and Wilco~ 
and Ay)"ub.2003) 
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H Rure-l.S: TFN to rep",sent the probabil ityofe"en(S (oroosic-evcnl§) 
Ta bIe4.S: Trad ili onalU'-<.:utbascdfuayari(hmclicopcralions 
Ol"notiDn 
Freq""ncyeslimation Aj .. ,t~ D (f'~",'~) 
PJ xP; P~=OP~·:p:= Dp~ 
P, ."} pt =I~ IP:'P: . ,~,P.~ 
"OR"gat~ P~='-~(' -P~);P: · ' - D(' - P::') 
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fliCLy-bascd a pproach rorFTAIETA 
In the proposed funy_base<I appmach,lhe probabilily OfC"CMtS (or basic-evc nts)canbc 
defined linguistically and described using TFN. The interdependence ofevenl~ (or basic-
events) is defined linearly using a dcpcndeocy coefficient (Cdl Ihat can al so bc described 
u,inga TFN. Fuzzy probability and dependcncy c""meien'" are used to dctcnnine the 
pmbabilily of (op-evenl and lhe frequency ofou(comeCvCnls in fU12ylcnns. TIlCfuzzy-
basedapproachiscompri.sedofthefollowingth~es\eps 
I Definition of input probability and dcpendencycoefficicnt u,inKTFN 
2. Dctermirulioooflik<:lihoodofow:omc:evcnlS(ETA)andlOp-c\"cn\(FTA)asllFN 
J Defuzzification 
4.4. ]. 1 IHJ;'lifitJI" ifi",,,.'p,,,b"bilif)'""dd~peldelC)'CO<'fficie"f "'·ilg TFN 
E~perts a~ mOIl' comfonable usinK linguiSlic ~x~ssion mt~r than numerical judgment 
"hentheya~a~edtodcfineanuoc~"ainquantity liketheprobability ofoccum:occof 
C"cnlS(Of Nsic-e"cnts) and dependency coefl'ocienlS (Ayyuband Klir.2(06). lnordcrlO 
Uplu~ t~sc: linguistic expressions. eight lillKuistic grades an: der.""d in the proposed 
approach (figure 4.6). It ioclu<le: Very lfighly (VII). Very Lo ... (V L). MOOallldy High 
(Mil), J.l<xkrmely Lo ... (ML). Low (L). MOO .. ,ro,1' (M). High (II). Rmht'r lligh (II.H). 
n,escs"",<lescanbc uscdtoassiKnthe probability ofc"cnls (or basic-c"cnts) for ETA 
(orFTA). 
Fi\lu .... 4.6: Mapping linguistic "",de. for FTA and ETA 
As mcmioncd earl ier. the traditional methods of fTA and ETA assume that the 
c'enlS in an e~ent trtt and the baSic-e~cllts in a fault trtt are indepeOOcnt. Ho"'e~er. in 
""",licc. !he intenicpendcr>eies among the e,'ems (or basic-ewms) could be ranged from 
/Wrfeclly de/W",lem 10 ol'pa,itely ciep"",lcm. A :;<;alar ql>anlity E [+ 1. -11 may de:;<;ribes 
the dependcr>ey between two eve~\s ..... Ilere lhe :;<;alar quanlity +1 refers to ~rfecl 
(/el",n(/"nre and -I referstoof!p/JSiledepend,·nce(Fcrson~lol,.2004). Morespccifically 
the positi"edependcncc b<:longs 10 an inter.al [0. +11. whereas the r>egat ivedcpcndcr>ec 
belongs 10 an interval [-1. 0]. Ho ..... ever. ,'arious I.,·eis ofdepcnd.r>ey are possible in 
between the c,'cnts (or basic-e\'en\s). The cu""nt work explon:s only the positi,·. 
depender>ee ofcvents (or basic-events) ot each node in I'TA (or ETA). Six linguistic 
gradesareuse<.l in thisSludy 10 dcscribe the dilTerent Icvcls of interdepcndcr>eies among 
the e\'ents and basic-e"ents that include: f'crfoctly lk""m/em (P). Very Strong (VS). 
Smmg (S), lVeuk (W). I'fry IVfllk (VW) and 'mkpen,km (I) , The 1c1! bound (CJ,) and 
the right bound (C • .) in Tab1c 4,6 are re~senting the TFNs boundary for the 
dcpcndencyc~ftltients 




(e., ) bound (e .. ,) 
I'rn«"ldepend.nc.bel\>o·~nthee"ents 1.000 
Ve'Y 'ttongdopendencc. but not fullydopendcnl 0.&00 
SI"",g<kpende~.bulnotlOOstrong 
Weal: d<pende""e. bul not 100 ",eak 
Very weak dcpendenc •• bul 001 fully in<iependent 
Perfe<lindependenccbctwecn l"" ... enl. 
4.4.1.1 ikll!rmillulioll "iliAd ihood oiml/c.,mee.-elfl und I"J>-e",.'nl u!i u TFN 
The dependencycocfficient Cj dcfines the depcndenceofthe events (or basi c-e"ents)a\ 
eachn.odcofa fault and even\ tm: (Table 4.6). The modified fU7.zy arithmetic with the 
~mpi rical ",Iation for FTA and ETA a", describ.,d in Table 4.7. "here Cr" I refers to 
perfect dependence and C.", 0 refers to complete independence among the ewn! (or 
bask-cvcnts) 
Table 4.7: Modified (Hut based fU7..l.Y arithmetic operations 
O!,< ,"" lion 
4.4.1.J D~iuuificulilJn 
li~lx D(p~,p~) 
P~ =[I - (l-C;;I.)X(l- P~I.l])(P;L 
P: :[I - (1-(.;R)X(I-P~R)JXP;R 
P~ _{I_(l_ P~L)X[I-(l-(.~L)X P;J} 
P: " {l-(l-P~R)X [I - (1-c.:;R)XP;R]} 
P~ ",{[l -(l-SL)X(1- P~L)]X r;J 
P: " {[I - (l-C~R)X(l-P~R)]XP;R} 
Dcfuu.ificalion transforms the fuuy number into a crisp "alue (Klir and Yo>a". 2(01) 
The crisp "slue is usefu l in cva lualing \he rank of outcome e.'c nlS· frequency for ETA 
and cakulating the conlribution of basic-<"ents leading 10 lhe 1Op-.c:>'Cnl ~TA A numbers 
of deful.7.ifkation melhods iocluding max membership priociple. centroid method . 
.. -eighted a>'erage method. mean max membership. cenler of ,Until. center of la~st area 
and fir.\! (or lasl) of max ima. are available in I,", litcra1Ure (Klir and Yuan. 200 1; Ross. 
1995.20(4). T,", weighted a"erage method is wmparativcly easy and compul31ionally 
efTocient 10 implement (Ross. 2004: Khan and Sadiq. 2005). Thcfollo"'ingequation for 
lhe .. 'eighted average method i. used tlldefun:ify the obtained fuuy numbers for the 
event tree and fauli tn:e OUlputS (Ross. 20(4). 
(4.2) 
4.5 [ ,· lden« theur)' (n idcnliMlrn ... ning) 
Multi-source koo .. ledlle Can provide more reliable informalion aOOut lhe probability of 
events (or basic-event) than a single so",,,.,. Kno"ledgec.n ne,-er be absolute as it i. 
soo;ially ConstruCled and nc80tialed and often sufTers incompleteness and conflict 
(Ayyub. 2(01). Evidence lheory has aliernatively be<:n used in many applications. 
cSpe<:iallywhcn the uncenainty is due 10 ignorance and incomplclc kno .. ledlle (S adiq,,1 
(1/,.2006: Wange/(l1.. 20(6). The mainad"anlagcsofcvidence Iheoryare: 
I individual be lief. inc ludingcomplcle ignorance. can bc assillned. 
2. an interval probabilitycanbeobtaincd for each uocenain parameler.and 
J. multi-source information can becombincd Ihal hclp510 avoid bias due: to 
some spc:<: ific source (SccnIZ and Ferson.2002). 
Evidence tl!cory waS first propos...od by Dempster and later extended by Shafer. This 
tl!cory is also known as Dempster-Shafer Theory (OSl) (Scntz and l'er.;On. 2002; Li. 
2001). OST uses three basic parameters. i .•.. basic Imlhability as.,ignm.'nI (bl''')' Belitf 
me"s~re (Bd), and l'I11w,'ibility me"s~re (Pt) 10 characteri7.e the uocenainty in a belief 
Slruoure (Cheng. 2000; Lefevre el "/..2002; rlae el a/.. 2(04). "The beliefslru<:lure 
re1"l'sems a ")Tltinuous imerval [belief. pllmsihmry] for the yocenain quamit ies in which 
lhet"'" probability may lie. Narrow beli.fstru<:lures are representative of more pre<:ise 
probabilities. The main contribution of OST is a scheme for the aggrt"lI"tion of multi-
soureeknowledgebasccionindi."idualdcgrcesofbclicf. 
4.5.1.1 F,atneo/Jiscemmenl 
Frame ,,/ discemmeni (FODl D is defined as a set of mutually exclusive elemems thaI 
aliowshavingatolalof2""subselsinapowefst.1(1').whcre~ is lhe curJirr"Utyofa 
1'00. For example. if D - rf. F). then the power set (1') iocludes four SUbs...1S. i.e .. : <P(a 
null set). {TJ. {Fl. and {T.FJI.aslhecardinalityislwo 
4.5.1.1 8a.icprobubilityanigrrmerri 
The basic probability Il-<signment (bl'u), also known as belief mass. is deOOled by m(pJ 
The bl'a represents tbe puniOfl oftolal kno ... lcdge assigned to lhe proposition of tile 
power sci (P) such that thc sum of the proposition is I. The focal elements. i.e .• 
by the following equation 
(4.3) 
Forcxample.supposeanexpcnreporui!ha!!heoccu"..,,,,,eprobabili!yofane,·ent 
in ITA is 80"/. true and 10"/. false. For this e"amplc. the MIIJS of ""cry subset. of m(p,) 
~an be wrinen as m(1) - 0.8. and m(F) - 0.1. The unassigned bpa is refcrred!o!he set 
m(U) - m(T. F) - O.l.This is be\:ause. the unassiilJle<l bl''' is taken as illoorance. whic his 
usualiy represeme(i by the subset. m{Oj(Sadiq f/ol .. 20(6) 
The lJeliej(lk/) me",'""", sometimes lenned as the lowcroound for a selp,. i sdcfine<las 
tr.: Sum ofali Ihc b".,softhe propcr SUbseIS/"of the sel of in Ie reS II'" i.c .• ,,, !; I',. The 
relationshipbetwcenbp" aoolJeli"jmew",..,iswri!lcnas· 
/k/(p, ) _ L m(pI) 
PI ';;' P; 
The Ikliejm<"lSuTf'S in Ir.:alxl\"c cxamplc are gi"cn by' 
(4.4) 
8d(D - m(1) - 0.8; IkI(F) - m(F) - O.1 and Ikl(f. F) - m(D + m(F) + m(T. Fl - 1.0 
4.5.1.4 Plau.ibility_ln·u,~ 
Theuppcrboond.i.e .. lhefl"u.l1b;/iIy(flJ"",wun:forasetl', islhesummatiooofb".lS 
oflheseIS/.,lhalinlers«lwilh lheselof inten:stl',.i.e .. p, /O p, ... ,p.Therefore. the 
relationship can be wriucnas: 
Chilpter4:FTA&.ETAforprocesssystemsr1ski!nalysls:oocertaIntyhMlcllr.gformuladons 
(4.5) 
The Plausibility measures for the ab<we e~amrle are given by 
f'/(n w m(l)+m(T.F) w O.8 +.0I mO.9: 
PI(F) s m(F) + m(T.F) E O.1 +O.I - O.2:and PI(f.F) s l .O 
-1.5. 1.5 R,,'e 01 combh, ,,/;,m!o, i"le,e"ct: 
The combinaiioo rulcs allow assregating the ind;Yidual behcfs of ex pens and provide a 
combined he lief structure. DS combination rule is the fundamentals for a ll combination 
rule~. Man~ modifications of tile DS rule of combination have been reponed. The most 
common modificalions in<;lude those b~ Ya~er. Smets. Inasaki. Dubois and Prade. 
Zhang. Murphy. and mo,"" recentl~ by Dezcrt and Smarand.che (Sadiq el "'-.20(6) 
Dctailcddiscussionson these rules can be found in Dezcrtand Smarnndache(20t:l4). In 
the cumnl siudy. DSand Ya~crcombination ruics are discussed in detail and used in 
devclopinglhcC>"idcnce thcory-oosed approoch for FTA and ETA. 
DS rombirw/ion rule:l1le DS combination rule uses a nonnaliling faclor (I·k) 10 
develop an agrecmcn\ among the acquired kno"ledge from multip le S<Km:cs. and ignores 
a ll conflicting e"idencethrough normalizllIion. Assuminglhat lhekoowl edge sources are 
independent. this combination rule uSCS the AND·type operator (pro<lucl) foraggrt"galion 
(S.diqel"l.. 2(06). For example. ;fthem, (p.)andml(I',).",IWosclsofev;dcn<;cfor 
lhc5amc eventcolle<:led from lwodifferenl experts. the DScomb;nation rule uscslhe 
following relalion 10 combine Ihe cyidencc. 
for p, Z <P 
(4.6) 
1-' for p, "Ic-<P 
lnlheabo,'eequalion.m',' (I'.)dellOleslf\e,ombinedknowledgeoflwo expens for 
lhe e,-ent. and k measures the degru "f conJlkl between the IWO cxpens. "hieh is 
delcmtined by the fanork_ 
k .. Lm,(p,,)xm1 (Pb) (4.7) 
P,, " I' b - <f> 
r"xercombinlilionrule: Zadeh(1984)poinledoUithallhe DScomhinalionruIe 
yicldscountcrinluili,·cresullsandexhihi1.'llhenuntCri,alinstahilityifconnict is large 
among the §OUn:es (Scntt and Ferson. 2002). To rc:solve this issue. Yager (1987) 
propo!ied an cxlcnsion .... 'hich issimilartothe DScombinalion rule cxcep tlhalito:iot:sllOt 
allownormalilation of join I evidcnce with the JlOmlalizing factor (l·k ). The tOlal degrct 
ofconniet(.) isassig.ned10 hc part of ignorancc D (Sadiq e/(I/ .. 2006). However, ina 
non· (01' less) eonnining ea",. the Yagcrtomhinalion rulcexhibi1.'lsimila rrc:sultsaslhe 
DScombiMtionntle. For high eonnict cases (i.e" highcrk va lue). itp rovides more stable 
and ro-b\lSI results Ihan lhe DS comhinalion rule (Fcrdousel(J/ .. 2009b) 
L m,(p,,)~ml(p~) 
mu(p;) " Panp~m pj 
L m,(Pa)~ m, (Ph)+k 
POnPb - Pj 
for p, = </> 
fur p,"I'Q (4.8) 
forp, _ fJ 
In the aboveuample. ifwea~umeanotherexIXnreponsnewevidern;eforlhe 
same event: m H T n ~ 0.6. m {{Fn - 0.3 and m ({T. Fn ~ 0.1. Both bodies ofevidern;e 
arecombir>ed using DSanJ Yagercombinalionrulcs.lneaggregalionoflhelnowledge 
is perfonned using Equation. 4.6 and 4.8. EqWltions4.3 and 4.4 are used to obtainlhe 
combirn,d bcliefstructure ofthee,·cnt (Tablc 4.8). 








1" {T, r f 
m - 0.48 {4">f - 0.2~ m - 0.08 
{4">f - O.06 {Ff- O.OJ {Ff- O.OI 
{T} - O.06 (F} - Om IT.F}- O.O I 
Bd(T ) Pf(T) Be/I f) Pf(f) 
0.89 I '''' I 0. 10 I 0.11 
0.62 Il93 0.Q7 0.38 
Experl knowledge i~ used to <lcfi"" the probability of occu""""" and okpendcncy 
coefficient of evenlS (or bask-e,'ents). Eaf.,h e~perl may J\a"e lheir own belief or 
koo"lcd~e lhal may be incomplele and lhal may be in COnniCI "ilh lhe olhers.ln an 
evidenlial reasoning framework. lhe igoo ... """ in an evidence is assigned to a subset 
m(O). "The connicl among lhe souree§ is dealt " 'ilh u§ing combination rules as dis.cussed 
abo,·e.Thefollo"ings«liO<1sdcs.cribctheslCpsofthec,·i<lcncctheol'y-bas.cdapproach 
toanalyu the e,'ent tn:effauh tn:c under uncenainlies 
4':;'1.1 Ikfitlirim, "'f,.,.m~ .ifdisn"''''':tlfS 
Inn:e diffe~nt FODs for thrtt uncenain quantil;('§ in FfA and ETA including the 
probability ofc,·ents. the probability ofbasic""vents and the del"'ooency c""mc ient(CJ ) 
an: us.cd toacquirt the belicfmasso:s from ditfcrcnlupcns. The subsets for the FODs.re 
gencratcd bascdon the cardinality of each FOD(O). 
Traditionally. the consequences of eVen Is in event tree analysis are dichotomoo§. 
i.e .. {T I and {Fl. "Therefore lhe FOD for ETA is defined asO {T. Fllhat Icads to four 
subsets inapowerset(l')thatincludcs{dI.ITj.IFI.IT.FII 
"The operational state of. system i,usuallydcfinedon the basi$ofevaluatinglhe 
SucceSS (S) or failurc (F) state of basic compoocnts(Vcsely el," .. 1981: Ilauplmanns. 
1980. 1988). Hencc.theoccu""nceprobabilityofabasic-evenl in FTAcanbcdestribcd 
using the FOD!} *IS. Fl. As lhe cardinality i. lwo for the FOD. the power set (I') of 
cache,·cntiscompris.cdoffoorsubsetstMtincludcsl<h.ISI./FI.IS. FI1. 
Six qualiulli"e grades of dependency arc: categorized in current study 10 de so;ribe 
intcrdcpemlcoces through depender>ey coefficients for FTA or ETA , The notations of 
the", grades all': Independent (I): Very Weak (M): Weak (W): Strong (S): Very Strong 
(VS): and Perfoxl dependence (Pl. 'The FOD for this case consiS1S of six cardinal 
tlcments .. hich is repre"'nted by!) .. {I'. VS.S W, VW.II. 
The 1>,"15 or belief masses for the c~ents (or basic-events) and the depeOOer>ey 
eoefl1cients (Cal all' elicited using the expert's kJllmlcdge. Assuming lhat lhe knowledge 
SOUl'I;es all' independent, the bp<'" art assigned 10 panicular subsets ofcach FOD. 
Howe,'cr. for the dependency coefficient. cxperlskno"ledge are collected only for the 
... bsets {PI, {VSI. IS). {WI. {VW), {I). and {D). The bl>US for each subset 
individually represenl the degrcc of belief of each expert. and implicilly, ilre pre",nlSlhe 
101al evidences thaI sU!>porI Ihe probabilily of OCCurrence ofnn e,'ent (ora basi c-event) 
and a dependency codf,cicnl(Coi 
4.5.13 Hdi,!stru("fure a"J Bet n lima,io" 
The combination rules allow merging the kno"ledge from different SQUI'I;Cs as c(}herent 
evidence. These rules help 10 account igrlOi1lnce into the kno"'lcdge alld resol~e cOflOict. 
among the soUl'I;es. 'The DS (Equation 4,6) or Yagtr (Equation 4.8) combination rules are 
used in !he current study to aggregale collected knowledge from different soul'l;cs. 
EquRtions 4.4 alld 4.5 arelhen used 10 derive the IH:liejalldpluwibililymcasure f orlhe 
probability and dependcn.:y coefficients of e~ents (or basic-e\,cnts) .The belie/and 
phlwioility !llCasure for six kinds of dependencies (in each node of FTA or ETA) are 
normalized 10 allain a geI>Crali>.:cd belief Slrutlure, Infonnation in Table 4.6. "hich 
rc~sentsthelx:liefandpl"us;l>ililyforeachkindofdependeI>Cy.isusedfornonnaliJ;ing 
the beliefstrutlure ofdependen<;y eoelf.dent for each node. SubsequenlIY.l"qua(ions 
sl\own in Table 4.9 arc used 10 es(imate the likeliiloods of ou(come cvcnlS and lop-evenl 
for (he ETA and FTA, resp«lively 
"&," pr{widcs a point estimate in belitfslruclure (similar (0 dcfuaifiea(ion). 
which is often used 10 reprcsen((hcerisp "al...: Oflhe finalc\'cn(s.l1ises(imalcdbased 
onthefollowingequalion: 
(4.9) 
"herc. wherc. td is (he .. ",.,Ii",,/ity in Ihe set 1' •. For (he example. the "'&," 
eSlimaleforlhebeliefSlruClurcoblainedusinglheDScombinationruleis cakulatcd as 
Thcdcnominalors"I"and"2"represenllhecardinalilyinlhercspcc(ivesubseIS 
Table "'.9: Equalionsloanal)"lelhccvenlar.d raul1 1rees 
0 1"'r. liO" 
-t; .. -t~D[ 8c1(P.).PI(f~)] 
&I(~,~t) '" [1 -~ -Bd(C)\W ~ - B<"I(I'/)l}>< BeI(I', ) 
1'1(1'01'1) '" [I - ~ - P/(C d)lx ~ -I,,(p,)l]x 1'1(1', ) 
&1(I'O~I) '" I - ~ - &/{I'/l}{ -? -B<"I(C)\X Bd(l~I] 
I'I(PO~ll '" 1- {I_ P/(I',I}' [1- ~ -I'I(C dll. I'/(I~I] 
BeI(I'"", I = [I - ~ -Bel(Cdl0 ~. Bel(I'A] x 8"'(1', ) 
1'1(1'"",)"'[I - ~ - I'I(CdI0 ~-I'I(I'/lIJx 1'1(1',1 
l1Iesameexamples discusscdcarl icrinS«lion4.2areSludicdi n dclaillw:rc:usingbolh 
t"u>-zy-ba.sed and e,·ide nce throry-basedaprroaches 
",.h.1 Ll'Grelca..,-ennttn:canal)". i. 
4.6.1./ F"~~h",",,dllpp"'lIc" 
The revised c,·cnl t= with fuzzy probabi lities is ill ustrnted in Figu", 4.7. In th~ fuzzy-
bascd approach. the ptobabilityof cvcnts(orbasic""" vcnts) and their depcndeoc y 
coefficicnts(Cdla",defir.edusing TFNs. l1Ie f",quencyf()l"thcQtltc~even1Sa"'then 
~stimatw using the a-eul based fuzzy formulaliolL'l developed in Table 4.7. For example. 
the path leading to lhe OUlcome c,'cnt "A" is followw by the two c,'ents, The probability 
andlhe coefficient of dependency (C,rl oft/>ese tw·o events are linguistically expressed. 
which are respectivel~' assumed to be "Modcratc l ~' Low (M L)". "Mooemtely High (MH)" 
and "Strong (Sr, Thea!signcd linguistic expre.,io", forthe-se two e"ents are conver1ed 
into TFNs (baSt.>d on Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6). The TFN for the outcome c,'enl "A" 
(.oown in Figure 4.K) is derived usin~ the empirical c-qu.tions described in Table 4.7 
Usin~ numerous trials for e"ent dependetlcy at each node of the LPG event lree. lhe 
unccrutinty rangcs (i.e .. fuzzy interval) f()l' the outcome evenl "A" are cSlimaled (shown 
in Figure 4.9). It can be obse,,'ed that the uncerutinty ranges are varicdae cording to Ihc 
changcofe,-cntdcpendcncyat eachnooeoftnecvenl 1ree 
1 .. '20 U'(; 
....... (I[) 
r"--------- 1', ,, ~:::;::tOf 
Fij:ure4.7: Event trtt with fU7ZY linguislic grades 

















Figu,"" " .9: lJnccnainty in outcomeevent"s frequcncy"A" 
-1.6.1.1 E"id,,"ce lheory-ilasedappfYHJc/t 
To demonstrate the evidence Ihcory-l>ascd approach. expens' know'ledge from Iwo 
unbiaseda!ldi!ldependenlSOtJreesiscOflsideredfordetennininglhcprooobilityas"...elias 
lhe dependency coefficients of events for ETA. The eliciled i<nowkdgc from the SOureeS 
is shown in Tablcs4.IO(a) and 4.IO(b) 
I"abkUO(a): Experts' knowledge on the probabi lityofcvcnl. 
S)'mbol E:x~rt I (m,) [~~rl2 (m,) 




E, Ignili""bplosi""mDAP 0,85 0.10 0.05 0.80 0.1 0 010 
(b): E.perts·l<nowlcdgconinlcrdcl"'ndcnccofcvcntsatdifferem nodes 
DS and Yagercombinalion rules are used to aggregate and detennine the be lief 
struCturcs of probabil ity and dependency coefficients ofe"ents for the ETA. Tab le4.11 
lists the be lief structures ofc\'cnts and dcpcoocncycocfficic nts forlhe L PGreleasee,'cnt 
tree (Figure 4.1). These belicfstructurcs and thc c-quations in Table 4,9 are u sed 10 dcri,'e 
the be lief structures for the outcome eventS of LPG release. Two different kinds of 
Q\apler4:FTA&ETAforprocesssystemsriskanaf:tsi;;:lJt"aItaintyhandl irwJlormJl<Itlons 
dependence. i.e .. independent and dependent are considered wh ilees!ima!ing !he belief 
sl"'clures forlhe outcome c~cn1S.1l1c resu lts arc presented in Table 4.12. An order of 
magni !udedifT""' ncei,obseniedinlhe··B~t ··eSl imalionforlhcou!comc cvcm··E··. Th is 
diiferenccsignifieslhe importanceofdclin ing!hcdcpendcnqrcia!ionships in ETA. 
r a bIc4.1 1: Bel iefslruCiure.for!heprobabililyand in!eNependenceo fcven!s 
t:;~;:~~! __ .,..:::",c:;":::.",," ,:::",,,.'::::ina:::;ii,,:::." __ ----""",''-'':.::',,,, ":::'':::"0::::'':::"''::::;0'''---
Table -1. 12: QutcQme ~\·~ms f~""n<;y for lWO kind ofinterd<poeOOencc of ... cnts 
(Yogcr.l\Il~ofcomb i""ti"") (Y.ger.rul~ofcombinati"") 
tl<t .. f_"'~C'o"a1I"A~iI[I.o54E-06,l.ol2E-OSJ. So, .. (T~I.QS.IE..06,ond.w(f.f) - 9.1J6.IE..06 
8ct(A) _~ + ,,~f) _ I.0$4~.()6.9·064: · ()6 _ $.5&6E.()6 
Ille diff.ren<;e of using ll>e DS and Yagcrcombinalion rules is shown in Figull: 
4.10. Intl>efigure.diffcremk;nds ofdependen<;iesarclalxledon tl>e .<·u is.Thebeliej 
and ,xuusibility meaSure for nch kind ofdependcncy;s plotted 011 the )~uis. The 
minimum and maximum ~a[ucs pA:S("nlcd in Table 4.6 are considered as the belief 
structureofdependcn<;ycoc:fficienlforca.chkind ofdcpendcncy.Tlleshade<Jurc:asin 
Figure 4.10 represent the belie/and plmuibility ",,-,asures for the ootCQme e'·enl ··A··. 
The.., areas show that the Yallucornbination rule ""-'asUl"e$a large Ixliefstructure in 
comparison to the OS combination rule. Hence. an interpretation can be mad. that the 
Yager combination rule yklds moll: con..,,,,.ti,·. results (i.e .. a la,""cr Ixlief SlructUA:) in 
the context ofnist;ng high cOllflicts in the sources. 
i----== ... --------
I'ag<' ",I. of <om bin a t ion 
, 1 S,(I()OE-& 
:;;;6.0001l-{l6 
;, 
l'igur .. ... IO: Bel iefsuucturereprescntingthcfrequencyforoulcomcevenl"A" 
4.6,2 Runa,,'ay n:~~lion - f~ uU I""" ~na ly. ", 
4.6.1.1 FUUJ'_blu~dupp"'{lc" 
To demonstmte the fuzzy-based "pproa,h for ITA. Ihe probability of basic...:vent. and 
their dependendes arc dc1incd using c.~pert linguislic cxprcSJl ions . The li nguistic 
expreSJlions arc cO",'crted inloTFNs. The linguistic expressions and the C<J""sponding 
TFNsare gi"en in Table 4.13. A total ofS-:"en difTercnt trials and the fU1.Lyarithmetic 
opcmliOfls(described in Table 4.7) are use<l 10 evaluate the TFN for the top-event. lk 
tria ls are "" tegorized based Ofl difT.rem assumpliOflsofdependencies at each node oft he 
f.ultt,..,c. The TFNs of the 1Op-e"ent for the different trial s are shown in Figu,..,4.II.ln 
Irial 7. when perfect depende""ie. are assumed. the IOp--e,'ent probability bears the 
maximum uncerta inly. Contmry 10 trial I. when lhe events are assumed independent. the 
top-evcntprobabi lilyl>cars lhcsmaliestuncenainty 
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Figu re ... I I: Uncertaintyrepresenllltion fO'IQfHven{usingditTerenttrials 
llIc fault tree for the runaway reaction as shown in Figure 4.2 i. studied to demonMrate 
the application of evidence theory.baSfii approa.ch in FfA. TIM: probabililY of basic-
events alld Ihe depclldency coeflldents for the fault tree arc obtained from two 






·S· ."",*"ond F. f"'"l1ITt 
DSand Yagercombinalion rules Bre used 10 aggregate tIM: kno"ledge and estimate 
tlM:bc:liefSlru<:tul\"S fortlM:ba~iccvcntsallddc:pcndencycocfficienlS.l"hebcl iefslru<:ture 
of the tOlH'venl is then cakulated by using the equations in Table 4.9. Table 4 .IS,hows 
tIM: belief siruc ture and the "&/" CSlimale oflhe lop-<:"cnt for Iwo CQmbinalion rules. A 
t01ll1 of """cn trials are performed using different assumptions of inlenkpendcncc 
helwe<:ntlM:basic-evcnlS.1lIcbeliefstruclUreforcach kindofdepclldcnceisdefincdin 
Table 4.6. Table 4.IS indi<;alcSlhallheuoccrtainly in ukulaling th(: beliefslruclun::alld 
"&/" estimate varies accordingly with the change ofintenkpcndcncc at differenl nodes 
0!ap!er4:FTA&'ETAtor!!OCf!SSsyste:nsrtskanatys!s:uncerta!ntyhardingtormulalions 
TabIe 4.15: IklicfscruclUresand "/k,"es\ima!ionsof!OIK"'em for different trails 
I~:~:~~~~~:~ ___ --'~=Ii~"''=-''.'''''-.'''-.'" ..''-.. '-''.''-... '-'' " .. '''b::=:''-~r_ .• _ _ 
m ~~~~~~~_~_~_~~~~_~_ 
W W 9,650E-OS 
W W 1,998E-04 
S S S S 2,S06E.()4 
'I' I' 
4.7 U"""n~jn!y-booS<'d f"nnu botion. for fn lt ~ nd ennt II'H~na ly..,.: a""m""rison 
llIc: It~clofunccr1aintyassociate<lwitha sys!cm isproportiooalloilscomplexily. "hi(h 
ariscs as a resuli of vaguely koown n:lationshipsamong ,'ariou§ Cn!ilies. and rnndomlXSs 
in the m«hani§ms go,'cming the domain. Sadiq ~I til. (2009) destribe<l complex §yslem§ 
SIKh asenvironmen!al. socio-poli!ical. cng i....,.,ring. or economic systems. "hich in~oh'c 
human intcrven!ions. and where ~ast BlTlIyS of inpulsand outputs could not all possibly 
becaptur«i analytically or controlled in anycQflv(nl;onal scnsc. MOreQvcr, rela lionships 
betWttnCaUSC'Sandcff«lsin chescsySlcmsareoftennol wcll underslOQd bul (an bc 
expressed empirica lly. Typical complex syslem. COflsist of numel'OtlS interacting factors 
or concepU. llIc:sc s),slCms are highly non·lincar in behavior and che combined cffe<;u of 
con lribu!ing faclOfSare often sub-add iliveorsu~r.ltddi li,·e. The modeling of complex 
dynamic systems requires melhods thac combi"" human knowledge and experiencc as 
... ·ell as (~pcrtjoogmcn!. When significanl hislOrieal dala exist model-free melhods sllCh 
IS artificial neural nelworio:.s(ANN)can provide illJlights imQC8u:;e..,IT""t ",latiQflships 
anduncenaintiesthroughlnmingfromdata(Ross.2004).llut. ifhistori..:aldatal'" 
suree and/or available infom'ation is ambiguous and imprecise. soft computing 
techniques can provide an appropriate framework to handle sllCh relationships and 
uncenainties. SllChu,,,hniq,,,,sincludeprobabilisti..:andevidcntialreasoning(lXmpster-
Shafer themy). fuzzy l<:>gic and eVQlutionary algorithms (Sadiq rl (1/" 2(09). Table 4.16 
pro"ides a qualitative comparison between five soft computing I""hniques including 
artificial neulal networks (ANN). decision trees (DD. fuzzy rule-based models (FRBM). 
Bayesian networks (UN) and cognilive maps{ fk!ZZY cognitive maps (CM/ FCM). Cenlral 
tQ thi s comparison is an assessmenl Qf how eath le<:hnique I",ats inhe",ntuncenainlies 
anditsabilitylOhandlein1eractingfaclorslhaten<;ompa~issucss~ifiCloengineering 
system. (Sadiq elul .. 20(9). 
Qualitati,'e and qWlntiUllivc comparisons ha,'e been pcrfonn.:d in this seclion to 
im'eSligatcthcfc8turesandun<;ertainlyhaoolingabilitiesofdiITcn:nttoolsaoothc 
propos<:d aPl>f'.)achcs for ITA aoo ETA. 11le qualitati"c comparison presented in Table 
4.17 illustrate. that most of the tools soch as Rele.~ V7.7 (2003). RAM Commaoder 7.7 
(2009) aoo I'ROFAT (1999) a", unable to haod le del"'mli'm:y u"",,,rwinry. Except for 
I'ROFAT. thc other tools cannot handle subjective uncenaimy in lhe faull a ode,'entt"' .. s 
for I systcm. PKOFAT (1999) is a fuuy based 1001 that can handle subject;"c 
un<;cnainty;ho}wevcr.ilfai lsIOatCounlforf/xsle ... icuncerfainryow;ngloigf"lOflln<;eor 
ineomplclcnessofancxpcrt·skoowledge. 
T a b!<- 4.1 6: Comparison of .ariou~ techniquc~ for complex systems (Sadiq e/ w .. 20(9) 
t;:~ C<>gJI i.;" ~ 
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Another type of uocenainty arises due 10 lock of information on dcpendcocies 
among e,'ents. Traditional fault tree analysis uses a default assumption of"independence--
among the risk ncnts to dctcffilinc the joint probability (risk) ofa parent event. This 
assumption simplilies the analysis. but may not be vel')' ",alistic. The ",Iationship 
be",'ccn risk events may be positi,'cly or ncgati,'cly correlatcd (or independent). In the 
cascoftwoindependcnte"cnts X and Y.thejoint probability of their conjuoction isa 
simplyaproductoftheirindividualprobabilities(Fersonnal .• 2004:Sadiq~laJ,2008) 
Tllc", c~ist many dilfcrcnt methods to e~prcS!i correlation (dependence) but the Frank 
Simple dcpendcocy coeffICient based empirical relations [similar to l..i·s (2007) 
approach[ embedded ,,-ithin the proposed approach can concurrently handle the 
dqlt:nd"",y unccrl<linty in fault and c,'ent tree analyses. The proposed approach 
successfully occounts for the subj«liH unccnainty using a membership function arid 
evs!uate. the uncenainty range asa fuuy inte",aL Tllccvilkncc theory based_approach 
0I.:!p!Ef4:fTA&'ETAforprocesssystemsri5kanatysi"un<Btaintyhardil!,lf~ 
can describe: Ihe ~p;s/emic and "lea/my ulICf'rlain/;<'s in expert.' kno .... ledge u.ing bpa 
andisablcIOJl!"Ovideameasurcofunc~naimyusingbeliefstructu",s 
Kelax V7.7 (20tH) and RAM C<Jmmander 7,7 (2009) a", 1 .... 0 usdul lools for 
",liabilityandsafctyengineering,Theprobab i lityuflop-cvcnlfurl~'"Runawayrcactiun 
fau lllr«" and Ihe fn.'<IlICncyufuulcumee,'cms fur the "Lru releascevem tree" ha,'c 
Ix-cn al\alyl~..J usin~ lhese lools for the same in",,1 (Figu", 4.1 and Table 4.2). Kesults 
(fable 4,IS) show Ihal by inlroducing 10% uocertaimy inlo the inpul data. Ihese twO lools 
accumulatedaoout 19%and9 ~. ofunccrtaintyonthecalculalcdtop-evenl·sprobabilily 
and outcome e"enCs fm]uency of"O",The origina l input data (Figu'" 4 .1 and Table 4.2) 
arc .wucw by 10"10 to introduce the uncenainly into the anal)'sis. The lradilional 
(JI!"Obabilistic) methods used p.wefined PDFs to describe: lhc uncertainly in Ihe inpul dala 
(i.e .. the probabil;tyofbasic e"ents orc"cnts in FTA or ETA), When tr.e crispdalaOtthe 
I'[)F . for the input data a", not known or limited (a nry common situation in process 
syslems). the FTA Or ETA an: highly dependenl on e~pert kno"ledge.ln Ihese silualions 
traditional tool. and probabilistic approaches an: not helpful. This makes lhe FTN ETA 
lessc",dible.Bothfun:ysettheoryandcvidcncctheoryarenOllimitwbya"a;lab;htyof 
delatleddala. The rcsuhs using both approaches.", presemed in l'ab!e4.IS, An expert 
knowlcdSt and assumplion of independencc among evenlS (or basic cvcnu) are used in 
calculating the top-c,'ent ptQbahility and outcome events fn:quency. In fU>.7.y·bascd 
approach. the uncertainty is assigned using the mcmber.;hip functioo, The TFN. 
cotll'Sponding 10 90% membcrsltip an: considen:d as inPUI dala for the analysis. In 
evidenc~lheory·bascdapprnachthcurn:ert:linly i.aliocatcdthroughthc unassigned mass 
(uignorancejofthepo"l'.sct.Fo'lheIO"/. uncertainlyinthebasiccvenll'fObabilities, 
the evidence theol)'-ba!'Cd approach eSlimales abou t 9"/. and 80/. uncertainti~s in the 
in fuzzy-based appmach measures less than 1% uncertainty rt:su lts in the rcsponsc: {lOp-
event'spmhabilityaswellal;outcomee.'cnt·sfrequcncy"O",jwithcom:SpondinllrUZZY 
Table 4.18: Quantitative comparison of FTAIETA tools 
DfI •• min. tiDn "rp roh. bilityorto~"~ntror"Runo ' ... y r"<lionrau 1t trtt" 
M~lu V7.7(100J) I MAJI.1 <"~=nM'7.7 
U",,~~jnlY Unc~:intY I U""~rt:;ntY U""~:inty U""~'::'inty U""~:inl)i U""~rt°a;nty Unc~:inty 
2.5510-04 ),41E4I 2.74E4I 8.7lE-O) U6E-03 3.l6E4I 286E-04 
[)elerm,nM1K> n "ffr"'l ucncyof o utcorn c c,-cnl. for U'G ""lease 
Unc.nainty Unc.nainty Uncertain'y Unccnainty Uncenainty Uncenainty 
Two tyP"" of uncertainty, namely Jll/a and <kf"''''kncy utm;r/ainly, were explored 
Expert knowledge in lenns of fU7.zy linguistic grades and hl'''s ,,"'as used instead of 
assigning the likelihood and imerdcpendcncies ofbasic-c"enlsle>'Cnls as crisp 
probabililies for FTNETA.l"hcdependcncyc""fficiem in each no<kofll1e fa~h lrttand 
evenllr« addressed lhc der",,,deIUY "n<YrlU;nly and described Ihe relalionships among 
1'" basic-evenls1ewnts. Fuay linguiSlic grades were assigned IOTFNsand a·culbase<:l 
fUZ7,y empirical re lalionsoflhe fU7.lY-base<J approach we", used 10 handle the linguislic 
and subjecti"e uncertaimy in expen knowlC<lge. For multi-source knowledge, Ihe 
incomplete and inconsistenl /HIpS we", combi...,d by using combination rules. The 
depcndc...,y c""fficients in evidence lheory-based empirical relations W'ere: used 10 
describe the t/epf'"t/eIUY "rn:.!rlllimy and analyze the fault tn:e and e,'enl lree under 
uncenainly duc 10 i...,onsislenl. incomplele and panial ignorance of multi-source 
knowle<lge 
The de.'eloped approaches w·cre appiiC<llo Iwoease studies; "LPG ",Iease,",,'enl 
lrtt" and "Runaway reaclion fault lrec·'. The inlerdependencies among I'" c,·en1.'l (or 
basic-c.'enls)we",varitdineachno<kofthefaulllrttorevcnllrec,11lcimpaC1SofllIe 
inlcrdepc:ndcncies we", obscn'td SO as 10 under.;tand the efTectsofthe depc:ndcncies of 
events (or basic-cvenlsjin FTAIETA for proo.:css sySlemS. For lWO depc:ndcncc cases of 
basic-cventsle,'cnls,lndepcndentandperfectlydependenl.lheoulput",sultsfortlleFTA 
and ETA are provided in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. ",specti,'ely. llean beobscrvC<l inlhe 
11r.;1 Ihrce rows of Table 4.19 IMll1Ie resulls remain almost the same. However when 
depcndcncy was conside",d (founh row in TaIJIe 4,19), llle results varitd by an onk:ro f 
magniludc. This highlights the imponanccofdependcnciC!l in ETA. 
T~ble " .19: Summary of ETA results 





Fuzzy-based Fuzzy inlorval (2,60E-06.9.74E-<16) 
-" 
Indepcnden1 
f uv.)·based Fuzzyime",al Perf""lly (S.78E-OS.6.49E-OS) 
-" 
""penden1 
The results in Table 4.20 all: iocoosislent mainly because ofdifTcll:nl types of 
unccr\aintics mod.:lcd in Iht different approaches. The perfectly dcpendenl case in fTA 
detcnnines Ihe probability mnge for the IOIH"'cnl lIS 10. 0.400). ",hich is a maximum in 
comparison to the i!lOkpe!lOknt case for reprncming the unccr\ainty. It can also be 
obse .... ·cd in Tab'" 4.20 that "hen the basic""",'ents are perfectly dependent, the point 
.stimal" (defuuificd ... Iut) of the top-e~en1 exhibits a higher onlcm:! mallnitude in 
comparison 10 (he dc!CnniniS(ic approach Md MCS-based approach. This confinns the 
signifiuncc of includinll (he dependencies of (he basic"""vents in PTA. Simi lar 
obsc ..... ations o f using the ""idenc" (heory---based approach for FTAIETA (fab lcs4.12 
and XVlconfinn lha(a reliable and robus(resuhcannol beauai""d ",ithout considerin g 
!he in(erdependc""iesofcvents (orbasic"""vcnlsl. 
Table ~.20: Summary oHTA resuits 













FTA and ETA are t .... o fairlyc!;1ablished tCl:hniqucs: oo .... cvcr.thc unecrta intyindcfining 
Iheprobabililiesandllk:relalio-nihipsof(ve"ls(orbasic~.·("IS)canleadloqueSlionabie 
",suits for QRA. ·rne lraditional approltChe:s reiluire lhe: kno .... n probability and lhe 
indcpentlenceassump1ionofe'"cnlS(orbasic~.-enlS).whieharernreandoftenunrealiSlie 
for procesSS)'Slems. Two di/Tcrcm approaches 10 handle Ihese Iypesofuncertainties in 
FTA and ETA are derived in this study by combining upert knowledge .... ith ful.l.y set 
liw:oryBndevidenceiheo<y.l1Ieapplicalioooftheseapproarheslotwodi/Teremcasc 
sludies shows tile proposed approaclles are more robuSllO handle Ille uncertainly in ORA 
for Ilk: proo.:ess systems in Ihc following ways 
Fu7.7.y·basedapproal'handcvide""'ctheory·basedapproal'hpropcrlyadd"'ssthe 
uncertainliesincxpertkno ..... ledgcandanaly>:etlk:c.·cntlrccsorfaulllrces 
asSQCialedwilhdifTercnlkindsofuncertainli(,sincxpcrtkno .... ledgc 
Imrod<><.:tionofdepcndencyc""fficiemin thefuuy_andtvidellCethfflry_bascd 
approaches describes imerucpcndcn(iesamong thee.-ents (mbasic-ccvenu) in a 
f.ulltreele.'entt,..,.,. 
The proposed approaches can be applied to FI"AJETA for any pr<xcss systems 
that ha,-c dala and 'kpc"'kn<"y uncertain/ie .• 
Including the ncglnivedcpendclICiesofC"ents(orbasic-c,-cnt,).aoo c ombining 
the subjectivity (using fuzzy_based approach) and illComplctcness (e,·idcllCc 
theory) inlO a single approach. e_g .. Fuzzy-Dcmp.tcr-Shafer. may offer additional 
futurc improvement to the approaches dnclopcd here. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Analyzing System Safety and Risks under Uncertainty 
using a Bow-tie Diagram: an Innovative Approach 
Refaul Ferdous.Faisal Khan. RehanSadiq ' . Paul Amyott"la"ll Brian Vei leh 
r",,"ltyofEngill<ft'inl.t Appli«lSti<n«. MemoriaIUni,· .... ity. 
'Schoolor E",in<rn",.Thc:Un iycnilyofBri';"'Col"m,"a~ 
'o.pMtm<ntofCh<mical~n&i~ngandAppli<dS<i<~. Oalhoo.irlJniv< .. j,y 
The de,'eloped manuscript for this chapter provides a detailed descri~ion of bow· tie 
analysis including its cOflstruclion and evaluation proce<lure for indumisl facilities. A 
,'c .. ion of this manuscript has bee" submillcd to the Journal of Process Slifcry (In" 
Em'ironmenw/ Prol~Clion for possible publication. 
The principal author and the co-authors worl<ed together to de..elop the research 
and manuscript ror this chapler. The co-authors provided dir«lions and 
rttornmendations !Odevelop the f11lmework and approaches for bow_tie ana lysis 
The principal aUlhor designed a ca.se stooy to demonslrate Ihe applicabi lity of the 
developed (","",work and approaches. He developed the Matlab code to simulate the 
case Slooy and gene"'lo the results ror intc'l'n.1ation. The oo-aUlhon monitored the 
progress.undim·c.tigatc-dandrcvicwcdthcoUlputrcsults.Theprincipal aUlhor prepared 
an in itial d11l1\0fthe manuscript. which was later cons«uti,·cly reviscda ndimproved 
based on the suggested comments and corra:tions by the co-author$ 
Abstract 
A bow-tie dia~ram rombines a fault t= and an e,"em t"", to "'pre~m the risk <()fltml 
param~ters ()fl a common platform for miti~ating an accident. Quantit.8ti,"e anal)sis of a 
bo"'lie is still a majof challenge sincc it followslhelraditionalassumplionso ffaultand 
nent I"'" analyses. The assumptions consider Ihe crisp probabililies and ~indcpendcnl"' 
",Iationships for the input ,,·ents. The crisp probabilities for the input e,'cntsare oflcn 
missing or hard to come by. "hi<h introduces dllia ulJa'rldinly. And. only the assumption 
of "independence" introduces mo<kl IIm:aldinly. Elicitation of npen's koo"'I«I~c for 
the missin~ data may pro~ide an altcmati~e: oo"·e'·cr. such ~oo"l«Ige incorporntes 
uncertaintiesandmayundcrminethec",dibilityofris~analysis 
This paper attempts to ",",commodate the e~pen's ~oo"ledge to O"eR;omt missing 
data and incorporate fuzzy ~t and e"idence th«>ry to as~ss the um:",/(Jinli~~. Funher. 
dependency cocmcient-based fw.7.Y and e~Hknce theQ<y appl"QaChes ha,'e been 
de~eloped toadJ",ss the "",,/el u'ICI'''"inly for bow_tie analysi •. In addition. a method of 
sensiti"ityanalysisisproposcdtopr«iictthemostcontribu\inginpute\lenlsinthebo",-
lie analysis. Todemonstrale the ulilityofthe approaches in industrial appli< at;on.a bo",-
tie diagram of the BPTexasCityacci<kmisdc,·clope<IandanaIY"LCd. 
Ke)'" o rds: Quantilati~e risk analysis (QRA). uncMainty. intenkpen(\enf,:e. 
likclihoOOs.fauitl"",anaiysis(FTA)andeventt"",anaiysis(ETA) 
'" 
"Accident" i~thetemloften use<! forthe()Ccu~nceorasingleeventotasc:<:juenceof 
e"elliS that cau~ undesired consequences. These undesired oonscqueoces may be 
environmental damage. propeny damage. economic loss. sickr.e~ injury or death 
··Risk··isafuoctionofasctofstenario( .• ).likelih.oodofoccurrcnce(l)andtII<: 
conSC<luences themselves (~) (Kaplan and Garrkk. 1981: AIChE. 2000) 
Risk " g(s.c.j) 
Risk analysis is asystematic approach that gather.l and integrntnqualitati"e and 
quantitati,'einformationofpotcntialcauses.consequences .• ndlikciih.oodsofad\'Crse 
events. Likelihood of an cvcnt r<:fer.l to a quantitative measuremcnt ofocc u~nce."hich 
is e.~PfC'sse<! either as frequency Or probability of occurrence. Fault t= analysis (FTA) 
and event lree ar>alysis (ETA) are 1"'0 well eSlablishcd tc<:hniqucs in performing risk 
analysis for a system. From a risk analysis pc:rspc:<:live. a fauillreedevdopsa graphical 
model for. parlicular system through exploring the logical relationship between the 
causes and OCcurrcnce of an undesirede,'cnt. typically termed as hasic events. and a top 
e,'cnl (Vesely ct al.. 1981: HauJllmanns. 1980. 1988). It uscs the likeliOOodsofbasic 
e"ents as input e"enl (\ata anddctermines the likclihood oflhe top cvent. The ev entt= 
constructs a graphical model of conSC<lucnces cons;".kring Ihe undesired c,'enl as an 
iniliating event and identifies possible outcome e,'ents at the end (Lees. 2005). The 
initialing event propagates Ihrough a numhcrof intcmlediale consc:<:jucnces. which are 
termedaseveniS. Each e"ent rePfC'scnts a barrie, to.:scalatc thc constqucnces oft he 
initiating event unlillhe final outcome events are idcnlified(AIChE. 2000). Like FTA. 
ETA also cons iders tne likel ihoods ofc,'cnts and initiating ncnt as input nc nt data and 
estimates the likelihoods for Ihe outcome e~ents. Tradillonal FTA and ETA assume Ihe 
input e'-cnts (probal:>ility) data are "precisely" known and Ihc indcpenden<:coflhe input 
(,'enI5( i.( .. basic cven ts.nd ncnlsj arc independent (CMPT. 1999; Sadiq CI.I.. 2008; 
Fe rdous cl al.. 2009b, Perdou, cl al.. 20 10j. Howe,'er. these assumptions are often 
unrealistic.nd Icad 10 crroneous conclusions and defy t .... purpose of risk ana lysis 
(Fcrson ctal.. 2004; Sadiq ct al.. 2008; Fcrdouset al.. 2009b; M.nowski etal.. 2009. 
Feniousclal..20 10) 
FTA and ETA distinclly inn.tigate Ihe causes and thc consequcn<:es of an 
undesired ."ent for a system, A bow-tie diagram is a combined concept of risk anal) s,s 
lhal inlegrales a fault lree and an e,'cnl lrce on th e left and right side oflhc diagram to 
representlh<o risk control parameters , ... h as causes. threat, (hazardsjand consequen<:cs, 
on a common platfo"" for mitigaling an accident. The qwmtitative analysis of a bow'lie 
diagram dete""ines the likel ihoods of the undesired event.s well as t .... oU lcome e,-entS. 
Cockshoti (2005). Chevreau et al. (2006). Oianousand Fievez(2006). and Duijm(2009) 
dcscribc the proccdure of bow-tie analysis in detail. Howe,'er. they did 001 consider the 
associa ted uncertainties in quantitati,'c .,'.Iuation , In the last few years. the bow-tie 
method has gailled acceptance as a credible risk and safety management tool bccauseof 
the following advantages. 
provides agrap/1ical represcntation of accident scenarios. 
providcse.'plicit linkages bt.1"-ccn the causes and the potcnt ial out comes. 
connccts possible outcome cventswith the undc.ired evcntand basic eventS . 
provides guidance throughout. stating from basi\: causes to t"" final 
conse<:juences.and 
providessystematich<:lpinperformingcom~hcnsivcrisk"na l ysisandsafcty 
The common objective of any safcty assessment and risk ana l)'sis t~'Chniquc is to 
nssure that a proce.'<'i or a system is designed aoo operated to meet "accepted risk" ora 
"threshold" criterion such as ALARP (S~elton. 1997: Markows~i et aL. 20(9). These 
techniques follow several systematic steps: hazard analysis. con5e<luencc analysis. 
likelihood assessment and risk estimation (AIChE, 2(00). In each step dilTerent 
approaches may be used. that colle.:tive!y guide (O ..... ardsestimating (he ris~, safety and 
reliabi lity ofa slstem. ITA and ETA individuall)' assisllhe risk and safety assessment by 
providing a qualitatiH hazar<l analysis and adelail quamitati,-eas$OSS mClltoflikelihood 
(CMPT. 1999). Ho ..... ever. uncertainties hinder ITA and ETA in performing meaningful 
quantitative analy$Os.Characterization. repre$Ontation. and propagation ofuncertaimies 
arc important and also vital for bow-tie analysis. since the credibility oft"" analysis 
fundamentally depends on the ITA and ETA. 
Uoccrtainl)' is inhe"'nl and unavoidab le in performing ris~ analysis since it belongs 
10 lhe physical variabilityofa systcm re-sponseand also to the lack ofkoowledge about 
the system (Markowski et aI., 2(09). In general taxooomy. the uncerta int )'ductonutur.l 
.'sriation or random bchavior of a s)'stem is named uie<llory uncertainty. whereas the 
uncertainty due to lack ofkl\Owledgeor incornpletencss istel1nt:d epislt'm ;cuncertainly 
(f)aeetaL.2004.Ferdousetal..2010).T...,..,twoly~sofuf\C.rtainlycanbcintreduced 
from any of the three different sources re:pn:sented in Figure: 5.1 (Henley and Kumamoto, 
1996; AIChE. 2000; Fredous.2006). Accortiinglo Figure S,I. 1M sourcesofunctrtai nly 
can be dass ified as <w1« ~nc~r/aimy, ItI(){ki "ncer/aim)' and qlll,/il}' uncerlllimy. (lu"lil}' 
uIlcal";Ill}'rcfcrs 10 Ihccomplclcand comprehcnsi,'c evaluation of hazards. including 
the idcmificalionanddescriplionoflhcirrcialionshipsindc"clopinglhe fault andc"cnt 
In,,,. K.",ursi,'c effonaoo the implementalion ofHAZOP. HAZID. and FMEA can mJ~e 
this kind of uncertainly for risk analysis (Skelton. 1997; AIChE. 2000; Cro,,1 and 
Lou"8r.2002).lIshouldbcnoledIMtlhecurrenlpaperdoesnotadJrnsthistypeof 
uncertainly whi'" ana lYLing Ihe bow-tie melhod. The main objc.:live of this raper is 10 
dc"clop a generic framework for bow'lic anal}'sis under uncertainlies. "hich indudes 
exploiting appropriale lechn iques 10 handle dill" "ncerl<limyand inlroducing Ihe 
imcrdcpcndcnceof inpulcvenlS10 cxplorc mu<klu",'crl";Il/Y. In addilion. 8 mtlhod for 
scnsilivity analysis has t>cen proposed to identify the m<lst imponant input c,'ents and 
measure the risk for the corresponding events in bow·tie analysis . 
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Fig ure S. l :Sotlrc.sofuncertainty(I'erdous.2006) 
S.2 Bo .. '-Tieanal)', is 
Bow_tie analysis is an intcg,ratcd probabilistic Icchnique that analyzesaccidcnt seenarios 
in tenns of assessing the probabi lity and pathwa)'s ofoccum:nccs (Duijm. 2(09). I! is 
intended to prevent. contro l and mitigate undesired c>'entS Ihrough development ofa 
logical relationshipbctwc"Cn the CauSCS and conSl.'<!ucne<:.ofan unde.ire devem(Dianous 
and Fic.,cz. 20(6). TI>e fundamentals of b"'Hie analysis are describcd in Ihe f ollo"ing 
A bow-tie diagram comprises five basic el.ments. Figure 5.2 shows Ihe relationships 
amonglhcseclcments. 
Causes: The causes are Ihe fundamental reasons Ihat ",su I! in fai lures. 
malfunctions. fauhs. or human error al a compo!lem level. Th"",, "'.sons are 
tenned basic events (BE). 
Fault Tn. ... (1'"1): ~T graphically rcp",,,,,nts the path of causation ~ading 10 an 
un<!esirroe,·cnl.1l1c undesircde>'cntisthetopcventandtheintcmctionsofdifTercnl 
cau""s are described using basic evems. imennediate events and logic gates 
Critical Event (CE): In a bow-t ic diag,ram, the top-e>'ent of a n is Ihe initiating 
E"cnt Trce (ED: ETscqucnccs tr.e possiblcconscqucJlCesuftheCEconsidcringa 
dicholomous barrier (i.e .. success/failure_ truclfalse. or yc-sloo) of safety function 
I-·---·---~~·--
(c.g .• alarm. automatic shutdown) or accident tSoCalalioo factor (e.g .• ;&JIilion. 
e~plosion.dispcrsion). 
Outcome e,'ems (OE): The final COflse<JUCRCes re.ulting fl'Q/ll systematic 
propagation ofa CE through the barriers are named outcome events. 
~·i2u reS.l : Elcmentsofa"IJ.oW·lje··di3gram 
/'BE-Basi<Evcn"' · IE-lnt<ml«l .... EYmls;'CE.Cri!iaoIE.rnt;ond"oE'O"'C<InI<E.<nlS) 
The coostn.tClion of a bow-tie diagram folio,," the same basic nMs as m:juired in 
devdopmcnl of FT and ET.The Ff is pllOf.'edon the lefl side oflhe diagram; i\ surts "ilh 
the ( .i,kat event (i.e., lop eHnt) and di"erges until the bask or inlennWiale causes all' 
described in lenn. of basic "venlS with the w;e of logic gates (e.g .• AND 300 OR &a1""). 
The right side orlhe bow-lie diagram com:sponds 10 ET de,'ciopment. which hegins from 
lhc crilical ,,\'cnl as the ;nitialing"\'cntandfolk,,,'slhescqIXnctsofcvenl5 
(consequences) 10 reach the oottomc events. Rased on coupled Ff and ET. all U\l~ 
ar.d consequcnccs related to a critical cvcm.recleariyar.djoimly idemifiedon tl>cbow-
tie diagrnm (Figu.., 5.2) . Many ",,,,,arel>crsinch>dingCocksholi (200S).CheH"eauetal. 
(2006). Diaoousand I'ie,·ez(2006). and Marknwski eta l. (2009)ar.d Duijm(2009) have 
illustrnted the fnllnwing basic rules for bow-t ie cunstructiun : 
Output ufa Fault Tree (i.e .. topc"cnt) i,the starti ng point (i.e .. in itiating event) 
FTand ETare linked toa cnmmnn critical event 
T)·picalcausesa",identif,edandplaced()llthe~'''tU$idl!(lcflsi.lcord;agram). 
Credible 'iCenarins and outcnmes a", depictedn" therlW"/"" · .. ,,/si,1e (nght side of 
d iagram). 
All brnnches from the P"'"<"'I'tU .• M., COIWCrge towards the cntical c.entand the 
brnnchesnn thepo.<I-ew.'tII sidc diverge until al l possiblcnotcomte"cntsare idcnt ifoed. 
Once the bow-tie diagram is cunSiructed. quantitati.·c analyses can be perfnnned 
follnwing the traditiona l assumptions ar.d mathcmatical up • ."",tions (Table 5.1) for ~~rA 
ar.d ETA. Hassal (1%5). Veseley et a l. (198 1). Henley and Kumamoto (1996). AIChE 
(2000) and Ferdnosetal.{2006. 2009b.2010)deseribelbetracl ilional conj unction 
ope ralion for "OK" gates and the intersection nP<'ratinn for "AND" gales fnr ITA and 
ETA. The quantitati>"C cvaluluion to dc1cnnir>e the likelihoods nftll<: top eve nt ar.d 
oulcome events for FTA or ETA is often challenging and highlydepc:ndent un the quality 
ufknowledge about the system and availabil ity of precise data such as probability and 
inlerdepen.denceofinpUle>'CnlS,Thepreciseprobabililyvalucsofinpule>'enlSare rall\c, 
scan:eandareeilhcrl),pieallymissingordifficullloacquin:(Panan.dYun. 1997) 
T~ble 5. 1 : Equalion,use<l in lrnditional bow·tie analysis 
Approach Ol~r. llon [qnli"" 
Conjun<lion 1'01< _ 1_ [1,(1_1',) 
I'ANO = D,P, 
5.3 Il<>w·Tieanaly"i. underun C<'rtwinty 
{)(,/u an.d m<J<kl "licertu;nlyare common and gcnerally una,'oidablc. In a majority of 
cases. Ihc likelihoods of inpul evenlS are oflen missing or limilN. an.d lead 10 d,,/u 
"nc",wj~ty(Sadi q elal.. 2008: Ferdous el al.. 20093, 2009b. 2010). On lhe olherhand. 
deficiencies in add..,ssinglhc imerdcpendcnce of input e" .nts in fomlUlation oflhe 
conjunction and intcn;o.",tion operations inlroduce ""-'<lei u""",winly. Bow·lit analysis 
combines II\c operations of FTA an.d ETA and delenninc, II\c likelihood of a crilical 
.venl as well as II\c oulrome evenlS. Hence, any unaddressed uncertainties in ITA and 
ETA evenlually propagate 10 lhe 11nal estimation of bow_tie analy~i~. A number of 
tneoriesincludingprobabi lity trn:ory.fuzzyseltrn:oryandevidcnccthcoryha>'ebe<:n 
proposed 10 describe uncertainlies in risk analysis (Abrahamsson, 2002: Senll and 
Ferson: 2002, Wilcox and Ayyub,2003: Ferdouseta l.,2009a. 2009b.2010). Monte 
Carlo SinlUl ation (MCS) is one of (he most popular an.d common techniques in 
probability theory (Abrahamsson , 2002; Wilcox an.d Ayyub, 2003). MCS is a sampling 
technique that reqlliresprobability dcnsityfllnctions that an: eitherdcrivtd from 
historical data or an: assumed, However. these probability density functions an: difficult 
10 obtain (Wilcox and Anub. 2003). Expcnjoogmeni/lmo ... ltdge is often ~mrloyed as 
an altem. tiyc source ofobjccti'e data to avoid d(1l(1 uncertainI)' in ETA and FTA. This 
elicited joogmentlktlQwledge may be $Objected to imprecision. vaguel\Cs" 
incomplctcl\Cssand inconsisten<:y (Ayyub and Klir.2006: Ferdousetal .. 2009b. 2010). 
In an attempt 10 circum"ent these tH'es of uncert(l;IfI;CS in ETA and FTA. many 
researchers in<:luding Tanaka et a1.{198J). Misra and Weber (1990). Singer (1990). 
Kenarangui (1991). Saw)'erand Roo (1994). Suresh (tal. (1996). Ki,-cra et 81.(1999). 
Huang e1 al.(2001). Wiicox and Ayyub(2003). and Fcrdousct al.{2009a.2009b.2010) 
havecxpl<:>reddifferenlmelhodologics.Markowskictal.(2009)sp«if,caliydcyelopoXla 
fuzzy-based appr<Jach for bow_tie analysis: ho"'·ever. this approach is not capablc of 
capturing un<:eMainly due to ignorant". inromplelCness and intonsistency in tile 
~nowlcdgc. FUMher. this approach was unable tQ duractcriu: model uncert"i,,'Y that 
arises due: 10 the &ssumplioo ofindcpcndencc among the input events in FfA or ETA, 
A generic frame...-,,", for bo"'·lie analysis has been proposed in Figure ~.J that can 
IIandlc data arod modcl uroccJ1ainties in risk analysis. T"" diffcrenl approaches. fuzzy-
based and evidencc lheory_bai;e{J are devclopcd and used in tile frnmeworklQaddn:ssthc 
different kinds ofuntcnainties in bow-tic analysis. Fuzzy-bai;e{J approach is used to 
address the unccnainty duc: 10 vaguc:ncss. imprecisiooand subjectivity in an upcJ1's 
knowledge. whereascviderocc throry is used for handling inconsistent. intompletcand 
COllflictingevidcn.cecl ici lcdfromthcdiffcrcnlcxpcrts. Todescribo the inlenlt...,ndcnceof 
inputcwnls .. adcpcndcncyooclf .. icnt(c.:Jhasbet.T1aOOpredandemhedde<;linbod!approai.:he:s. 
Figure5J: I'roposedf",mew<>rl<f()f" 8<Jw-tieanal y.i. 
A deptoden<;y coefficienl (C~) within tlte range ofso:alarquan\ity E 1+1, -II may 
dc:so:ribe tlte po5sible kind of interdeptoden<;ies amons tlte input eventS. TIM: so:alar 
q"~nlilyC4 · +1 rcfersIOptrfccldcptndcn<;e. (;,j " OrcfmlOiooeptoocn<;e.and(;,j - -1 
rders 10 Ihe exislence ofopposilc dcptnden<;c amonll Ihe inpul cven1S (Ferson cl al.. 
2004; Li. 2007). TIte fundamenlals and details of lite proposed approaches are 
sub5cqucmlydescribedintltefoliowinllsul>-s«lion. 
TlM:basiesoffuayse\\iIrotyandcvidcn<;clilrotyarediscusscdin\hiSSC<.'lion. 
J.J. I . I,.·uuyulllleory 
Zadeh (1%5) f,rsl inlroduced fU7-ZY ""I lilroty in hi. pioncering ,,'Ori<.whcrelte lIIgucd 
Ihallradilional probabililylheoryalonei.insufficiemlorcp"'""malltypesof 
un<;ertainticsbecause it lacked lheabililYl0modcl human conceptualizalionsthat may 
occur in pra<lice. Fuzzy selthco<y is able 10 caplure subjecli,'c and nguc: unccrtaimy and 
can i>cv;., ..... ed a.ancxlensionoflnadilional SCt lheory (Fcnlouscl al.. 2009b. 2010). I I 
provides a languallc wilh syntax and scmantics 10 translalC qualillllive 
kno ..... lI>IlgeJjudgmem. imo numerical ",.soninll. For many enginec:ring applications 
includinllsafctyasscssmentandriskallalysis.fuuysc:ttilrotyisnowlwcll-lII.:ceptedand 
established lechnique.especiallywith rcspec\ to handling vaguenes:5. Rom (1995. 2(04) 
and Ayyuband Klir (2006) elabora\e on Ihe foundalionsandarilhmeticaloptralionsof 
Ihistechniqucforcnginecringapplkalions 
FW.7.ysetlhroryusesfuaynumberslocxploillllenurr.:rical",lalionshipbclwecn 
an uJ'k:crlain '1uanlily p (c.g .. basic CYcnIS. or c,'cnl probabilily) and a membership 
fUJ'k:lion. which ranges belw"""n 0 and I. A fuzzy number can be fomled by any t><Kma1. 
bounded and convex funclion. e.g .. Iriangubr. lrapewidal and Gaussian shapes. 
Howcver.lr.e selection ofa fUJ'k:lion essenlialiy depends on IhevariablccharaCICrislics. 
"".ilable infonnaliOll and expen's opinion. Triangular or lrapewidal fuzzy numbers 
(TI:N or ZFN) aR: commonly preferred due 10 Iheir sim pl icily. In Ille currenl paper. TFNs 
are used 10 quanlify Illesubjecli,'c and vaguc uJ'k:crlaimy in an cxpen'sknowlcdgc. For 
example. a TFN (FiguR: 5.4 ) is Ille simplesl possible shape Ihal can e.~press Ihe 
uncenainly in the likelihood eSlimales ofinpul e,'enIS and dependcncy coefficienls for 
inlerdependence. A TFN is a "eclor (I'J.. P". f'vl thal can be "'presenlcd by a lower 
boundary. most likely value. and upper boundary. "Then...,UI in a TFN "'presenlS the 
deg"",ofmembershiporcontidcnceaboutlhe uJ'k:enainty in a quanlily 
,:t "",,, /\ 
" ::c:LtL 
o O.)$PL P .. I>RO.ll 
TFNofc·,c,,,.probob;t;ty 
Figurc S.4:TFNrepresentingtneUJ'k:enaintyof likcliiloodofaninput 
5.3.1.1 t:"id~ltce lheory 
Evidence throry evol"cd during the 1970s through tile combined effon of D<: mpster and 
Shafer (Yans and Kim. 2006: SenLZ and Fcrson. 2002). Tile rnoti ... tiOll behind the 
development of this theQry was to characterize I~ uncertainly caused by partial 
il!:noranc~. knowlwgedefidencyor inconsislcncy about a system by Ihc experts (Sentz 
and I'erwn. 2002. Sadiq elaL. 2006: Wange! al.. 20(6). Unlike traditional probability 
thwry.evidencethWl)'considersthesubjectiveprobabilitiesassigne<lbyanexpenas 
c\'idence and allocates them into the com:sponding subsets of a power sel. l1Ie 
Ilnassigne<lprobabilityduetomissinginfonnationisassignwlolheignorance subsct (as 
opposed to the ilaycsianapprooch Ihat distribulCS missing evidence in rc:mainingdisjoin t 
subsets) (Sentz """ Ferson. 2002; SadiQ et al.. 20(6). Sentz and F~rwn (2002) have 
described the foliowing..J.·antagesofevidence trn:ory. 
individual belief can be expressed by probability mass function that may bear 
incomplctencssfrom partial to full ignorance. 
a belief interval (similar to interval probabilities) can be obtained for cach 
uncmain parameter. and 
bias from a spccific sourc:e can be avoided and conflicts among different sourc es 
can t>e resolved through a bcliefstructure. 
Evidence theory uses three basic nlellSllres ·lJ.askl'm/xl/,iliryu$.5ig"menJ (bpo). 
&li.I(&/). and Pluusibilirymeasllr<: (I'f). to characterize the uncenainty in a belief 
stt"Ul:ture (Chen~. 2000: LcfC\'rc et al .• 2002: l:lae ct al.. 20M. Fenloos et al.. 2010). ,.Ilc 
beliefstructurei.acontinuollsintc .... ·al [bdkJ,p1dUSibiliry[ in "hich a true probability 
may lie. A narrow belief struetu", indicates mo", prttise probabilitie •. l1Ie evidence 
theory also provides rcasooing·based combination rules. whichaliow tllc agg"'gation of 
different beliefs provided by diffcrent experts (Sadi" et al.. 2006. Ferdolls e!al.. 2 010). 
[vidence the<)<)' characteri,.<:s the u",enaint~ in a raramcter (c.g .. likelihood of 
basic event. e"enl and depcndc",~ codl1cicn t) ",ilh a defin ition of frame uf dim:m"",nl 
(FOO). The FOO is a set of mutuali~ exclusive clements that "1I0",~ having a 100al of2.a. 
subset. in a po",er set (P), "here 101 is Ihe cardinantyof the set. For example.lwo 
cardinal element., True (n and False (F) . can t>e represenled by a FOO !J m IT. FJ and 
ma~ conta in four subselS. i,e .. \ <P(a nu ll sel). {T}. {F}. and {T. F}}. The lasl subset. {T. 
F\ •• ccounlsforlhe ignornnce of an expcn's knowledg" ",hich arisesd"" to i",omplele 
and lackinginfonnalionaboulasyslcm. Thcfoliowingcquationsincvidc",clhcoryare 
generally uscd 10dcvclop a computablc mc\hodology usi ng thecxpcn's koowledgc . 
bp<l: The basic probabililyassignmcnl (bp<l}n:fcrs IOlhe subjeclive probabilily 
foraproposilion . • ndisdenotedbym(pi) . liprovidestncsupponingcvidencefor 
each subsi.10fapower set. 
(S.I) 
lkl, Belief""'lISurc(lkf) represents the lowcr bound t>elieffor3 5C:tp,3nd is 
definedaSlhe sumofalilhebprupropc:rsubselsp,oflhesetofinlen:stp •• i.C .. (I, 
(5 ,2) 
1'1: I'lausibilitymeasure (I'f) represents the uppcrbound be lief for a set 1', and is 
thc summalion ofbp<r5 of the sets I" that inter>«t ",ilh the sel ofinten:SI 1',. i.e .• I" 
PI(P j ) - L m(Pk ) 
Ptnpj"'q, 
(5.3) 
SJ.l Applicati<)n of un~erbinry apprQ>l ches in !>ow-tie analysis 
Iloth lhc fuzzy-based and evidence lhcory_basedapproaches have t>«ntonsidered to 
handle,ilJ/o undltWlkl uncl:r/«inlies in bow-lie anal)'sis. The likelihoods of the input 
evcnlsaoothcirintcrdcl"'ndencyn:lationshipsaredefincd by fuzzynumbersorhl'<l< 
Expe" koowledge from a single or multiple sources is emplQyed 10 elici lthe fuay 
numbers or bras. A dependency roefficient (c,,) has i:>e<:n introdUl:ed to deS<.:ribe the 
imerdepeooence Qf input e,'ents (basic e>'ents and e,'ents) in the bow_tie. The fuay 
numbers address the linguistic and subittli,·. unce"ainty whereas bflilS in evidence 
theory explQn:s lhe uo"ertaintydue to incompktenessaoo inconsistency in the e.~perfs 
knl.mledge. The following two =Iions elaborate the stepwise mClhodolollY dC\'elormcnl 
offw.q-based and evidence Iheory-base<J approaches. 
$.J.l.fl-·uu,y./JusedopprtXlc/t 
In lhe prop<lsed fU7~y_based approlll'h. ~ likdihoods of inpllt events are defined 
linguistically using TFNs. T1>e imenkl"'ndence nfi nput events is defined line arly using a 
dependencyc<Jefficiem(~lhatcanalsob<:deri"ed using the TFN. The fU7~y_base<J 
approachisoomprisedQfthefQIIQwingfQurSlcps: 
1. FuZ2y numbers 10 deline likelihoods Qfinpul evenls: EXl"'rts a",,,,,,,,, oomfortable 
using linguistic expression ralhert"an numericaljudgmenl wl>en they a", asked IQ 
delineanunce"ainquanlity like the likelihoods Qf inpul cventS or dependency 
c<Jefficienls(Ayyuband Klir. 2(06).lnorderlocaplu", lhcsclinguisticcxpn:ssions. 
cigh l linguistic gradesha>'e i:>e<:n proposed 10 deline llle likelihoodsQf input c>'c niS 
(Figure 5.5). However. tile lower aoo upper boundary ofTFNs for each kind Qf 
linguis(icgradccanbt;"aricdaecurdingtothcdcfinitionofas)'stem.Thepr<Jpo~ 
grad~ arc Vny High (VH). V~ry Low (Vl ). Moderately iligh (Mil), Modera/ciy Low 
(M l ). U)w (l). Moderate (M), High (II). Rather lIigh (RH). The li hlihood Or 
probabi lity of input e.,ent, for the how'liecan be assigne<.! usingthcsc gr .des. 
t'igure 5.5: Mapping linguistic grades on fl!T.ly scale 
In praclicc.thc intcrdcpcndcncc of input events (i.e .. Ihe events or ba sice,'enls) 
can lie anywhere in the ran~c from P':if<:<'t "e~ndem:e to opposite d,.'~",lence 
(Ferdous et al.. 2010). TIlt posil i" ~ dependence belongs to the interva l (0. +1). 
whereas the negati,'~ dependence n.:longs t01he inte .... al [-I. 01 (Ferdousci al" 20 10) 
Fi,'clinguislicgrndesnreimrod ucedin lhisstudytode$Cribelhefivelypesofposili ve 
dependence of input cvcnts thaI include: Perfeci D<:p"n<km:e (P). Smmg (S) 
J/Olremle (.\(1, Weak (W) ond ltulel't'tulent (IJ A similar linguistic grade wilh a 
negali,'csigndefineslhenegati,'edependencefortheinputevenls. The dcpendency 
coeft1cient (C,) categorizes the difTcrcnt kinds ofdcpcndcncc with an urrn: rica l r.mSt 
hounded with Ihe lo ..... cr(C,L) and uppcr (C.w) va lues. Thcrangcs in Figure 5.6 are 
consideredinconstruClinglheTFNsfurthcdcpcndcncycocfficicnts. 
~ J , t~~~r----,.'~~~I 
(p) (S) (Ml j ::: 
Fi$!urt5.6: Lower (C..) and Uppcr (C...,) bounds for each kind ofdtpcndcocy 
2 Aggregation of fU12y numbers: Aggregation provides an agreement among tile 
~onnkted kno .. ledgc providC<! by dilfemll experts (Lin and Wang. 1997). Wagholiar 
(2001) ~ummaril.C<.I a number of aggll:galioo operations including minimum. 
muimum, arilhmc1K: mean. mtdian. quasi-arithmetic mc:an. symmetric Sum and \-
norm for aggregating the fuzzy numbers. The weighted Dvnagt mC1hod is 11M: moSt 
commoo method. which allow. the aggregatioo according 10 prior weights Ofl the 
arguments. The ..... cighlcda'·cragccqualion for aggregating m cxpcrts'knowlcdgc in 
fuu.y numbers can be deHn.ed as: 
(5.4) 
"hcr.:Pi i~lhe:fu.zzy numberofuncerlaininputeYcnlieliciled fl'Qfllexpenj. "isthe 
numberQfinpulCvCnlS.",islhe:numberofcxperls .... jisawcighlingflOCtorassigned 
for upenj and P, is lhe: aggregaled fuzzy number. 11K same equation can also be 
used in al!gregatinl!tr.c fuzzy numbers of dependency coeffocicnts provided hym 
experts. 
J. DcH:nnination of lil.:clihood of critical e.-cnt and outcome evems: I'w.qarithmetkal 
opcratioosare n:quin:d tocalculatc the: li~clihoodofacritkale"ent and thcoutcome 
C'"cnlS for bow-tic analysis. The dependency coefficient-based fuzzy arithmetic 
operations have bttn developed and proposed for the bow-tic analysis. Table S.2 
summariRS the modified fu7.1.y arithmetH; "'itk r.:lati,·c equations 
O""n ' ion 
Conjunction 
TybIt S.2: Modifiedfu7~yarithmeticoperations 
pm.· .. D(p~·p~) 
• r; ",[1-(1 t C~ )~(I- P;L )]x P~L 
p; =[l-(l t C~) ~( l_<,)]X P;R 
r; " {l-(l-P;L)~[I -(1 tC:L ) ~ P~L]) 
r; " { I -( I-P;R) ~[ l - (l tC:R)~P;R]} 
r: .{[ 1- (It C:L )~(l - P~L .J~ P;L} 
r; " {[I-(ltC:R)~(l-P~R.J- P;R} 
4 Defuzzificalion:(kfuzzificationlransformSlhefu7.zynumbersinlOacrisp'·alu(Klir 
and Yuan. 2001). Thc crisp value is useful inoclcnnininglheranksofl ikcl ihoodof 
ouloome eventS and calculating the contribution of basic e"~nts leading 10 the critical 
event and outcome events in bow-tie analysis. A num berofdcfu7.7.ificationm<:thnds 
including max m<:mbership principle. centroid method. weighted average method. 
mean max membership. center of sums. center of largest area and first (or last) of 
maxima. are available (Klir and Yuan. 2001; Rl.>S'i. 20(4). The weighted average 
method is comparati ... ly easy and comp<ltalionally efficient . This method is used 10 
defuzzifythe fU7,zynumbers for the bo'Hic analysis (Ross. 2004: Khan and S adiq. 
2005) 
(5.5) 
S.J.1.2 I::,'id. nct! llu(),y_bll ... d " ppmllch 
Different experts may have differenl beliefs thai may be incomplele and connicl with 
each other. Eviocntial reasoning can address Ihe incompleteness. inconsislency and 
igoorance in the experts' knowledge. The theory alloeates the missing hI''' to the 
'Bnorance subset. i.e .. m (fJ) and deals ",'ith the conflicts amonB the sourecs by employinB 
combination ruies (Ferdouset al..2010),The foliow ing se<:li{)!"ls <icso;riiJe the steps of the 
evidence theory-based approach for bow-tie analysis 
unceMain parameters (i .e .• likelihood ofe,"ents and basic events. and dependency 
coefficient (C4.l) arc defined 10 acquire evidences as hp .... from the expert"s 
kn,,,,-Icdge, The sub"'l0 for each kindofFODare gcncratcd based on t"-:irc ardinality 
in the FOD (D) 
Traditionally. the conseq"""'e of an event is dichotomous arid considen the 
binary situation s. i_c. True (T) or False (F). Yes (Y)or No (N) and Success (S) or 
Failure (F). 10 propagate lhe consequences for identifying the outcome events 
Thcrefore.theFODforanC\'cnlcanbedcfinedasD{S.Flthatleadstofoursub"'IS 
inapowersel(l')tnati",ludes{<P.{S).{F).{S. F)1 
Thcopcrational SlatcofasySlcmisusWlllydetincdon the basis of evaluating Ihc 
SuCCeSS (S) or failurc (F) stnte of basic componems (Vesely eul.. 1981), Tnebasic 
componCnlS lermed as basic e,'ents can be described with the FOD D - IS. F) 
(Hauplmann •. 1980. 1988). A.the cardinality i. two for thi , FOD. the power set of 
eachbasicC\'entiscomprisedoffoursubsetsthatinclude {<P.{S).{F). {S.I'D. 
Nine qualitative grades are categorizcd in the current study lodcscribc pos iti,·c 
and negati.'c dcpcndcnce of input events forbow·tie analysis. The ootationofthcse 
grades ""': o,,,,,,,,ite d~l'e"'wJ1CI! (F); Nega/iwly Sirong (S); Ncgali ... ,iy MQ(krYllc 
(lIf); Negmil'ldy Weak (IV); /",w//e>kkm (/); SJl'<mg (S); A!OOUillf (,IQ: II'e<lt (W)' 
amJPcrfocl(/eJ"'I1(/ence(I') The fOD for this case COllsists of nine cardinal 
elements .... hich CM be represenled by D - /P'. S'. )1.1'. W- .1. S. M. W.P} . 
2 Detcrminationofbl'ru:Theexpc",·koo ..... kdgchasbeenuscdtoacquirelhcbl'Mor 
belief masse, to del,ne the likelihoods of the input events and dependency 
coefficients. Assum;ng that the koo .... -Iedgc SOUrces are independent. the bpt's D'" 
assigned 10 ra";cular subset. of each FOD. Ho"-c,'.:r. to define the dependency 
cocfficicnt.cxpert knowledge is colh:ctcd only for the subsets (P-). (S-) .(M·}.(W-). 
IS}. {M}. {W}. {PI. and (OJ. The b".", in each subset individ""lIy represents the 
degree of belief for each expert. and implicitly represemsilietoul evidence that 
SUPf'Oruthedefinitionofl ikelihoodsofinpUievents{i _._.evenlsorbaske"ents)and 
depende",y cocflicicnts (Cd) 
3 Combination of koo .... lttlgc: The combination rules in evidence theory allow 
aggregation of diIT.rent degrees of belief from diITc",nt expen's koo .... lcd~c and 
provide a combined beliefstnJClure (Fcrdouscl aL. 2010), The Dempslerand Shafer 
(OS) rule is Ihe fundamental combination rule de,-eloped in evide",. lheory. A 
number of modificalions of the DS rule on Ihe basis of minimi'lIlion and 
oormaliLlltionofconflicaamonglhe ditTerem so"",es have been ref'Oned (Sentz and 
Ferson. 2002; Sadiq ct. al.. 20(6). The mosl common mod ificat ions include those by 
Yager. Smels. lnagaki. Dubois and Prade. Zhang. Murphy. and more "",enlly by 
Dezcrt and Smarnndachc (Sadiq c1 al.. 20(6). Detailed discussion and comparisons of 
thesenJiescan be found in DelenaJ1dSmarandache(20t:.W), To address IWO eXlreme 
casesofconfliCl ions.high-<:ontliclandnon-contliclissuesinthcexpens·kn-owledge. 
DS and Yager combinalion ru",sare used in this study. The details ofthcse two rules 
"",givenbclow. 
os role o[combin",;on; DS combination rule uscs a oonnalilin~ foctor (I-k) to 
<kvelop an agreement among the acquired kn-owledge from multiple sou",es. 
and completely igoo"", the conflicting evidence through normolbrlion, Th. 
combination rule useS the AND-type operator (prodUCt) for aggregaling 
kno"ledge from indepcndcntsouree.{Sadiq~al.. 2006). Forexampk,ifthe 
m, (p.) and m, (1'.) are tWO set~ of evidence for the same event collected from 
tWO different e.~pcns, the DS combination rule uscs the follo"ing relation to 
for p,., <p 
(5.6) 
ji".P."' <P 
In the above equation, m, .J (1',) denotes the oombined kno"ledge of tWO 
expcns for the event, and ~ measures the ,klJ"'e of <vnflicI bctwc;:n the 1>"'0 
expcns, which is dctcnnincd as 
Lm,(p,, )xm , (Ph) 
P,,"Pb - .p 
(5.7) 
b. Vager rule of combination: Zadeh (1984) pointed out that the [)Scombination 
rule yields counlerintuiti.'c resuits and c~hibits nUrT., .. ical instability if the 
confliclamongthe soureeS is large (Scntland Fcrson. 2002). To resolve this 
issue. Yager (1987) proposed an extension. "hich is similar to the DS 
combination rule except that it does not allow nonnali7.ation of joint evidcnce 
with thenorrna lizing factor (I·k) . 'Inc 10lal dcgre<: ofcoof1ict(k) iSBSS igncdto 
the igroom"ce suhsct (Sadiq et al.. 20(6), However, in a non· (or less) 
conflicting case. the Yager combination rule exhibits similar =ults as the DS 
combinati"" rule For high-c.mflict cases (i .e .• higher k v31~). it provides 
compar.lli~ely more stable aoo robust results than the DS combination rule 
(Ferdousct al..l009b.2010). 
L m,(p,, ) ><m , (Pb) 
m,., (Pi ) " p"n p"p/ 
L m,(p,,)xm,(Pb)+k 
P"n Pb" p/ 
jorp. _ '" 
jorp, ~D (5.8) 
jorP._ U 
4. Iklief Slructure aoo lIet estimation: Ikl iefstructures for tile ur.ccnain parameters 
ir.cludinginputenntsaoodependcr.cycoefficientsarederi,·edusingtlleassigned 
bfJ<ls.combinationrulcs.aoo equations of lie I aoo 1'1 measures. In onlc, tonnain a 
gencrn lized belief structure. tile belief and plausibility measureS for rocfficicnts are 
nonnaliud. 1'he ranges dcpict~"d in Figure 5.6 aoo the belicfstructures of each kind 
of dependence are emplQyed forno'IIlali7,ing the fina l beliefSlructure. Equation 5.9 
refers to the nonnalization techni"ue lhat is useil W detcnnine the belief structure 0 f 
lhedepender.cycoefficicntfortheinput c~cnts.TabIc5.3 is then applied to calculate 
the likelihoods ofa critical e~cnt aoo the outcome c'enlS for tile bow-tic analysis. 
IIkI(C •• )><C ... 
lkl(C. )~ , .-. • 
L ReI(C • • )><C. ,. + L PI(C •• )><C .. ,. 
,,' ... , (5.9) 
i, PI(C • • ) ><C ... . 
PI(C. ) .. • ..' • 
L Bd(C •• )><C ... +L PI(C •• )><L·." 
~, ~, 
"hcn:.lkl(C~Wldl'I((-';Drethcbcliefandplausibilitymeasurnforeachkindof 
kind ofdepcmkncydepictcd in Figure 5.6 (t.lI .. forS. c..., .. 0.7 andC .... c().995) 
'!W," represent.'l a point estimation based on belief structure (similar to 
defU7.zification). It can be detcrmif>ed u~ing the follo"ing equation: 
8('/(1') .. L "'(1'/) 
p, ,,;,pIP; 1 
(5.10) 
" ·hcre.\p,iistheccm/i,,,,/iry in the set", 
l'yb"'S.J:DcpcOOency cocfficicmhasede<jUlltions 




I'm: " O [BeI{l'i).PI(l'iJ] 
• &/(l'o~,): [1- ~ ± &I(C d)~ ~ -&/(I'j)}]X lkl(l', ) 
1'/(1'011'): [1- ~ ± I'/(C d)~ ~ -1'I(l'r)}]X "1(1', ) 
1kI(l~~I) '" 1- ~ -1k1(1'/)}_[I- i ± lkl(C d1}_lkl(l'lJ] 
1'1(1'0111 J: 1-kl. pl(I'/)}~[I- ~ ± I'I(C d J~ 1'/(1')] 
lkl(l'"m) = [1- ~ ± &I(C d)~ ~ - 8e'(l'j)l]x &1(1', ) 
I'I(I'OUI):[ 1- ~ ± I'I(C d)~ ~ - 1"(I',)IJx 1'1(1', ) 
S.J.l.1S,," si';";Ij·(J""'Ysis 
l ikelihood asseSSmenlll in bow-lie analysis provide a nume.ical appro~imatioo of 
'",",u=oce of the critical e"ent and outcome e"enlll without identifying the most 
si8nificantcontriooting input evcnlS (FenJouset al.. 2009a). Sensiti vity analysis (SA) isa 
systematic approach that can provide a quantitative evaluation 10 idenlify the weakest 
links and bene. design altemativesofa syslem. as "-ell as lhe impoo1anl sources of 
variability anduOCerlllinly in lhe risk analysis (Conlini ct al .• 2000; EPA. 2001; Sadiq. 
2001) 
SA can be pc:rforrncd usinll anal)·tical. slalistical and graphical mclhods(Frcyand 
Patil.2002). Frcyand Palil(2002)dis..:ussandrcviewlheadvanlagcsanddis.advamages 
ofeachmet~."The st.atisticalmet~forSAaliows lhe"ariatiot; ofoneorJ11()rcinput 
cventsatalimcandmeasun:sthecOlltribut;';'nsofeachinputevenlonlhcouIpute,·ent. 
ThealUllYlical method eval""tes lhe:;.ensitivityofan inpuleHnl "hile OIher in putevenlS 
n:mainconSl3nt. The graphical method provides a visual rqlrcSI:ntationofcon"ioolions 
ofe""hinpule ,·enlloanoutpule\'ent. TheprollOS<'dSA""'t~forbo,,··tieanalysis is 
compriscd of the follo"inll""O SiCP'l; 
Contribution ofinpul evenlS; Detcnnin~uiOll of lhe co"f:!allollC<Kfficienl is lhe inilial 
step to calculate the cOIl\ributionofeach input event in causinll the OUI pulevenlS."The 
ofi npulaoo OUlput al'C ciuSlercd togclher (Sadiq. 2001). Spc:amKn's rank com:lalion 
cocfficienlsoffer an aitcmalive 10 avoid such silualions(Sadiq. 2001). In thismcl~. 
lhe random "alues arc gencMed from the defined distrioolions and ranked after 
soningthe vahxsin aso.:endingorder. Thecalculalw OUIPUI e"entsalso ncw10 be 
runkcdin the sarnc way. Ilydef,nition. the rank com:lation coctlicient may vary f rom 
+ 1 and-I. andean bedetennined using the followingequstion (Lohman et al.. 2000 ) 
(5.11) 
where. RI:.', refcl"'l to the rank correlation coefficients. N to the tOial number of 
rnndom values. J",aml 0, denote the ranks of input and output cvents. respcCli,·cly. 
andl<, andOj.l",~senltherncanrankof/" andO,. 
1"he rank corrclation coefficienlSHre "Iuared and normalized to 100"/0 in onkr 10 
estimate Ihe pcn:cntcootribulion ofinputc,'cnts luding 10 an outpul c\' cnt(M""''''11 
and KaSlenbe'll. 1999). A ~phical plol. Iypically named as a lornado plot. can thcn 
be drawn 10 represent thc relalionshipsofthc inPUI e,'enlS causing Iheootput eve nls 
Risk ""'uction: Risl: reduction provides a numcrical cSlimation ofdcducingrisl: in 
the output events if the ljkelihood~ of the contribUling inpul evenlS are reduced to a 
ceMainle,·cl.ltisadifficultUl'lk loidentifYlhemostimpo<1llntinputc,·cntsforla,!!c 
and complex system in ordcr 10 mitigate lhe overall system risk. TIlC tornado plot. 
which graphicslly represems the com:lation of the input events to an outpUleven I,is 
integratedloenharn:cthistaskforbow_ticanal)'sis.Asthe~approachesfor 
bow-tie analysis provide interval estimation for the output e,'enlS (i,e .. the crilical 
e,'ent and the outcome ewnts),the risk reduction in this case cannot bc estimated as a 
point value (Suresh cl a1.. 1996). 1"he present won.: proposes an imcrval based 
'''' 
estimation (Equalion 5.12) to meaSure the pereentage of risk reduclion in lhe 
corre:;ponding outpul e'·cm. "Illis equalion is de"eloped by foUo"ing tIM: basic 
principle of Ilimbaum importancc measuR:S. "hiell e$limate tIM: importance using Ihe 
difference belween Ihe unava ilabilily of a syslem including and excluding Ihe 
conlriOOtedinpuICventsinlhccalculalion(Surcshctal..I996). Tanaka ct al. (198J) 
and Lai etal. (1993) also uSC a similar equation to measurc the imprmcmcmindcx of 
each inpute"."t;n fuaymeasu"", 
R,(O.OJ =t (d -O/)+(d' -(f ) (S.12) 
"flcrcR,i'lflcriskredocti""inanoulputeve"i.Orcfcrstothelikcli~oflhe 
output e,'enl while lhe occum:nc"" of all inpul events are considered. O,denoles Iflc 
likcli~oftheoutpute,·cntwhileth.l i kcli~oftheinputcvenl;i.redocedton 
certain Incl. and b refers toth.: numberofvalucs in an interval. Forexample.lhe 
TFN uscs til ... ., ,'al""s. PL. P ... Pu. (Figure S.4), and a belief structure exploits Iwo 
values to represenl Ihe uncertainty. 
SA F.' plosion at liP Tuas ci lY .... finery: ~ n illustno li"e u~ml'le 
On March 23. 2005, a massi,'c explO'lion and fircerupled in the IlPrefine<y, localedJO 
miles southwest of Hou.ton in Texas City. Texas. l'his accident caused fifiecnfnlalities 
and injured over 180 people (CSB 2007. 2008). BP (2005) and CSB (2007) have 
published adetailcd investigation rcpor1oftheoccidcni."Ille fire and cxplO'lionoccu rrcd 
in the retine<yduring restart of the ISOM unit.as.hown in Figure S.7.and involved the 
Ramnate splitter. [)lowdown drum and stnck as a pan of daily o[XratiOll (CSB. 2007 and 
200K). Khan .00 Amyone (201l7). and CSB (2007) ~nt a detailed process description 
and quantitative risk assessment study. As not",ed in CSB (2007. 2008). the e~plmions 
occurred due to a significant release of high flammable hydrocarbon from the blowdown 
drum and stn~k. which did not have a flare system. The released hydrocarbon 
immediately formed a "apordoud and exploded in the presenceot"a suspccted ignition 
source of an idling diesel pickup truck located about 25 II away from the blowdown drum 
(CSB. 2007 and 2008). Considering the highly flammable hydrocarbon ~ Iease as a 
critical e,·cnt. a bow_tie diagram for the BPaecident has be<onconSiructed in Figure 5.S. 
Table 5.4 gives the identified causes as basic events and conscquences. Two references. 
CSB (200S) and Yanget al.{20iO). have be<on uscd to derive the information in Table 
5.4. Thc proposed uncertainty-baSl.-d bow-tie ana lysis was pcrformcd to anal}'lC t he risk 
ofthc possible outcomes oflh. BP accident. The implementation of the proposed bow-jic 
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5.4.1 Fuuy·bast"d a p.,ruach 
E. icilcdkoo .... ledgcfrom l .... oupcns,,·asusedlodefinelhetikclihoodsofinpulc'"enIS 
forlhe bow'lie analysi, (fablc 5.5). r:qual wtights were assigned 10 both expensand 
expen a~rel!ated ,·alues were estimaled as shown in Table 5.S. To calcul.le lhe 
likelihood of the c,ilica1 c~cnl and ouicome .,cniS. fuuy a,ithmetic operalions described 
in Table 5.2 "-cre applied. St,"en differentl.ials based on differenl interdependence 
assumptions for lhe inpui e~eniS al JlOdes N·3. N-4 and N·S Were performed while 
eSlimat ing the likelihoods. In Table 5.6. ihe TFN of lhe dependency coefficient for a 
single trial and thc executed operntions in each noo:k:are prescnted. For the difTc rent 
trials. the uncertainties in the estimatesofthc likelihood of thc CE (critical evenuland 
OEt(OuICOntCC,'cnt 1) were mcasurcd and are sho,,'n in Figure S.'1. It is obvious thaI thc 
interdependence of input e\'e nts has a strong in/l""nce o"er the measurement of 
uncertainties for the output events (e.g .. CE or OEs). In trial 7. "he nperfectdependences 
are assumed. the likelihood estimates for the CE bear the maxi mum uncertainty. COfltrnry 
to trial I. when the input e"ents are assumed as independent. the likeli hood ofCE boca", 
the smallest uncenainty 
Tab le S.S: Expenkno"ledge i" fuzzy scale for the input events of Bow-ti e 




(0.350,0.45-0.0 ,55-0) (0.450.0.550.0.65-0) (0,400,0.500.0 ,600) 
BE, (0.350.0.45-0.0.55-0) (0. 100.0.25-0,0.400) (0,225.0.350.0,475) 
"" 
(0.350.0.45-0.0.55-0) (0.600.0.75-0.0.900) (0.475.0.600.0.725) 
BE, (0.450.0.55-0.0.650) (0. 100.0.250.0.400) (0.27S.0.400,0.515) 
BE, (0.100.0.25-0.0.400) (0.45-0.0.550.0.650) (0.275.0AOO.0.515) 
(0. 100.0.25-0.0.400) (0.000.0-025.0.05<1) (0.050,0.138.0.215) 
BE, (0.000,0.025.0.05-0) (0.045,0 ,097.0.15) (0.02).0.061.0.100) 
"" 
(0.045.0.097.0.15-0) (0.100.0.250.0.400) (0.073.0.174.0,275) 
(0.045.0.097,0.1\.0) (0. 100.0.250,0.400) (0.0n.0.17~.0,275) 
(0.350,0.450.0.550) (0.4\.0.0.550.0.650) (0.400.0,500,0.600) 
(0.850.0.902.0.955) (0.95-0.0.975,1.000) (0.900.0.939.0.978) 
(0.9\.0.0.975.1.000) (0.600.0.750,0.900) (0..775.0,863.0.950) 
(0.95-0,0.975,1.000) (0.850.0 ,902.0.955) (0.900,0.939.0.978) 
(0.600.0.750.0.900) (0.45-0.0.,550.0.65-0) (0.525.0.,65-0,0.775) 
(0.85-0.0.902.0.955) (0.45-0.0..550.0.65-0) (0.65-0.0.,726.0.803) 
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Ta ble 5.6(_): Dc:pc:ndc:nocymatrix of input events at N-6 
BE, 
liE , • 
• : , -idence lbeory-baJCd a p proacb 
In order to demonstrate the: evidenocc theory·based approach. 
indepc:ndc:nt e.~pc:rts Were: engagN to define the: likeliOOods as well as the: depcndcnocy 
~~.--~-.-.--
coefficients of tile input c'·~nts. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide the expert kno .... ·lcdge for 
Ihcs<: 1 .... 0 p"rnmcters 
Tyb"'S.7: Expcnknowledgeonlhelikelihoodofinpulcycnts 
.: . pt rt I (m ,) [ , ptrt2 (m,) 
Inl'ut["U IJ 
lSI (·"1 (S. FI lSI 






BE, O.JIO O.4J.O 0.260 
,~ 0.020 0.650 0.330 0.115 
BE, 0.027 0.027 0.069 
fiE, 0.07) 0.417 0.063 
,~ O.28S 0.550 






0.100 0.200 0.250 
0.300 (1,200 
T Mbk S.8: Expcrtkoowledgeforthedepcndencycoefficien\atdiIfCfl'nt!lOdcs 
hptrt. N __ 
(IC.) (1'1) t. 
(1,000 0.250 0.100 0.100 0.100 O.ISO 0.100 0.140 0.000 OJI6O 
] I ~~ ::: ::: ::~: ::~: ::~: :::: ::~: :::: ::: ::: 
0000 0.000 (1.200 O.ISO (1,050 O.ISO 0.)00 0.000 0.000 O.ISO 
~ I ::: ::~: :::: :::: ::: ::~: ::~: :::: ::: ::~: 
',.. • Opposil< ........... 11«, So. Nqaliv.1y s.""'a. M-· N.goli ".I~ Mod ...... WO. NOSOIi.<ly Weak. I • 
h""p.ndcn~ S· Siron" M· Modc<atc. W. W .. k, p. P.rf"", d<p<nd<n<c and fI.lgooran<~ wbscl 
The expe"~' ~nowle<Jge was aggJ\'gated using tile DS an.d Ya~ertOlnbinatioo rules. 
Aller aggreegation. the final belief §Iructurcc of dcpendeocy coc:fficicnl~ for nodes N-J. N-
4 an.d N-S " 'cree dctennined by usin~ Eqwuioo 5.9. For tile others nodes. Ihe 
inltrdcpendcnce among inpul evenl~ ,,·tree coosidcrW 10 be independent Table 5.9 
illuSlraltslhebelicfslruclures for tile inpult\'Cntsanddcpendencycocfficicnls for nodes 




















0.017 -0.008 O.IOJ 
0.109 
·Th<fkli<f""""u .... ro.'h<&ilu .. /Fl ofinput.vno ..... ....,.,ninlhctallie 
Table S.10pn:st"nlSthe resuluofcstimated likelihoods ofthc critical c,·cnt(CE) 
and outcome C\"ent5 for the bow-tic diagram sIIo .... n in Figu", 5.8. For the: differl:m l)"pcs 
ofdeJICndencies. the: variations of un.:ertainty in the: bcl estimates were meaS ured and arc 
summarized in Table 5.11. An obsc .... ation can be made from Table 5.11 that the: bel 
estim3tion of the critical e,·cm varicssignificamly with the change ofimcrdeJICndence 
assumptionsforthe:inpille , ents 









TabIcS.II :likelihoodofcrilicalc>·cnl(CE)fordi fTerenlkindsofdc:pc:ndcncic5 
l. t.ro • .,.aduc .. of inpul 
",·uto in ."i~nt:tl rr.'0<Ie'I(N) 
(T) 
·1loI;'f""""""'<>f<riti<>l ... _IOt~ ..... [G.47S.U",71 
So, .. (F) " O,47S ••• ,I.,,(S.f) - 0.37S 
",(1') .. (S.F) O.47S O.37~ 
B"(CE) " '+--;- " i+2 " O.661 
ThcdifTercnccin usingthc lJSand YagcrcOOlbination rules for cSlimalion oflhc 
likelihood ofouleom.: e>'cm (OE,) is ploued in Figure S.IO. l'orthcsa,,",OU ICO,,", evenl. 
Iheshadcdarc:aindicalesthallhcYagcrcombinalionruleprovidc:s &largebc licf slrUC1Ure 
in comparison 10 thc OScombinalion ruic, llIcrc:fore. an inlerprelalionun be made chac 
chi: Vager romhinalion rule yields more oooservali>'e results (i.e., _ larger belief 
SCruclure) in IhcconcexlofuislinghighconfliclS in chc SOtl"'''" of knowledge. 
Yager.rule 
figureS.IO: Beli cfstructurelOrel""c",mthe likelil\QodofOE, (VCE) 
CSB (2007) im'estigateda numberofcauscs and conSCQuences forlh. Bl'accidenlut 
Te~as Cily. In Table 5.4. SOme important cause. Dnd consequences have been identified 
as input e"enlS for tilt BPaccidcntbow·tieanalysis. The investigation report identified 
the intenkpendcnce "'''lionships ofthc mechanica l componem failures and th eoperator 
fai lure. a. importa" t factors caus ing tilt failure oflhc ISOM unit at BI'. Since lhe 
likelihoods and tilt interdepoellllcnce of most of the input event.s are unkno .... n for lilt 
accident. conducti ng bow-lie ana lysis in such uncenaincooo itionsischa Iknging.l'ulZY· 
basedandevidcncclhcory·basedapproaclltsh.avclhcreforebeencarriedoultoanalyze 
the bow-tie under such uncertain cond itions. TI>edemonstrationofthesetwoapproachcs 
in bow-tie analysis ha, been described in the previous section 
Two l}pt:S of uncertainti., namoly. data and mo(/eJ unartainty. al'<' explol'<'d while 
anal}'ling the bow-tic for the IJI' accident. Eli citat ionofexl'I'rt" knowledge and their 
aggregation arc used to minimize the oota uncertainty while defining the li~el i hoods or 
depe ndcncycocfficicnt> for the inpul events. The dependency coefficients a I'<'assignedto 
address the """",!uncu/uimyanddcscribethc intcroependcnce of inpul events for the 
bow·ti~ anal}'sis. 
For example, to addre,s the irlterdcpendcncc of component. for the ISOM unit in 
~ig urc 5.8. d ifferem lypeS of dependency at N·J . N-4 and N·8 were ass igned in the 
corrcsponJing basic events while calculating the like lihood of hydrocarbon rele asc(CE) 
and outcom" events (OE,) for the Bf' accident (Table 5.4). The output I'<'sults are 
depictedinToble5.IOandFigure5.9.Asigniticantvariationisobscrvedinthcestimate, 
of likelihood,for the critical cvcntas wc ll as outcomcC\'cnts whi le the interdependence 
at N-J. 1'1-4. and N-X is .'aried. For example, see trial 7 in Figure 5.9: here perf..:t 
dependence isas.signed in the oodes. and the likclihood estimates of the outcome e.'ents 
as well as the critical event boearthe maxinlu m unce rtainty. This iscon{rary to tria l I • 
.... hen the input c"eots arc assumed to boe independent and the likelihood e,{imatesof 
{hcscevcm.bearthesmatiestuneertainty.S i mi l aro~rvati onsarcnotedinTableS.II: 
i.e".bo ut24%(Yagerrule),·ar; "tion ;so~r.·ed i nthelJe/estimationof the critical 
event ,,·hile tne intcrocpt:nd.:ncc ofinplllc,'cnt, i, varied from independent to perfect 
dependence 
The tornado plot in Figu", ~.I I highlights tho failu", ofLAII_J. RV_I. 2. J. 6 and 
V-6.sthc most signifocantcontributing input c,'cnts causing theoccu rt"encc dOE,. the 
'·'purcl""dexplosion.lndepen<icntrdationshipsalllQngtMcinputc,·cm,andatllQusand 
trials were uscdlop"'rformscnsilivilya,,,lysisfortheoow·tic. The results are p",,"ide<! 
in Table 5.12 and illuslrd tc lhat41 %riskcanpussiblyben,duccdf<ll"thcOE, (using 
fULzy-based approoch) if the likc lihoc>d of the input c"ent LHL-J i,red..cc dbyaboul 
Tablc S.12:Riskred..ctiQl1onOE,forlhClllQstcon tril:>ute<!inpute,·ents 
RV-6 (p~p~.p,.) 
(0.050.0.138.0.225) (0.040.0,1 10.0,180) 
fa il . 10 Belief [0.023.0.331 
CI~ Slruetu", 
[0.018.0.2511 
[Bel.PIJ Y3~rulc, JO.0230.322J [0.0IS.0.2S7[ 
Funy"umbe" (0,07).0,174.0.275) (0.058.0.139.0.220) 
1.2.3 
f3ilsto Eklief [0.060.0.2081 
"ruelu," Yager rule< [0.0S6.0,2681 
[0.048.0.167] 
10.044.0.215] 
Futtynumbcn (0.073.0.174.0.275) (0.058.0.139.0.220) 
~3~:P [0.04U I68J 
slruet"re Yager ",I"" [0.042.0.2211 
10.OJS.0.llS1 
10,0)).0.1771 
Puny numbers (0.400.0.500.0.600) (0.320.0,400.0.480) 
[0.377.0.5021 










BEI~2IJE } ~4~ S ~6BE7~ ! ~9BEI01 
LScrie!1 0,00"4 LJ~% OJlO% • . OJ% 0.17% 14.69 2.&1% 23.14 14.69 39.07 
Figurt5. ll : Tomadoplot forOE , 
AcompariSQfloftheprQpQK\landln>dilionalapproacl\eswasperfllfmOdbasedon 
handling uncertainty in the inpul events. Table 5.5 pro"ides the basic data for ~arrying 
out the compariSQfls. Equations in Table 5.1 are used to estimate the likelihood of 
ouleomeco'cnt I (OE,) using the traditional approoch. To che<;k the error propasation. the 
interdependence of input .,'cnts (i. ... basic CO'cnts or events) is assumed to be 
independent and the {Jf',.~nUlge de"ill/ion (D) for the OE, is measured with 20% 
imrodllCtion ofu"".rtainty in the basic inpu! data. In the fuzzy.ba~d approach. the 
uncertainty is assig~ using the membership fU"'lion and the TFN~ ~spooding 10 
110"/0 men,borship grade are considered as input·evenl data. The cvide",e t!>wry·based 
ap~h""QC"testheuncertaintyinte""sofbl' .. fortheunass igJledmasslolhepo .... er 
sel _Theanalysisrtsu ltsare&hown in Tab le 5.13. which shows that with 20% uncertainty 
in the input""vent data. 65% de"iation is obtained "hileeSlimalingth elikeli hoodofOE, 
using the tradiliona l approoch. The fuzzy· and cvidc",e theory·basedapproaches 
measured almost 0.25% and 9% deviation for the same outcome c,'ent 
Approu h .. 
Fuzzy.ba=I 
=~ theory. 
Tabk>S.IJ: Errorpropagalion for diifcrenl awroaches 
Likt liboodorVC[(o[, ) 
""c~rt.I "ly unctrtoinly 
" (l'~r«ntOK~ 
Dnlotlon) 
Bow.tie analysis is a relatively new tool fur safely assessment and risk .naiysisof. 
system. Uncertainties in input dal~ arid model adequacy for bow·tie analysis an: Slill a 
major concern and may mislead tit. dIXision.making process, To address the uncertainty 
as .... ell as mil igate the risk. fuay·based and evidence th • ."ory·based approaches along 
,,'ilh a sensitivity analysis technique were developed for bow·tie analy sis. Theprop<lsed 
Bppt'I.ll>thesa,",ommodatethefoliowingfeaturesthatpennitronductingriskanalysis for 
anysystemsunderuncenaimy. 
Knowledge acquisition offers an a lternati,'c to overcome missing data and l ac~ of 
infonnation ahout a system. The f>l"oposcd fuay- and evidence theory-based 
approaches can accommodate experts' kn<lwledge and faci litate risk analysis 
undcrsitu.tionsofmissingdataandexi.tingrelation.hipsamongtheinput.,·ents 
T1>eaggregation rules and combination rule. embedded within thescapproaches 
minimize unccnaimy by providingconscnsusknowledgc 
Special treatment procedures are n.-quired to explore different type. of inherent 
u""ertaintie. in t"" expens' knowledge. T1>e fU':l.y·bascd approoch Can properly 
address the subj""tive ur>Ccnainty and the cvidcnce ttleory-hascd approach can 
awopriatciy add"". the un<enaimy duc to ignorance and inC<:lnsistcncy 
aSS<Kiated in the txpen's knowledge. 
Introductionofadependcncycoeffident in the fuuy-andcvitlcr>Cctheory-bascd 
approaches can e'plore the difTerent kinds of imertlcpendencc among input events 
and addresscs the modcl ur>Ccrtainty for oow-tie analy.is. 
T1>eproposcd.pproachescan.pplytosafetyandri.kanalysisofanysystcmsthat 
"",encounte",d "ithdata and model uncenainty 
Sensitivity ana lysis can identify the most significam contribu ting input e"ents for 
the output events in how-tie ana lysis and f>l"ovidean evalu.ation to mitigate the 
percentageofriskreduclionforasystcm. 
• 'The devcJo.ped approaches can handle lhe ulICcl1ainly and minimizc crror 
ac<:umulalionin likeliilood estimalionQfQtltptltCVCl1tS 
UjXla1inlllhc like1ihoods and/<lI" the interdependencies Qf input evenu; with newly 
arrived infQnnatiQn isaOOlhtr imp<:>I1nnl aspc<:l Qfooill ining cre<iible QUiPUts from risk 
analysis. Integralic:mQf a Bayesian ujXlating mechanism can becQnsidere<i asa fUlure 
extcnsiQn Q(lhede"eIQp<:d approaches 
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CHAPTER 6 
Handling and Updating Uncertain Information in Bow-
tic Alialysis 
Hefaul ferdous, Faisal Khan, Rehan Sadiq '. Pau l Amyouel and Briart Ve itch 
FacultyofEngi ...... ing"'-Appli<dSC...., • • M<"..,..;ol Uni •• "'ity. 
''i<hoolon:n~i ...... ing.Thc: Uni. m ityofBriti>hCol"mbi.Olon" on 
' Dc:_rn,ofChcmicol Engi"""';ng .oo App lied Sc,,"co. D.li>ousi< Uni,· .... ify 
rhe chapler presents a manu,"-,ripl "'hieh deve loped a methodology ford,",,,clcri£ing 
un~crtainly. aggrcgatingcxpcn knowlcxlgc. and updating prior knowledge for. bow-tie 
ana ly,i., A version of this manuscript has "'en submined 10 Ihe .;'",mlll of 10,',' 
I'rnl'ntioninf'roc~,~'ltulu.<trie.,forf>Oss i blepublicaliorl 
The principal author fonnul"led lhe approaches for deve lop in!! the methodology 
. nddesignedacaseSiudyford.""ihing{heuli li{ynflhemctf\odo logy. Theco-aulhors 
supervised the melhodology ""vclopmcm, reviewed Ihe lechnical "'peels and 
im'e.lig.ted Ihe output resuhsofthe case study. They .Iso pro>'ide<! the essenti.1 
correctionsandguide linesmimpro>'elhequ.alilyofthemanuscript 
Abstract 
Bow-ticanal}'sisisa fairly ncw COIICC", in risk assessment that c.an de scribe the 
rclationsnips among difTo,rcnt risk control pardmete",. slICh as causes. hazards and 
consequences to mitigate the likclinood ofoccurrcllCc ofunwantcdcycnt, i nan industrial 
system. It also Facililatesthe f'C,Formanceof'luantitativcri,k.nalysis for an unwanted 
event pmviding a detailcd investigation sta rting from basic causcS to fina I consequences. 
TIle credibility ofquantitati"ec"aluation ortne boo",-tic is stil l a majorcolICcm since 
unemainty. due to limit.dor missing data. often restr icts the perlortnanee of analysis 
The utilizat ion of expert knowlcdgc oficn providcs an a ltcmat i>'e for such a situat ion 
However. it cOlnes at the cost of poss ible uncertainties related to incomplctcn ess(partial 
ignorance). impn:ci,ion (s ubjectivity). and lack of can", ,,,us (i f mu ltiple expert 
judgments are used). Further. ifthc boow-tieanaly,is is not flexib le cnoug htaincarporate 
new knowledge or evidence. it may underrninc thc purposeofrisk asscssment. 
Fuzzy set and evidence theory are capable of characterizing the uncerta inty 
associated with expert knowledge. To minim;,,,, the o"erall unc<:rtain'Y. Fusing the 
knowledge of mu ltiple e~pcns and updating prior koowlcdge with new ovidellCe are 
equally important inad<lition to ad<lrcssing the uIICcrtainties inthc knowledgc.Thi spaper 
propo",sa methodology '0 characterize tne WlCena imies. aggregate koowledge and update 
priorknowledgeorcvidenc:e.iFnewdatahccomea,'ailablcF(>ftheoow,-tieanalysi,.Acasc: 
study comprising a oow-t ic fora typicalaITsOOn: pro<ess facility hasal""b.,en de veloped 
to dcs<ribc the utility of this methodology inan industrial environment. 
Risk and safety assessment isa systematic and scientitic way to predict and preventtl!c 
occurrence of an accident in an industrial system (Khan and Abbasi. 2001). A numboc.of 
qWllilativt and quanlilali>'c lcchniquc:s includ ing I~AZOP analysis. Fau lt Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and E.'ent Trtt Analysis (ETA) ha,'c been used for risk assessment (Khan and 
Abbasi. I99S).llo"-ewr.all of these techniquc:s share aeommon objeclive. "hich is 10 
pro,'ide an assurance that a process ora system is designed and opcrnted und.:r an 
~nccepted risk~ or • "threshold" criterion such as ALARP (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable) (Skelton. 1997; Markowski et al.. 2009), A systematic risk asseSSment 
techniq ... follow" foyr basic steps: hazard analysis. consequence analysis. likelihood 
assessment and risk estimation (A IChE. 2(00). In each step. different techniques 
mentioned earlier may be used. which colle<:tively guide to"'ard estimaling risk and 
ensuring system safely. fTA and ETA are t .... o well established techniques that 
individWllly assist the risk and safety assessmem by providing both a qualitll!i ,'.analysis 
ofhalards identitication and a dctailcd qUlOnl itati>'c cvaillation of likclihood assessment 
forundesiredevents (Spouge. I999; Crowl and Louvar, 2002; Modarres, 20(6) 
FTApn:",idesagrnphicalrc:lationshipbetwccntl!eundesirc:de>'entandbas;ccauses 
of such an occurrence (Hassal. 1965: Vesely el nl., 1981; Hauptmann •• 1980. 1988: 
Kumamoto and Henley. 1996), The undesired event and basic causes in FTA arc: 
typically tcrmc:d as a top-cvent and basic events. respectively. Unlike FTA. ETA is a 
graphic.lmode l ofconscquencesthatconsiderstheunwantedeventasan in i\iatingevent 
andcOflStructsa binarytn:e for probablcconscqllCnces .... ith nodes n:presenting. set of 
success Of failure ~\alC~ (AIChE. 2000: Huang el ,,/,. 2001: lce~. 2005: Modam:s. 2(06). 
l'he follow-up consequences of the initiating event in E'TA arc usua llytenne dBsevcnls 
orsafcty barriers. and the e>'cnts generated in the end states are known as out come events 
(,\IChE.2ooo),Bothlcchniquesuscthcprobabilityof(e.g.failureor success) basic 
c,·.nts and eVentS as quantitati,'c inputs and dctcnnine the probabili Iy ofoccurrcnce for 
Ihe top-cvent as well asoulcomeevents for likelihood assessments (Cro,, 1 ilII<l Lou'·ar. 
2002: Modam:s. 2(06). Bow-tie is a combincd co<>ccp! that inlcgr~lcs bOlh l<:<:hniques at 
a common plalfonn. considering the top",,·.nt and initiating e\'en! as link«110 a ComftM)l1 
evenl called a critical event (Cockshott. 2005. Che,'reau e/ ai, 2006. Di:u.ous and Fievez 
2006. Duijm 2009. Mar1mwski n a/.. 2009. and Ferdous n al.. 2010), A sample 
sc hematic of a bow-lic diagr~m is ~i"en in Figure 6.1. li ke FTA and lolA. bow·!i. 
analysis also useslhe probabilily of failure of basic events as input e "."ts inlheFTA sile 
andtheprobabi lityofoccurrcnce(eilherfailureorsu<ces<)ofevenlSas inpulevenlS on 
Ihe ETA sile for ."alualing the likelihood of crilical and oulcome .>'entS (Mar1<o"ski el 
fI/,. 2009. and Ferdouse/al.. 2(110). Ferdousnal. (2010) provide a detailed descrip! ion 
of!heoovantages.consll1JClionandanalysisS(ralesyoflhebo,,··ticmctilodoloS)' as a 
safely and riskasscssmentlool for indusnial sySlcm •. 
Prc-<vcnl side: FT dewlopment I PosI..,,-cnl side: ET dc"clopment 
'0<, 
l'igure6.I :Elcmcntsofabow·licdiagr4m 
Forquantitati"~ !:>ow-tie analysis. the probabi li ties ofinpul evenls.re required 10 bt 
known ei lheras precise crisp data or defined probability density functions (I'DFs). if 
ur!Ccrtainty .,.,ed,to bteonsidert:d(Markow,kiellll.. 2009: FerJo.usft/lI/ .• 2010j. n.c 
cri'p<ialll or PDFs arc often difficult 10 come by and even if these a", availablc ,precision 
of this data ha, many inhe"'nt uncertainty issues. ,uen a,varianl fa ilure modc"design 
faults. poor undcrslllndingof failu", mechanism., as well as tl\<, vagueness ofs)'stcm 
pl>fnomcna (Ayyub. 1991: Sawyer and Rao. 1994; Yulma .nd DatlK), 2005; Wu. 2006. 
Sadiq c/a/,. 2008: FerdouselaI..2009a.2009b.201 I). Since in a majorilyof cases. crisp 
data as well as PDFs arc r4re ly ".'ai lable. elkitation of ex!"'" knowledge is on~n 
employed as." .ltem.tive tn the acquisition of objective data (Ngyun. 1987; Ayyub, 
2001; YuhWl and DatlK),2oo5; HEda/ .. 20(7) 
Unccrlainty isinncremlyun",'oidablcsinceilboclongstotheph)'sicalnriabililyof 
a system and data unavailability aooutthcs)'stcm resulting from lack of knowledge or 
limited information (Ayyub, 199 1: Markowski", aI., 2(09). The urk:ertainty due to 
nalUral ,'ariation or randomized behaviour of a pnysical system is cal led o/clIli>ry 
unCUllJinly. "hereas the ,mcerulint)' due to lack of knowledge or irk:ompleteness is 
termed ~"i'lemic once,llI;nly (Bae el 01.. 20(4). FU7~Y sets and evidence theory ha"c 
bcen proven to be effecti,'e and eflicicntat handling these IypesOfUrk:erulintiesin 
cxpen knowledge-based anal)'sis (Bouchon-Mcunier ci 01 .• 1999; Fag in and Ha lpern. 
1991; Cneng. 2000; Scntzellll .• 2002; Wiirox elal.. 2003: Boudraaelal. , 2004: RaeN 
al .• 2<X»: Agarwal elaI..2<X»:Ayyubelal.. 20(6).llowever. these th(o.-ies alonc.rc 
not capab le of updating the like lihoods assessment wncn a new ~xpen judgement 
Ferdous e/ "I, (2010) dc"eloped. framework utilizing fuzz)' set.nd e"idence 
theory to resol". the urk:enainties due to employment of ex pen knowledge i"defining 
the likelihood and intcnicpenderk:c of input events for bow·tie analysis. Tllis framework 
is inlcndc-d only for addressing the data and model uncerlaimy. which are subjected to 
missing dala and interdependent ",Iation.hips among the inp<Ji events. 1\ is unable to 
update thc risk estimate of the critical and outromc events in bo ..... -tie analysis if new 
knowlcdgeorinformationaboutaninpUle,'cnlisdiseove",d.Th.,current paper is mainly 
focu""d on the panicular methodology de"elopment of imp lementing an updating 
mechanism along with tne characterization ofurk:enainty and aggregation of multiple 
c .• pens' knowlc-dgc for bow-t ie anaiysis. The de,·elopcd methodology helps to address 
the uncertainty, "hich occurs in like li hoods assessment and more imp<>nantly. updates 
the analysis recursi,'ely ifanynewk1i<Jwicd~corinfonnati on is a,-ailablc 
6.2 R;"kanalysis underuncen~inty 
InCQrpurationofcxpcrljud~mcniscanhc1p inconducti ngknowledge·basedriskana l ysis 
for a complex system. This is eSpe<:ially useful when quantit.t i.-e infomlation such as t~ 
probability of input e\'ents is missing or limited (Clemen and Wink ler. 1999: Rosqvisl. 
2003:F.rdouSei,,'- . 2009h.2011).lJnfonunately.expcnk1i<Jwledgeis oflcnincompicte. 
ineonsistcnl. vaguc.or imprecise. This introduces uncerlainty in ri.'k a nalysis (Misra and 
WcOCr.1989:YuhuaandDatao.2005).lnordcrtorccognizelhiskindofuncertainty and 
1o ellhl ivcly consider its implicalioos for risk analysis. s.e'·cral fonnaltcchniqucshave 
i:>ttn de"elopcd (Wilcox and An-ub. 2003). Tllcse techniqucs can be applied in any 
quantitati,'e risk analysismoocl such as faulttrcc. cvcnl trec and oo"'lic for unccrlainty 
evaluation. The employmcnt of thcse tC\:hniques is usually catcgot izcdbascdonthctypc 
and nature of uncertainty a.stated in Table 6.1. Probabil itylhC<:lry based ManteCario 
Simulation (,,-KS) is the moS! p<>pular among these te<:hniq u~. for conducting uncenainty 
evaluation (Abrahams",,,. 2002; Wi!<o .• and Ayyub. 2003). This sampling based 
technique requires kno"n PDFs. "hicn are generated from historical dal a. and is unable 
to properly address the uncertainty if the knowledge is high ly subjective. vague, 
incomplete or inconsistent (Wiicox and Ayyub. 2003; Druschel elal .. 2 0(6) 
ThrcedifTcr"nta'p':C1S:i)charnclcrizationofutlCenainty.ii)aggregntion of 
mult iple expens k1i<Jwledge if any. arld iii) updating t~ likciihood wilh new knowledge. 
must be con,idered while formulating the uncenaimy ofacomprehensive risk analysis. 
esp«ially "'hen the risk and safety criteria are e,'aluated basc<lon uti lizationofcxpert 
kno",ledge_Thel1rSlaspect.characlerizationofuncertainly,iscssenlialforcategorizing 
Ihe nalure of uncertainly inherited in expen knowlc-dgc. Fuuy numbers in fuzzy set 
Ihwryand basic probability a"ignments (bpas) in evi<kncc theory are usually employed 
to address such tyl"'s ofuncenainties. The secooo asrect..aggregation. is ncr essaryfor 
building a compromise hoetween conflicting data ",·hcn a lack ofconscnsusariscs among 
the different expens (Lin and Wang. 1997). Dezertand Smarandache (2004) summarilCd 
a number of combination rules for e"idcnce theory and Wagholia, (2007) <kscribcd 
aggrcgationtechniqucsforfuayscllhcQ[), Ihat al low fusion of know I edge from different 
SO urCeS. The I1nal a'pecl.updating, is introduced for incorporating newknowll-dge ",ith 
Ihe prior knowicdge 10 oblain an updatc-dlike lihood assessment for Ihe analysis. This 
provides an inference in ri,kanaly.is by making a bond between prior knowledge and 
new knowledge. For each updating. Ihe updaled koowlcdge of the input events is 
recursively used as new inputs in the risk analy<i, model (e.g_. boW-lie) 10 altain a revised 
estimation for likelihoodassessmenl (Freson. 20(5). 
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6.3 Melhodology forunccrla in ly ma nagcmcnl 
rhe uncenainty·based approaches for ETA. ITA and bow-lie analysis have already been 
dcvclopcd (Fcrdous el ", .• 2010: 201 1),Thecum:nl work is an exlension oflhe previous 
dc,·clopmcnlS. In this papocr. w. allcmp1 to combine the three imponant aspects of 
un(cna inly managemem: .)charactcriz,tion ofuncenainty. b) aggregation ofmultipk 
expcn kno,,'lcdgc. and c) updaling prior knowle<lgc for risk analysi •. The paperdi .seuss.:. 
the methodology development for bow-tic analysis.. which also c.-.compasses FTA and 
ETA. In the 1irst step. characlcrization ofuncenainty isdcvclopcdloadd rcSSthe diffcrcm 
kindsofuncenainlyinthecxpcnknowle<lge.Aggregalionofknowle<lgeis pcrfonne<lto 
merge the knowH:dgc from dilferenl expcru. The updaling is intCl!J1l1Cd for rcvising the 
prior knowle<lge when neW infonnalion becomes available. The framewo", dc,'eIoped in 
Figurc6.2 provides Ihe relationship among the three sleps of the proposcd mclhodo logy 
Dclailcddcscriplionsforcachslep,rediscllssedinthefollowings«tion. 
Figure 6.2: Framework for updating risk estimate in t>ow·lieanalysi. 
Ch~ .... cteri>.ationofunccrt&inl)' 
Expen knowledge ofTers a bener ahemative when crisp probability or the POh for lhe 
input evems are oot acc urately availahle. Therefore. unceMainty characterization is 
imponam in how-tie analysis as expen knowledge is ne"er absolute and may include 
difTerent types of uncenainty (lJouchon_Meunier d ,d .. 1999: Ayyub. 2(01). To 
ctTectively minimi?", uncenai nty. the technique foruncenainly fonnulalion needs 10 be 
exploredinaccordancewilhlhcnalure ofunccnainlyexisl inginlhcobjectivcdala,lnlhe 
proposc<J melhodology, fu~zy SCI Iheory is e~plorcd 10 deal with uncenainty due 10 
vague"",", imprecision and subjectivity in Ihe expen knowledge. Evid~ncc theory is 
employed to hand le unceMainty d"" to ignornnce. incomplete""ss, and connioing 
ev idence (Ferdou •. 2009b: 201 1), The fundamentals of these theories and uncenaimy 
dmractcrization arc dcscribo....! in the following sub-s.,ctions. 
6.J.I.1 FUU,)'S<!IThM'y 
Zadeh (1%5) first introduced fuzzy set theory in his pioneering work. where h eargued 
that tr~ditional probabi lity tbeory alone is insufficient to char""terize all types of 
uncenaim)' associated with human conceptuali?.ations of the real world. Fuay set theory 
is sp"cially designed to provide a language with syntax and semantics 10 translat. 
quali!ali,'c knowlcdge!judgmcnts into numerical reasoning and to capture subjective and 
.'ague unccnainty (Tanaka ci ,,/ .. 1983; Weber. 1994; Abrhamson. 2002: Wu. 20(6). 
Ross (1995: 2(04) and Ayyub & Klir(2006) described the foundalion and arithmetic 
operat ions of fu>,Zy SCI tl1eory and its implicalions for engineering systems for 
characterization. represemation and e,'aluationofuncenainty in risk analysis 
ChJPB"6:HandllllQ andtJPdatil19uncertaininfonnalion.,bow·tieao<tll'Sis 
Fuuy number: Fuzzy sct Ihcory uses fl.tZZy numbers to caplun: Ihe imprecision or 
vague.,." in expert assessments (Lin and Wang. 1997). The membership function ofa 
funy number exploils the numerica l relationship for an uncertain quantity p (e," .• 
probabililyofinpulc,"cnts)rnngingbelwccnOand 1 (S.W)'crand Kao. 1994). Anylype 
of membership function including nonna l, bounded and com'ex functions. e.G .• 
triangular. trapezoidal and Gaussian shapes. Can be considcrcd for Ihc fonnalion ofa 
fuzzy number. II"wever. the sekc\i"n ofafunClionesscntiallydependsonlhcvariabie 
characterizali(lnanda"ailable inf(lnnali,," . In trn: CUl"n' nl paper. a TFN is used 10 quanlify 
subjecti vilY in lheexpert kn""ledge. A TFN can be described bya veclor(pl.,pm. pU) 
Ihatre~escntsthel(lwe,boundary. m(lS1likely,'alue.aJldupperboundary.11Ie"-I'u(f(l' 
a TFN represents the degree ofmcmbcrship of PI in lhc SCII'. The membership function 
!!..L..!!..!:.. 
P~ - Pc 
P~ S p, S p'l (6 .1) 
Risk analysis of\cn articulalcs cxpertknowlcdgeljudgmcnt in tcnnsoflinguistic 
,'ariables such as ,.",yhigh. high. wry 10 ..... low. etc_(Ayyub.I'I9 I: W u.2006.Sadiqellll. . 
2001). Ayyub and Klir. (2006) have provided a chart to defi ne the lower and upper 
boundary for such ,'ariablcs. Considcring thc most likcly value as a n avcragcoftncsc two 
boundaries. TFN,can be used 10 represent tr.ese lypeS (Iflinguislic vari.bles(Lee. 1996: 
Lin And Wang.IW7: Sadiqt'l a/ .• 2008). For example. eight linguisticvari3b~s. c.g .. 
Vt'ry lfigh (VH). Very Ion ... (VL). Modemlely Illgh (MH). MO<krl.,ely Lv .. , (ML). Low 
(L). ,\/vI/em'e (M). lfigh (H). Rlllher(R). 1\3,·c been proposed in fJfCsent study to 
dcscribec.~pcrllmo"lcdgefordcfiningtheprobabilit)"ofinpulc"cnts. The TFNs of these 
variables are refJfCsenicd in Figure 6.3 and asnn example.lhe membership fUn<;lions for 
Low (LJ. MOlkrote (.If) and lfigh (fI) are illustrated below· 
:WtNYil 
o 00-150,05 0.tOO.15 0.350.4(1 0.450.SS0.600.6SUS(i0.90.9$ 0.95$ 
Figure6.J: MBpping linguistic gnidcson fuzz)" scale 
o:T5,,(p/ -O.I) O.I S p , S O.25 
(6.2) 
(6.3) 
o:h X {p,-O.60) 0.65",,5, 0.75 
(6.4) 
The fuzzy boundaries of a TFN (i.e .. lower and upper boundary) rn;jy also be 
delennioro from lhc poinl of most likely val"" and crror faclon(EF) iflhe rigid fuzzy 
scaie.de"clopedin Figure 6.3. is unable 10 map lhc subject;,·c unccn.ain1y of an ex",," 
(Huang. 2001). ErrorfllCtonrepre!lentlhedeg"",ofimprecisionassocialoo wilhex""ns" 
knowledg .... The magnilude of error fllClon is often reponed along with the moSllikely 
•• Iue in lhe lilerature (liang and Wang (1993); Huang (2001). Liang arid Wa ng(I993); 
Sure.h elul. (1996) arid H~ng{200I)proposcdlhetqua1ionslOdctcrminclhcruay 
boundaries of a TFN. The e<juations also have f1uibi!ity 10 consider lhe error focton 
bast{! Of! direct npen judgment. Equations 6.S. arid 6.Sb ha,'C ~n OOi,'"" for twu 
difTen:ntronditions(;.e .• mosl likelyvaluc less lhan 0.5 or grealer than ore<jua 1100.5) in 
thissludytoeonsln>CllheTFN. Khan and Abbassi (1W9) and Fcnlouse/a1. (2009a) 
deri,·oo similar eq~t ions for trnl'C'7.oidal fuuy numbers (ZFN). As an exampk. \he TFN 
representing an impreci", probabilily of an inpol e,'ent arourld "0.2 (mo,t likely 
probability)"" is illustrated in Figure 6.4 and lhe membership function for this fuzzy 
numberunbeOOivwasEq~lion6.6 
p, : p~x O.5 
P. =P. x1.5 
p, .. 311; - 1 
P. = 11_2+ 1 
'lll 0.8 ! 0.6 ! OA : 
': "i " 
p~- o. :!() 
f>rotJabililyofhbo(Pf) 
~·;gure6." : TFN represented ..... ith error facto. (EF) 
OS P. < 050 
0.5 Sp.< 1.0 
[
o:k)«Pf- O. IO) 
1' , (1', ) - 1- o:k X(/.,- O.20) 
, 
O.IO S p,S Q.20 




6.J.I.l t:yjJellce llteory 
The thcory of evidcoce c\'oln-d during tt... 1970. with the joim effort of DempstCT and 
Shafer (Yang and Kim, 2006; Sent7. and Ftrwn. 2002). This theory enab les 
characteri7.ationofuocertaintyduetoparlialignoraoccorkno ... lcdgcdeficieocy in expert 
judgment {Sentz and Ferson. 2002; Kulasekere elal .• 2004; Sadiq el (JI .• 2006; Wang el 
,,1 .• 2(06). Unlike traditional probabilityti>wry.evideocetheoryallowstheallocatiooof 
subjcetivcprobabilitics.supportingtt...evideoceofnpertbelief. inco~d;ng 
subsetsofa power sel. The unassigne<i probabilily (ignoraoce) is distributed to an 
ignoranee sub~1.3SopposcdlolhcB.ayesiallnpproach. lhatdistribulesmi ss ingevidence 
in remainingdisjoinl subscu (Scmz and Ferson. 2002; Sadiq elal .• 20(6) 
8usi .. probobility ouil:II"",nr (bpa): Evidence theory characleri7.eS uocertainty 
starling with a definition of frame of discernment (1'00). The FOo represents a set of 
mutually e.~clusi\'( ckments that al1o ... 's a total of 21nl subsets in a power set (P). where 
Inl iSlhecardinalityoftt...set.Thefunctional stateofan input event can be classif,cdin 
two states: success (S) or failure (F); availablt or una"ailable (Vesely c/ 111 .. 1981; 
Stamalcialos. 2002). Therefore. Ihe FOD 10 characteri,.e the uncertainly of the input event 
for bow-tic analysis can be defined as n IS.F} that leads 10 four sub""ts in a power set 
(P).induding{tP.{SI.IFI.\S.FII· 
In evklencc Ihrory. Ihe basic probability assignment (bpll). denoced by ",(p.). is 
used todistribule the probabitityprovided by thetxpert for each subset belongingt o\he 
po"·cr~t. P(Druschel f!lal .• 2(06). The unassigne<i bpa. i.e .• m(O) - I- m(S) - m(F) 
accounts for the igtIQranceorir.complete infonna1ionin1hecxper1 ktIQwledge(Sadiqet 
(l/,. 2006; Feroousel,u .. 2009b) 
1\ beliefstruc1urcinevider.celheory is uscd to generalize ihe toml utlCer1ainlyina n 
in l~rvalbounded by belief (&0 and piausibility(f'/} measurcs_ &1 (f') represcnls Ihe 
lower bound ofa belief that measures th~ minimal supror1 for a par1icular subsetI'. 1'1(1') 
represents th~ upper bound of the belieflhat de1cnnincs lhe maximal support for the 
subset.f" Thcbclief slructu", for an ur.ccrtain parnmctcr likc likclihoodofinpUlc,-cnts 
canbecharnclerizedbythefoliowingbfX·fur.ction 
m(pj)-> [O.I[ wllere. m (<f.i)-+O "ltd L m(pi)~ l 
,,<I' (6.7) 




6.3.2 A!:!: l'l'\la t;onof muhil,lenperts knQ>. -ledge 
Knowledge can never be absolutcas it is socially conslruc1ed and negotiated (I\yyub. 
2001). h often suffers from itlConsis\etlCy s;tlCe different cxpcr1S may have different 
percepliOflsthat may be incompicte and cOI1 n ict with each OIher. However. kno"lcdgc 
from muhiple expor1' al,,-ay, provides a better approximatiOfl than knowledge from a 
singleupcT1. lnord<:rtoitlCorpc>rntcdifTcrcntexpor1s' ktIQwle<lge in risk analysis. the 
knowled~c from diffcrenlsources needs 10 be aggregated before perfonning the bow-tie 
aNllysis (Huang N lIl .• 2(01). The follo"'ing two sub-se<.:tions pro~ide tl>e mctllodsof 
aggregatiOfloffuzzynumber.sorb(l(1 .• todefinctl>eprobabilityofinputeventsinbow-tic 
analysis 
6. J.l.IFuu,)' num/)e"· llIIg'<'guli,m 
Aggregation provides a mutua' agrttment and minimizes the connict nmOfl!llhe diffcrent 
SOUIU'S (Un and Wan!l. 1997). i\ number of methods. e.g .. max-min. arithmctic 
averaging. quasi_arithmetic means. wti!lhted a"eragc method. fuzzy Delphi method. 
symmetric sum and t_nonn. are 8"aHable 10 aggre~atc multiple experts' kno"-led!le in the 
formoffrn:7.Y numbers (lIuan8 fl (II .. 2001; Sadiq el (II .• 2007; Wa~holiar.2007). The 
"eighted a.-erage method is the simplest method allowin~ agKJtglltion accordin!l to prior 
weights of the arguments. It uses tile following equation for aggregating m experts' 
koowledge 
(6.10) 
where l';-isthe linguistic expression of uncertain input event i elici ted from expert 
j. nisthenumberofinputevents.m is \he number of ex pens. w, isa weighting factor 
corresponding to expenj and l', istheaggl"gated fun:y number. For equally weighted 
knowledge. the wei""ted average method !lives a similar estimation to the arithmetic 
averaging method 
For identical FOI)~. the combination rules in e~idence Iheory allow one to aggregate 
difTerent kno"ledgc from different SOurces and pro~ide tl«: combi,. ... d belief structurc 
(Premaratnell,' .. 200J:Fersonc/ol .• 2004:Sadiqelo/ .. 2007).The[)cmpstcrandShafcr 
(OS) rule is the most fundamental of all tt..: combination rules de.·cioped. !lowe~er. a 
normalization ofconnictsamong sources (Scntzand Ferson. 2002: Sadiq el (11 .. 20(6) 
T1>c mo~t commotl modifications indude lhose by Yager. Smets. Inagaki. Dubois and 
Prade. Zhang. Murphy. and more recently by Der.ert and Smarandache (Sadiq c/ al .. 
20(6). Detailed discussions and comparisons oftncse rule~ can be found in [)czert and 
Smarandact..: (2004). In the current study. 10 address two exlreme cases of conllicts i.e .. 
high-<:onllict and non-<:onnict i .. ues in experts' knowle<lge. II«: DS and Yager 
combination rules ha"e be"n uscd for II«: purp<>Se ofknowle<lge aggregation. T he details 
oflhcsc Iwo rules are giyen below. 
DS rule of comb;""f;"'" Tt..: os combination rule uscs a normalizing factor (l.t) 
to develop an 8gl'Ument among Ihe acquired knowledge from muhiple sources. and 
complctcly ignores Ihc confliclingevideoce through normalization (Ferson ef"'-, 2004: 
Sadiq ef aI .. 2(07). The combination rule uscs lhe ANIJ-Iype operator (product) for 
agg.n:galingkno"·Ie<lge from independenlsourees(Sadiqefl!I .• 1006). For example. if 
Ihe m/(p.J and m1 (pI,) arc IWO SCIS of knowledge for an input e"cnl coll«led from IWO 
differente.~perts.theDScontbin.alionruleuscslhefoliowinScqualion for aggregation 
forp, "" /> 
(6.11) 
1-' fo~ p, ;o'/> 
In Ihe ab<we equal ion. m'_l (P,) denoles Ihe combined knO\<lcdge ofl .... -o •. ~po"S for 
the event. and k measures the 'kgree of conflicl between the two expo"s ..... hich is 
L m ,(Pa)x m , (Pb) 
Pu " Pb ", t/> 
(6.12) 
YUlier ru/e (lfwmbin(lli(l,, : Zadeh (1984) po inled out thai Ihc DScombin alionrule 
may yield cou"lerinluili<'c resuils. and txhibils numerical ins labi lilyiflheconfl ictamong 
the soul't'es is large (Stntz and Forson. 2(02), To resolve Ihis issue. Yager (1987) 
proposed an extension in Equation 6.13. "hich is similar to the DS combination rule 
except that it does not allow nonnaliuuiOll of joint evidence with the normaliz ingfactor 
(l-k). Thctolal degree of conflict (k) isassigncd lolhc ignorance SUbscl (Sadiq C lui .. 
2(06). However. in anon· (or less) conflicting ca..,. the Yager combination rule exhibits 
similarresultst(}the OS combinalion ru le, ForitighconfliclC3..,s(i.e .. higher k va lue). it 




Ulldating prior kno .. -ledge 
furp, ~ rJ> 
fOTp,,,,Q (6.13) 
fOTp, . Q 
Conditioning is the basic QPeralQr f(ll" the updating process in probability theory II 
provides a n:<;ursi.·c way tQ update priQr knQ"ledge c<>nditional to gi.'en knowledge 
(Fagin and Iialpem. 1991: MQraland Camp<>s. 1991: l'remanUncelut,. 2(09). Moral and 
Camp<>s (1991) di>linguishcd the dilfcrcOlCe between combination and conditioning as 
combination is a process of merging input of IWO (II" more sources of inform.al;on, 
whereasconditioningisareslrictionQfanpiece ofinformationtltaliswil ized whilethe 
prior koo"-Icdge is updated with an another verified new information. The classical 
probability fnune,,-orl<alone is not sufficient for updating the priorpmbabi lily ... ith 
incoming koowlcdgc (Nygan. 19H7: Chou and Yuan. 1993: FefSO/l. 2005). Ba)'.:s' 
theorem describe<! in EqU3ti0fl6.14 provides such an inference fQl" accumulating and 
updating koo ... lcdge based on new gi"eIl infonnation (Ferson. 20(5). Since expert 
koowlcdgc is often scalcd as fuzzy numbel'5. the integration of Baycs' theorem with 
fUZlY SCI theory ;scsscnlialtoup<late uncertain information in risk analysis. Chou and 
Yuan (1993). Taheri and Ikhboodian (2001) and Wu (2006) prop<>sed applications of the 
fU7-'/:y-Bayesian method in hypochcscstcsting and structural reliability. In thecU""nt 
work. the fuay-Baycsian method is cxlcnd<...! for how-tic analysis considering that the 
likelihood ofinl'llt events is notdc!ined pm:iscly by thccxperts , Unlike the f uzzy-
Bayesian approach, cond itional notation within the oontext ofevidcnce the<.><y,upports 
the updating processofa prior musorbeliefbased on a si,'cn proposition (Pr<:marn tned 
lll..200J: Kulaseker<:c/lll .• 2lXl-'),ThisalwallowsurJatinsthe lk/and PI me asurcsfor 
aninputhascdontheconditionalprobabi li ty{FasinandHalpem.IWI). 
I'{fE,I E)= 1'(£ l l;;:)}'(1£, ) i=1.2.3 .... .. n (6.14) 
w·hcrc.IE; isthe," unccrtain inpute,'cnt. for which likelihood i.dcfined u prior 
knowlc-dgc P(IEJ. }' (I£/ E) i. the posterior knowledge of the input c .'cm giwn new 
expert knowledge £, and P (El lEJ the conditional probab ility for the event following a 
defined PDF. Thc dcnominator of the abovccqu3tion iscallc-d the normalization factor. 
which can be calculated by the law or total probabi lity (Chou and Yuan. 1993: Fcrson. 
2005), However. the computation or the normalization factor depend. on the aspcct of 
implementation of Tlayes' theorem. For bow-tie analysis. it can be calculated using 
Equation 6.14a. since the likelihood of components in FTA or barriers in ETA 
(commonly termed as inputc"ents in bow·tie analysis) are e"aiuated on the basi, of the 
l'{£) ~ P(E liE, )P(lE,)+ P(E l IE,. )P(lE,. ) (6.143) 
A fuzzy-Baycsian arproach can be used tocompulc tht: po!itcrior or updated probability 
incorporating ncW subjective knowledse in to prior information. The Ikmoulli-fijuation 
(Equation 6.15)in probability theory is unable to addrcss subjeclive. im pm:isc, Of >'ague 
unCertD.inly. since the I'lIndom variable I'J used lodescrihe the lihlihoodofa ninpute"ent 
IE, may 1101 he exactly unity (e,ent fE, occurs) or uro (e,en! IE, does not occur) (Chou 
and Yuan. 1993). Moreowr. the Bayes' theQl'em gi"en in r"l~lion 6.14 doe~ not 
considersuchfu7.zinessintheinputdata{ltohanditagaki.1989).Thefuay-Ilayesian 
approach referenced by hoh and Itagaki.(1989): Chou and Yuan. (199J): andCarausu 
and Vulpe. (2001) is awropriate when the li~dihood of input events in bow·tie analysis 
is ddincd throogh fuuy numbcrs. The propo.o;ed fuzzy·Bayesianapproach for updating 
the prior knowledge as "-ell as for computing the posterior probabilities of bow_tie 
analy,isaredescrii)e{linthefollo"ingdiscussions 
(6,15) 
where, Ii() is the dirac delta function, and 1'1 is the I'lIndom variable, In fU7.zy 
measure,ptisconsideredasa fU7.zy numher and represented bya rrn:mhership function 
Asanexample,ifanexpert ",y.the probability of an inpute,'ent/E,is"L ow", then the 
mcmbcrship funclion for this event can bc expressed by Equation 6.3, ForacontinllQus 
fU7.zy numbcr.the dirac delta function in Equation 6_ 15 can be written as Equation 6.16 
(Chou and Yuan, 1993) 
I'(lE)~ 1""jl,,(f'f )X{f',) (6,16) 
where, P,,:(Pf) i.thc fU7.zy numbcrcorresponding to the failure rrobabilityofinput 
.,'ent fE. and ""'/ )is the dt:fincd PDF forl'rThc conditional rrobability in Bayes' 
theoremcanaccordinglybereviscdforfu7.>;y mcasureas F..q~tion6_17 
I'(E ' IE.)~ 1"",JI"(l'f )g ,,m(P, ) (6.17) 
Thc substitution of Equatioos 6.16 and 6.17 in Equation 6.14 yidds Equation 6.18. 
that e~emuallycomputesthe posterior probability for input event IE, based on the given 
(6.18) 
In fw.7.Y arithmetic, the complement (i.e. probabil ity of success) of the failure 
pr<Jbability isdclennined by F..quation 6.1~ 
"here. l'{IEJ is the complementary probability of 11;'. P'if . P:' and 1'7, are the 
Idl,nlOst·likdyan<l uppcr valucs respe.;tivdy represcnting the failure probability (IE, ) 
Expens' kn(mledge is used 10 assign the probabilityofOl'culT<'nce for the input 
events in bow_tie analysis. Figure 6.3 is used for constructing the mcmbership functions 
if the probabilily ... lucs are dcfined using linguisticvariablcs(e.g., VII. VL. MI-t . etc.). 
Thepr<Jbability valllCSdcfincd with an error facto-r such as'"abouIO.20··. ··aooutO.I5"". 
"abou\ O.JO~. CIC., are expressed "ilh the membership functions developed using 
Equations6.5aand6.5b. Theconditionall'DFreprescmingthelikelihoodofoccu=nce 
of an ~\"Cnt is usually derived from a set of historical data and filled to a panicula. 
distribution such as nporocntial. weibull. nannal. lognormal. eIC .• (Ebling. 1997: 
Stnmatelatos, 20(2)- In nonnal operatinB conditions. exponential distribUlion i5 
com'nonlyprefcm:d sinceinthatregionthclikcliiJoodofoccu""nccofanevemfo11o,,-s 
a constant trend (Ebling. 1997: Crowl and Louvar. 2002. Stamatclatos. 20(2) The 
dc,·c\opc<lfuay·Ba)·~'Sianapproach for bow-tic analysis utilizes exponential distribution 
(as sllo .... n in Figure 6.S) as the conditional PDF function 10 update prior kno .... ledge 
"-henc"erncwtxpenkno,,lcdgc isobiaincd to define th<: probabilityoccum:nc eofinput 
. ·igure 6.5: Exponemial F'DP represeming sate of input evems 
IS.J.J.1 IAE_i1dseJ I',.Jl'nfiulupJUfi"lI 
Initial kno .... lwge is typically ,'cry buggy. incomptcte. and weak (Richardson and 
[)omingos.200J)_ "ThebeliefstlUCture.represcntingthcranseofuncenainty.n:.:ur.lively 
requires updalinS with incoming knowlcdge or evidence inO<dcrlOcR:atecon"cr genccto 
a true range. Evidence updating strategy conditional to given evidence (knowlwge) is 
proposedinthecu""ntstudybasedonthepremise(similartoKulasek~ree'a'-.2~) 
that updated belief conditional to ~ivcn evidence is taken 10 be a linear combination of 
the originally assigned belief and the conditional belief. Fagin and Halpern (1991) 
dcriv~d the conditional mcasure~ by narrat ing the cuntinual not.tiuns in the inner and 
outcr measures to DS notation. Mornl and Campos (199 1); I'r.marntne e/ al. (2003. 
20(9): and Kulasckel"C e/ al. (2004) c.~plun:<l a number ufthc e~pr.ssions 10 dctcnnine 
Ihe condilional measure and upot,\e the belicfwucture (i.e. [lkl(I£).I'I(I£)[. Equation 
6.20 is one of the expn:ssions thaI promptly uses .,·iden •• lheory to meaSUre the 
condilionalhelid. 
(6.20) 
where. lkl (IE,(E) is the condilioni"~ of input event probabilily IE, wilh respect to 
new evidence E . E represenls lhe complementary .,·ent of E. In a sinti lar manner. lhe 
counterpart of Equalion 6.20 mcawresthe conditional plausibility. Forupdatin~theprior 
bcliefand plausibilityofan input t .. ent of 1£. the lincarcombinatiun ofBeI(l£Jun<llkl 
(IElE) yicldsEquations6.21 and 6.22. The updated probability of input nents deri"ed 
using these equalions iSlhen finally used 10 revise Ihe risk eSlimate 0 fbow_Iieanalysis 
lkl,(lE,l " a , BeI(lE,)+/J, lkl(lE, /F:) 
PI. (lE,) _ a , PI(lE,l+/J, PI(lE,IE) 
(6.2 1) 
(6.22) 
where. a" and fJ" refer 10 lhe weighting paramote ... dependent on the condilioning 
proposilion of E.Bel, {JE,) and PI. (lE, )denote the updated belief and plausibililY 
rmalure conditi (",al \Q E. The summalion oflne weighl ing paramCICrs has \Q beunily, 
si~e "",(J JO)-+IO.l lprovidedm. (~) " O 
The weighting paraJl)l'ters in the aoo\'e equations basically measure: the i~rtiaof 
the priore\'ide~eforthe updat ing rrocess, PremaralnC~t"/, (2003) and Kulasckcreet 
"I. (ZOO4) validated tn.: condi tion ing bascd updating stralegy referred in Equat ions6.19 
and 6.20 by providing different appo:aling properlies_ Se"eral slrategies t<:> measure: 
.. eighl ingparamete .. have been reporled by Kulasekere: el 0/, (ZOO4).lnparlicular, ilisa 
reasonable assumption that the updated be lief measure can ne.'er be more than the 
updated plausibility measure, i.e .. &h (fEI) :!: PI (fE,)) (Ku lasekere ft ilf .• 2(04). T1Ie 
IAE·bascd (integrity of available evidence) <;trategy in r"lU3tion 6.23 calculates the 
weighting paramelers thai allow In., i~"'mcnl of neh(I£1) maximum to 1'/ (I/:.'J 
1 1-1'/(£) a, " I-BeI(£) 
<lrbi""yilt[O,11 
for lk/(£)S P/(E)< l 
&/(E) ~ I'/(E) ~ I 
6, J Ap plicat ion of proposed methudulugytubu .. -tieanaly. i. 
(6.23) 
Fuzzy numbe rs and b"". in the proposed rmthodology help to characterize the 
uncertainly assoxiatcd ,,'ilh uperl kno"ltdgc for bow-tic analysis. Based On this 
characterization, either the ruay weight a.'erage method or combination rules can be 
cm plo)'cd to unite thcknowlc-dgc from mulliple sourecs if there are any. Ferdouset,,/. 
(201O)dcri vcdtheintcrsectionandconju~tionoperaliunslop"'rformbow-ticanalysis 
underdilferentu~crlainticswilhres.pe<:ltucxperlkno"·lcdgc, These operalions arc also 
capablcofaddressingunccrlaintyregard inglhe inlerdcpendcntre:lalionshipamunginpul 
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A bow-ric fora 1ypical oITsoon:oil and gas pro<:css faci ii1y.shown in figure 6 .6. 
has been dnclopcdtodcmoos1ralelhe u1ilily Oflhc proposed rnc1hodol"!I.Y in induSl,ial 
applica1ions. On an oITsoorc oil arnl gas process facil i1y. gas Ic.kage isa Common iss ..... : 
lhis incident may subsequently lead to dimn:nt credible accidents such as ~apo' cloud 
explosion (VCE). fin:. explosion and BLEVE. KhanNa!. (2002)propo",da risk·ba..,d 
safety design and assessment melhod forolTshore fac iliti es to mitigatc thc risk of such 
actidemsfor dilTercntprocessuni1S. They also provided adcrailed pro<:essdescriplion 
and idenlified a numher of possible causcsas bask evenlS that di=lly or indirccdy 
enhance the ncCUlTCn~ of credible occidents in an ofTsllon: facility. Table 6.4 
summari1A:S some of the possible causes as input ncnts for the bow-tie dc~tklpmcn!. In 
addition to possible causes, olher inpul events are listed in Table 6,4 t(l dcscribc the likely 
consequences (If a gas leak occurrence on an offshon: facility. The dc.'eloped bow-tic 
diagram for the facil ity is illustrated in Figure 6.7. In Figure 6.7. the leakage from the 
facilityisconsidcredasacritica l c"entandthccauscsaooconscquenCeS (If such an 
incidcnt are dcpi.:tedas input events. Tll<: nK>dcls for characterization. al!l!regat ion and 
updating uncertainty in risk cSlimates are applied to the bow-tie to dctenninc the 
likelihood of possible outCOmt!l. Different uncertain conditions i""luding the use of 
expert knowledge for missing data, knowledge from multiple experts. and 'IeW 
knowledge forinputeycnts.re cOIlsidered while perfonningthe oow-tie anal ysis. 
i'iJ: u .... 6.6'Processnowdiagramofatypi.:aloITs/>(>rcfacility 
~6:HandlingandLJPd<!ting<.JnCel't<linlnf""""tlonint>ow·ljeill'\alysls 
Table 6.4: Idcnlificd CauS<:S and conseqllCrn;c. for offshore facililY 
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6.S R .. ult. andanal)·.i. 
Two different kind5 ofkoo"ledgc (subje.:ti~e and incomplete) from IWO differenl $Ourees 
were tonsidered while pcrfonning Ihe bo,,··lie analysis , n.c e~pcn kno"l~dgc for lhe 
inpute,enlS is pre!'Cnte\l in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. The uncenainty due 10 subj""li~ily was 
addres!'Cd by fuzzy numllcrs and aggrcgll1ed using lhe weighted avc ... g~ melhod by 
assigning equal ,,'eighu for both cxpcns. The b,NlS in evidence ti>eorytonsidcrcd the 
iocomplelckno"lcdgeasigno<1lllCcwhi\echaraclerizinglheuocenainlyanddistrib\l1ing 





























(0.000.0.025.0.0SO) (0.015.0.oJO.0.045) (0.011.0.035.0.059) 
(0.045.0.098.0,ISO) (0.000.0.025.0.05(1) (0.023.0.061.0.100) 
(0.0IS.0.OJ5.0,053) (0.000.0.025.0.05(1) (0.008.0.028.0.048) 
(0.on.o.05(l.0.098) (0.045.0.098,0.15(1) (0.OJS.0.074.0.tlJ) 
(0.000.0.025.0.05(1) (0.045.0.098.0.15(1) (0,023.0.061.0.100) 
(0.05(1.0.100.0.15(1) (0.000.0-025,0.05(1) (0.OlS.0.061.0. 100) 
(0.045.0.098.0.15(1) (0.100.0.25(1.0.400) (0.073.0.174.0.275) 
(0.020.0.040.0.060) (0.000.0.025.0.0SO) (0.018.0.0n.0.0H) 
(0.000.0.025.0.05(1) (0.021.0.045.0.06S) (0,010.0.OlJ,O.055) 
(0.018.0.055.0.083) (0.000.0.025.0,OSO) (0.014,0.040,0.066) 
(0.SSO,O.1I02.0.955) (0.600.0.75(1.0,1lOO) (0.IlOO,O.9J9,O.97S) 
(0.600,O.7SO.0.1lOO) (0.S5(I.0.1lOO.0,95(1) (0.72S,O.S26,O.928) 
(0.600,O.7SO.0.1lOO) (0.700.0.800.0.1lOO) (0.5SO,0.66J,O.775) 
(0.8SO,0.1I02.0.955) (0.600.0.75(1.0.1lOO) (0.725,0.826,0.918) 
crn.:w6:H~ndllro] and updatll"lguncertain information In bow·tleana/ysis 
Table 6.6: Expert knowledge on the likelihood ofinlXltevenls 










1lE. 0.670 "~ 0.045 
Il E, 0.650 0.065 0.050 
"~ 0. 100 0,100 0.'" 0.260 
0.100 0,2SO 0.700 0,150 O. ISO 
0.750 0.050 0,200 0,035 0 .185 
0,8SO 0.025 0. 125 0,780 0 .100 0.120 
BE .. 0.070 0,650 0.095 0.255 
H, 0870 
0,6SO 0.200 O.ISO 0850 0.1 00 
0 .)00 0.100 0.700 0.200 0 .100 
0 .150 
The aggregated knowledge illu,tr~tcd in Tab les 6,5 and 6.1 was employed to 
determine and eva luate the likclihoodsofdiffcrentoutcomcs for the offshore facility. The 
resull,are presenled in Table 6.8 and Figure 6 .8. In TabIc6.8. "ilh thea,'ailablc prior 
knowledge. Ihe OS combination rule estimaled Ihe t>elief.llUClures of Ie akQ(currenceas 
[0.290--0.5011 for the offshore facility. ar>d VeE as the mo, t likely conSC<l""nce which 
measured the highest probabil ity of occurrence as [0,261·0.4561. For the same critical 
e,'ent and outcome event. Ihe Yager combination ru le estimated a large bel icfstructurc in 
comparison to the OS combination rule. Therefore. it can be easily interpreted thaI the 
Yager combina tion ru le)'ields more cOflsero.'ative results (i.e .. a larger be lief strueture) in 
thcconlc.~tofexistinghighconl1ictsamongthesources 
T. bIe6.7:BcliefS1rucluresof inpulevcnlS 
'BE, 0.96750.015 1 0.98490.03250.89) 1 0.0140 
BE, 0.97820.01120.98880.02180.89700.010) 
1m, 0.95930.0166 0.9834 0.0407 0.8848 
BE., 0.9032 0.0328 0.9672 0.0968 0.8)11 
BE, 0.90-180.03320.9668 0.09S2 0.831) 
III:" 0.9034 0.0652 0.93~8 0.0%6 0.7480 
BE, 0.87)9 O.(}/III 0.91890.12610.7275 
BEo 0.9~12 0.0193 0.9807 0.0588 0.8798 
0.96320.02010.9799 O.oJ69 0.8625 
BE.. 0.9395 O.cI~OO 0.9601 0.0605 0.8148 
E, 0.96390.03350.96650.03610.7629 
10, 0.9314 0.0588 0.9~12 0.0686 0.7 125 
E, 0.8209 0.1642 0.8358 0.17910.5500 
I:" 058310.09630.9037 01 163 0.665() 
~~~rromth< 
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The likelilloodofthtdiffcrenloulcome evenl.'i for the bow-tit anal~sisdependson 
the failure probabilit~ of the critical e,cnl. as well .s the probab;lit~ of OI:currence of 
subse<[ucnt events. An~ fH"wknowledgc or evidence incorporated with prior inform.lion 
of the input events in bow-tie .nalysi. may provide a different li~el i hood assessment for 
Ihccriticalevemandoutcomeevcnls.llteupodalinsmtthani,mde,'cloped in this ,Iudy is 
abk to capture the oew kno"lcdgc and pro,'idc up<latcd lii<elihoodforthc inpulevcnls, 
crilical evenl. and OUICome eventS. As a continuation of bow-tie analysis for the off,bore 
facility. rlCwkno"lcdge fora fewselttted inpute"ents iscon,idered in Table 6.9. The 
developedfuuy-Bayesianand IAE-basedevid.:n lialupodatinKapproachese,tim.tcdlhe 
new probabi lity for these e,'cnIS and provided Ihc upodalcd values as shawn i n 'hble 6.10. 
rhebow-ticforthcoft'shorefacililyisrce,'alualc-d based an Ihesc up<latcd p robabilit ics 
that pro,-ide a revised estimation (depicted in Figure 6.8 and Table 6.11) for leak 
occurrence and the outcome evenlS. In Figure 6.8. both the prior and upodnted fuzzy 
numbers of leak occurrenct and tht likelihootl afoulcome events are illustrated. Figure 
6.8 shows thai the VCE is the most likelycon~uence. and lhe prior mostlihly value of 
VCE (measured in a fuzzy number) exhibits 28% de,-iation "hen revalualed with tile 
upodated koo"lcdge. Table 6.11 represents the upodaled belief structures for the critical 
event and oulcome events for the bow-tic oflhe affshare facilily. In Tabl e6.II.itcanbe 
observed that thc belief estimation. incorporated Wilh Ihc new kno"ledgt. far Iht 
















Tub le6. 10: Updalcdkno"ledgef<>rlhcsele<:lcdinpulevents 
TFN f/JJ. p_p,,) YagfrC<>DlbiDaUt>ncu l< 
(Q.{IOI,O.OOJ,O.OO6) 0.0110 
(0,005.0.015.0.027) 0,0649 
(0 .032.0.078.0.124) 0.1348 
(0 ,002.0.008.0.016) 0,0197 Om8J 
(0,001,0.005.0,009) 0,0378 
(0.926.0.954.0,981) 0.9334 0.9393 0.1681 
(0.650,0.775.0,900) 0.8852 0.9024 0.0766 
----------------------
Twblc6. ll : Updated likelihood forcritkal event and OUlcomc cvcnu 
~~ag~ from It.. 
,,"" 
I'.l<plos;oo(VCE) 
~;;: Howe<! by 0.0069 
OE., ~~ Vapor 0.0016 
010, ~~ un~~ by 0.0085 
OE. ~~itCloudovcr 0.0007 O.OOJI 
III order to in"esti~atc the nalure oflht updating apJll"O'lch. the updating of input 
events WlI!i performed lill«n limes using the fuay-Ba)'csjan approach. The trend of 
unccnainty range for each update was estimated and obscr.'cd whi le ,,>'alwning the 
likelihood of the critical e"cnt and oulcome events. In each inst3rlC c of updating, a few 
arbitrary input events Were considered and the prior probabi lity oflhcse events .'.-as 
updated with random new knowle<lge. The uncenainty range for "",h update was 
measured by accounting for the difference in fuzzy boundaries of n'N and plolled in 
Figure 6.9. Tl>edecrea<inglreMsoflhe uncenainlyrangcforll\ccrilicalc"cnt (CE) and 
outcome events (010) in Figure 6.'1 dearly show that the uncertainty in the final estimate 
dccrcascs when the number of updates incrcases for the inpulevents. 
~6:Handli09andllPdatlngoocertainlnformatioolnbow·tle~$ 
Numbersofup<iate 
t"ig ,tnl6.9: Trend.ofuncerta inty range for d ifferent nuntberofurdates 
6.6 Summaryand condusion. 
Bow·tic anal}'Sis is a tool for predicting and analyzing safety and risk for industrial 
systems. It imcg",tc. lwo wcll-est.blished lechn iques (i.e .. FTA and ETA) for 
quant;tati,·e';skasscssmcnt. it pro"idcs an exp licit ,icws1llrting from basic causc. 101he 
final consequen<;es of accident scenarios. and it connccts possible OutCOmes of accident 
seen.ri"" Wilh the cril ieal e,ent and t~ input events to perfo"" a systematic and 
comprchcnsivc risk analysi. and safelY asscssmem. "lnequantitativ eanalysisofabow.tie 
still has difficulty in estimatin~ the precise: occurrence probability ofa critical e~ent as 
well as outcome events. as the probability ofoccum:nce for input e,'ems are often 
missing and estimated using e~""n kno"lcdg~. Ex""n knowledge i. hahitually subjected 
10 the uncenainty of iocompleleness (panial ignorancej.,1(! imprecisi on (vagucncssj.Thc 
inheremuncenaint ies(i.e .. missingdata.naturalunccnainticsinthe cx""n data. multiple 
sourees of expen data. and incoming kno"k-dgc) create chal lenges to impro~ing the 
crWibilityofbow·tieanalysis. 
A methodology that integrates tl1<: characterization of uncertainty. aggregation of 
different expens' data and updating priorkno,,1cdgc isdc"cio""d in the current pa""rlo 
enhance and impro"C the o"er~1I perfonnance ofa bow-tie analysis. The application of 
this methodology has t."cn dcmonstr.lted in bo'H;C anal}sis Oll. typical off shore process 
fac ility. From thcanalysis. ;t has t."en obserwd that the likclihoodsofa cr iticalc~entand 
outcome c"cnts wcrecomputc"d in a rangc of values that gcncralize the tOlal uncenainty 
associated wilh ex""n knowledge. Mon:o,·cr. incorporating ncw kno,,1cdge or cv;dCrlCC 
tOlheinputeventsyiddsanupdatedvalueandprovi~sre~isc<llikelihood eSlimalesfor a 
crilical c,'cnt and outcome e,'cnts. Finally. the deveio""d methodology accommodates the 
following features "hich arc uscful in conducting a systematic risk a s""ssment 
I. Supponingtl\c cxpen·knowledgcciicilationpr<xcs.""al\curisticoption for 
oblainingandupdalinguncef1aininformat;oninbow-tieanalysis 
2. Accounting for different kinds of uncenainties in expen data while 
perfonninglikelihoodasscssmcntforbow·t;eaOJlysis 
J Facilitating the aggregalion and rules of comb ina lion techn;qucslO mi nimize 
e~istingconnictsanddatainconsislem:y in difTen:nl!;Ourcesofknowledge. 
4 Providing compat ibil ity to uroJate the analysis n,,,ursively w~ncver new 
knowicdge bt...:omcs ava ilable for likclihood assessment in bow.t ie analy sis 
In the fulure. th is wO'" "iii be extended towards introducing a similar type of 
uroJaling approach for describing the imerdependent relationships among input events 
ThedifTcrenlt)· pesofoonditionaII'Ofss""hasweibull.lognormal.normal "ndo~rs 
may also I:>cconsidcred in lhis fulureulcnsion loexplorc a more robust fuzzy·l)a yesi.n 
ujXlalingapproach for bow·tic analysi s 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions and Future Research 
FfA. ETA and !klw-(ie analysi~ are impoflan( techniques for ORA to c\'a luatc, and 
predict occurrence of accidents for industria l process faci lit ies. Uncertainties are 
una\:ceptable and unavoidable, and often undcnnir.e the overall purpose ofQRA. The 
uncertainties in ORA arc manifested due to insufficient or limited data. unrealistic 
assumplions. and lack of dynamic IIIIlun: of risk cstimal~'S. Comprt"hcnsi,'c fmme,,'orb 
and approaches thus still ""cd lobe dneloped rorQRA "hich can incorporate expert 
kno .... lcdge as an a lternative to limited or missing data. charactcri~e and propagate 
uncertainties, aggregate multiple_SQurce knowledge. and integrale dynamicaspccts into 
7. 1 Surnmaryandcondu.iono 
Literature review (Chapter 2). highlights the limitaliQlls associated with the existing QRA 
methods for indusuial processfacilitie •. Most of the previoussHxlies were spec ific.cither 
foliowing the lrad ilional assumplion.or unable 10 addrcss dilfcrcnt tyI'C sofuncenainties 
I' unhcnnore. they were de~elopcd for specific methods or approaches. which thu, limit 
thcirapplic.bility. ifadilferent kind ofunccnaintyor new knowledge Or data become 
available. Thchurdlesfordcvelopingacomprchensi,·cri,kanalysisfrnmeworkin.:lude 
i)dc~clopmcmofappropriatc approaclleslo fomulatc dilfcrt:nt kindsofun.:cnainlics.. 
andii)intcl:'""tionofappropriatemcthodlOcnhan.:cdynamic'Iualiticsinriskcstimatcs 
"Illis study adopted two different theorics. namely fuzzy set aOO evidence theory. 10 
de"clop unceruinty-based fommlalKms for ~'TA. IOTA and BoYHie analysis. and 
updating aPPfOl"i>es to integrate dynamic llspe<:lin QRA, 11Ie present rescarch is mainly 
f"",used on the following objectives: (I)de"clopmentofaquantitati"c frJtTlCwort; for 
haOOling differenl types of ulll'eruinly in FfA and ETA. (2) de"e!optncnl of a 
cornprchensi"e frameworl: for tIow-,ie analysis including unceruinly, (J) in legralionand 
de"elopmenlofupdating inference for incorporating dynamic aspect in the risk analysis. 
and(4)awlicationsofde"cioped methodologies and approaci>es indilTerent case s tudies 
Kecpin~ Ihcseoojeclive. in perspecli'·c.lhe following conclusions have been achieved 
I. Two types of uncertainty. namely dati' aOO ,w,1elllklll), unceruinly. were identified 
while analyzing a faull tree and event tree following Ihe lraditional assumptions. A 
quanlitative framewort; based on fuuyand evidencelheory was proposed inChaptcrs 
utilize. lhe expert kr><>wledge 10 overcome the dllla unct'rtailt/y in ~'TA and ",A. The: 
dependencycoeffocient in each """"oflhe fault I"", .ndevent I"", wnused to 
address the Ik/1ellllency uncertainty and to describe the interdependence ofba.ie 
eventslevenls.lnthefu7J,y_hasedapproach.theprobabililiesofevenls.aswelia,Ihe 
dependency coeffocient (Co) of eventS wen: def,ncd linguistic.lly using lhe fuzzy 
scalc comprised ofTFNs. "Ille vagueness and subjeCli"ilyofthe expert kr><>w'lcdge 
w'crcdcscribcdcmployingtheextcndcda-culbasedfuzzyempiri..:alcqualionsduring 
analysiswilhlhefaulltrceaOOcventttl:c.lnthccvidcncetheory-basedapproach.the 
bpus ,,'ere assigned based on e.~pert kno"lcdge. The incomplete and inconsistent 
baps frum multiple sources were combined using tl\c DS and Yager combination 
rules. llIc evidence theOfy-based empirical ",lJlions were Ihen u~ 10 address 
uncenainty relatcd 10 multiple experu' knowlcdge and lhe inlerdependcnceofbasic 
cvcms/c>·cnts. Of the two combination rules. the Yager combination rule provided 
mOre rcliable aggrcgation in the context of having highconnicting infon nll1ioninthe 
multiple sources. Consequently. this rule yielded more appropriate results for 
FTAIETA with uncertainty. leading to a lower value in the belief measure and a 
higher value in the 1"""";MIiI), measure compared to the l)ScombinatiOl1 rule. The 
developed approaches nre nexible to accommodate tl\c cxpen knowledge and to 
handiea wide rnngeofuncenainties associated with the knowledge in case of miss ing 
data. These approachcs are unique and allow the description of six difTcrcnt le"eisof 
imeruependenceamong the basic-<:>'cnts/c,"cnts 
2 InChapter 5,fU7.Zyandcvidencetheory-bilscdapproacheswcrecxtcndedtode\'elop 
a comprehensive framewort (i.e .. quaiitativcand quantitati>'c) for pcrfonningbow-tie 
analysis underd(J/(.and m.xlel (dependency) uncertainty. First the " 'cightedavcrnge 
method in the fU7-Zy-based approach was adopted to aggregaletl\c fuay numbers 
assigncdbydifTerentexpens.Second.thedevclopedempiricalrelationsinfuzzyand 
evidence the<.>ry based approaches were modifiw and utcnded 10 address both 
positi>-" and negalivedependence. Finally. scnsitivity "nalysis (SA) comprising two 
steps were proposcd to identify the tlIQslcontribuling input events and estimate lhe 
risk reductiOl1 for the corresponding e,"ents for boW_lie analysis. llIc developed 
fmme .... -ori< can alS<! pro~idcs a q~litatiH' guideline to construct I bow-tie diBgnlm 
for any un .... ·anted e~enlSstating from the basic cauSCslo il. f,nal conseq"",,",es 
3 Two updaling approaches. namely FUCly- Bayesian and IAE-based evidenlial 
awroaches .... ere de.-c\opt.-d in chaplcr 6 10 incorpomle lhe dynamk Bsp«IS and 
updalcthcpriorkno .... lcdgeforbow-licnnalysis.lnbothupdalingapproaches.first 
informal;on is considered as prior kno .... ledge. ·rl>e fU7.l:y-Bayc-sian approach uscsthc 
TFNs to de""ribe lhe subj,""li~ily for lhe prio-r kno ..... ledge. and employs the 
exponenlialdistribulionasaconditional PDF fM updating lhe prior kno .... ledge. On 
lhe other hand. lhe IAE-based c.·idenlial updating approaeh compules the belief 
interv.l. comprised ofthe beli~fand plmuibililY measures. Oflhe poslerior kno"ledgc 
bascdonlheronditional rntiomcasured from priorbelit>fandl'ltlUsibilitymensull's 
Theb(I(Jinthecvidencell\o:ory·bascdapproachinitialiychal1lcterilCslheuncenaimy 
due to;ncompictcncss.deficiency and inconsistency in the kno ..... ledge. andmeasul"C.'l 
thebeliefinlervalofthtpriorkno .... ledgc. Tlw:lwoupdatinginfcrence$along ..... ithlhe 
oncertainty based formulalions. i.e .• fuayand evidencc theory based approaches all' 
uscfultop:rformlikdihoodi<ssess,.,.""in an unccnainand dynamic environmcntfor 
risk analysis. Tlw:approachC"S all'capablelo incorporale ne ..... knowledge ..... ilh priM 
kno"lcdge and provide revised probability estimation for bo .... ··lie analysis. ·llIe 
Bw1icalionofthesc approaches can alS<! be cxlcnded in developing 8,..,a l lime risk 
anal)·sisprofile forlhe indUSlrial facility by calculating lhc new liktlihoods forcach 
lime when new infonnatio-n b«omes available. 
4. Applicationsofde,·dopedfrntnewori<s.approachesandupdatcdinfell:rlCCshavci>ecn 
dcmonstrntcd in four case studies and described in Chapters 3, 4. 5 and 6. Concluding 
remarks and a short ovef"llicw of each case study are dcscribc:d bc low. 
a) Chapter 3: the uti lity of the developed frnmcwork and approaches for ETA was 
demonstrated in the study of"LPG rtlcase at alklcrgent Alk)'lale Plant (OAl')"·. An 
event trce modcl and analysis forthc LI'G ",lea .. was reconSlructcd aM """'aluated 
inordcrtocompa"'theerrorrobust"""'oftrnditionalte<:hniq~andde"cloped 
approaches in"'lIu uncer1llinty. It was thereby obse,,'ed that. for 10% error in the 
probahilityofti1einiliatingcvcnt(Ll'Grcieasccventm:e).thedcterministicapproach 
exhibited approximately 9"10 de"jation in the f"'qucncy estimation of the outcome 
cvent"lr for the I.PG rclcaseevent tree. In CO<ltras1. lhc fUlZy-bascdapproac hgave 
more robust ,<,su its. i.e .. -.{).OO30/0dcviat ion for the same percentage of errOr in the 
init iating e'·e"t. The MCS-based approach yielded --ll.80/0 dc ,·iation. while the 
eviderlCetheory-basedapproachcalculated-6~. dcviationforlhe same scenario. ltis 
emphasized. oowe\"er. that evidcncc theory takes into accou nt the ignornnce o fexpert 
knowledge .... hile defoning the probability ofe\"cnts. which the other approaches 
b) Chapter 4: the sccondca$e study, with two separate sul)..exampies (event tree for 
·LPG",lea .. -·;faul!treefor··Runawayreactio"··).wasdeononstratedand.". lyzedto 
illllSlMC the compatib ility of developed approaches for ETA and FTA instead of 
trnditional le<:hniques.Besidescheckingtfleerrorrobustncssofthcdevcioped 
approaches. a detailed coonparati,'c study for diffcrccnlt«hniquc:s of ITA and ETA 
was perfonncd,Twoaddilional comparisons in handling ikpendeneYUlltcruinty " 'ith 
Ihe a\'ailable and dc~eloped approaches we", also perforrnro for diffe",nt 
assumptions of interdependence in FTA and ETA , For two dependence cases, i,e .. 
indep(ndent and perfectly dcpendent, Ihe oU lput results of FTA and ETA wcre 
cxaminedand compan:<l for the d ifTerenl approaches. The comparisons of the "LJ'G 
release" e"ent tree example revealed that all approaches including the dca'eloped 
approaches provided similar resullS when Ihe independence assumption was 
considen:<l. Ilowe,-cr, when perfect dependence was employed, a higher order of 
magnilude was estimated while calculating the probability of outcome e,'ents using 
Ihe developed approaches_A simi lar ot,se .... ation wasfoondforperfecldep(n denceof 
hasic"",-cnlS for the FTA of "Runaway reaclion," These two obse .... ations confirmed 
lhat rela~ing Ihe Jcpendcncy assumption introduces significant emitS in Ihe outpUl 
",suits. and thelraditional approaches arc not capahlc to address this type of 
uncertainty. Therefore, Ihe de"elop(d approaches arc more comprehensive and 
extensi.-e than the lradilional approaches, which provide a reliable and robus I result in 
Ihe situation of do/" and modd unceru inly for FTA and ETA 
cj Chapter 5: for the third case study, a oow-lie diagram of the BP Texas city 
accidenl was conSI"'Clcd following the developed framcwork and analyzed usinglhe 
developed approaches. It was observed from the case study that, whi le Ihe 
intcrJcpendenee of input e.-ents varied from independence to perf""t dependen<;e, the 
uncertainly measun:<l in the probabil ity of the critical event (CE) and outpul .,'ents 
(DEs) ranged from minimum 1<> maximum uneeminty. A conclusion was drawn thaI 
llleinlcrdcpcndencchasas1roflginfl""ncco>'crtllemeasu",mentofunccruinties in 
Itt.. likelihood (probability) estimate<! of 0 105. To check the robuSlntSII of handling 
data uncenaimy. a OOnIparntive analysis W31 pcrf<Kmed using Itt.. developed and 
tradilional appr<JltCtt..s f()l" tile hQw.tie. In Itt.. OOnIpa,i •• m. Itt.. same UP case study was 
carried QUI and the em>r pr<JpagaliQll foreltCh approach was <>bserved foraspecitic 
outtomee,ent. '"OE ,~. AO\Idysisoflhistompariwnrcvealedlhal introd"':lionof 20"1. 
uncenainlyinlheinpul-evenldala!elldt065% dc~ialion in Itt.. likelihoodeslimal<:s 
ofOE, "hile employing Itt.. lraditional approach.llM: fuzzy and evidence Iheory 
based approaches mca~red almost 0.25% and 9"  deviation for the same OE. Aside 
from this compa,i""n. a lornado plol was develope<! using the pr<Jposcd SA method 
for identifying lhecom:lalionsofinpule"enls leading 10 Itt.. occum:nc cofOE,. The 
demonslralion of SA melhod in the case sludy also Ilelpe<! 10 conclude lhal a 
signilic3lI1 percentage of risk of OCCum:nce of 0& cQlJld be miligated if the 
likelihood f()l" Itt.. highesl contributing inpul e,'cnls may be reduced 10 a d.:sired 
percenlagc. 
d) Chapler6'the last case study was illuslraledon an olTsI>oreoil &: gasproccs.sing 
fltCility 10 describe Ihe utilily of the dc .. elopcd and updated approaches for boW-lie 
analysis. Tl>c updaling approaches " 'ere demonSlmled only for Itt.. bow'lie 
awlication. TIley can alw be encompassed w;lh Ihe FTA and ETA. Knowledge front 
IwodilTercntsourccs.aloogwithlhc subjeclivilyandincomplcleness uncenainly. " ·u 
tonsidered "h;lc pcrformingbow_licanalysisf()l"llIccasc study. l'he fw.7.Y " 'ei ghled 
a"cragc melhod",ith Itt.. assignmentofcqual weighlson bolhSOurccSand OS and 
, .. 
Yegarcombinalion rules wcre applicd 10 aggrcgatc lhe knowledge for input.vents. 
The corresponding probability for the CE (gas leakage) and lhe OEs was dclennined 
using combined knowledge and dcyeloped approac~s. To demonsl"'le lhe 
applicabililyand validilynflhe updalcd appn:;tacbes. a few arbit"'ry in pUI eve nts of 
the bow-tie were considcrro and Ihe prior probabilities of these nents w c",updated 
with some random new kno"lcdge. The trend of the unccrtlointy range for each 
updatc " 'asestimatcd andobsc:r .. ed "hilc c"aluating the probability 0 fCEandOEs 
The decreasing trends of uncertainty range for CE and OEs confinncd thaI the 
uncenaintyinlhefi'laleslimalede<:rcaseswhenlhenumherofupdalesincreasesfor 
Ihe inpul e,·ents. The updaling inference is useful tn enhance the dynami c nalure and 
performanceofQRAbyaddingnewkno"ledgeorindustrialdatatnlheprioranalysis 
nndimpmvinglfleearlieranalysiswithhcighlenooconfidence. Theseappn:;tachesare 
a lsousefulfnrperfonn;ng.reall;""'nnaly sisus ;ngl~updatooinfonnaliOfland 
rcctifying Ihe likclihoc>d assc:ssmcnts of input evcnlS and OEs that may cseala tetoan 
Finally. Ihe general conclusion oflhe de"elopcd approaches can hedeseribed using 
fable 7.1. Table 7.1 provides lhe comparisons ofdifferenl approaches in pcrspt."<:tive of 
hand ling.nd updating the anal)'sisof f.ult lree. event tree or bow-tie for QRA. It is 
ev ident from the lable that. for the most part. the prupos.."<l .pproaches is more advanced 
Tuble 7. 1: Oiffcrcmapproache. for FrNETA/Bow·tieanaly.i. 
ApproMChCll IlIputdMtM .u.umptions Un crrt~inty bandlin2 & Updating 
• Assigned vat .... s=.xa<1 
. 1O<:apabl.ofdescribing 
U::1C~'P andpre<i ... uncenainty 
approach 
. B., icevenlSleventslinput 
• Un.blelOupd.t.p'iorana lysis 
e'o'ents .... independent. 
• PDh.re known and well • OntyU>erandomuncertainti'" 
Traditional defined. .rel""l"""lyhandl~.n.eolher 
MCSbased 
. Ilasice"entslevonts /input =i~ncenaint i"'CMnotbe approach 
event$=independ~nt 
' Unabletoupdatepri", .. ,."t)'sis 




U .. TFN. Inlerd.pendenceoft>asic ikpe"*IOCY)url<ert.intyc.n 
-"" 
. ,'"' 
.vents /evemslinput p""'p"rlybeoddreSS<:d . 
.wntSCM be ranged from 
• Able to up<!ate the prior perfOClto"PflO$ile 
analysiswhenc"eT""w dependence know ledgebecom.s.v.ilable 
7.20rig ina lily"fth""i' 
The main contribution of Ihis thesis is Iwofold. First. IWO diffe",m approaches are being 
embedded in the de ,·eloped frameworks for ETA. FTA and bow·tie ana lysis 10 harKIl. 
dllla and .kpemkncy (modd) un""nainty in Q RA. In addition to these approaches. a 
sensitivity anal}'sis method has also been de,·eloped for identifying the important risk 
contrib\ltorsand pr<:.-iding an evaluation of possible risk ",duction forbow.tieanalysis. 
S...,ond. 10 im:orporate the dynamic aspeclS in QRA. two updating mec hani sms "re 
integrn ted with the deYeloped approaches. The origi nality andsignificar.:e oft he tl\csisi, 
funl\crdeseribedwiththefolio,,·ingfeatut'l!S.whichindude· 
Supporting tile elkiuuion process of upcn kno .... ledge to o,'ercomc tile ,k,/a 
uncertainty issu.:sin FTA. ETA and bo'Nieanalysis 
Adopting a dependency cocfficicnt todc:seribe a ,,·ide rangeofintcrdcpcndcnc" 
for addrcssing motkl uncertainly in FTA. ETA and bow-tie analysis 
Enhancing the process to idcntifythe important risk contributOfSand ntitigalc risk 
forindustrialfa.cilities 
l'roviding tile compatibility for QRA in updating and rtttifying the: analysis 
rttUl!livdy"hcnevernewkno .... ledgcbccomesa'·aitablc 
I'romotingtheappticabilityofQRA for any industrial facilities lhat endure (/(J111 
and 1tkH1e1(ordt·""tu/,'ncyjuncenaimies 
I)ased on this resurch folto"ing recomfm'ndalions for fulun: work can be made 
The present slUdy encourage. the use of tile implication ofexpcn. kno"ledgc as 
an altemali,·" oplion to limiled or missing data. A conceplual fl1lmo,,·or!< that 
dc:scribeSlhe:proccdural!i1cpsoflhc\:oowledgcc1icilalionprocCSllrequirestobe 
dc:'·elopedlOmaintainlhcqualilyondcredibililyofkno,,·ledgc.Koo .... lcdgcfrom 
multiple sources provides more reliablc predictions about an ul1Ccnain pal1lmtler. 
Hence. a gl1lphical fonnatlo suppon the knowledge elicitation process. and a 
seoring or vOlingsy§lem 10 facililalclhe priorilizationofknowledgc.n«dlObc 
integl1lted into\hcfl1lfm'WOI'k. These integrations will oosically help tocaiculale 
theassig.nmcntofweights for each cxpert. and perform an intcrnclive risk anal ysis 
morespe.:ifi~allyforaparticularsystem. 
This research int~nded to formulale the uncertainty for ITA. ETA alld I)ow-lie 
analysis. and enhance Ihe perfonnanceofrisk analysis in an unec rtainand 
dynamic environment. However. risk isdefincdasa function of both coosc quence 
alld frequency. FTA. ETA alld BoW_lie ana lysis are l\OIll1ally used to estimate the 
probabil ily of concerned incidenlS alld e>'enIS. An effort is sti ll required to 
develop a f",,,,,,wor!< Ihnl will integrate both conseq~nce ar.c.l frequency 
estimalion for an unwanted c.-entand provide anm-erall riskeSlimalion 
Impro>-emenl in the dc>'e lopN MpprOllCbl':'l 
The present researc.h used Iriangular diWibution 10 address random uncert ainty in 
the MCS-b.sed approach for ~·rA and ETA. In future research, the other Iypes of 
dislributions including cxpoocntial. weibull, oormal and lognomlal (com mooly 
preferred;n modcling the failure data fo,thc basic compor.ents or OCcurrence of 
an eventl can also be considered to perform a morc cornprcl\cnsi>'e comparison 
among the different uncertainty-based approaches foo-FTA and ETA 
Two Iypes of uncertainty, dalll and mo.kl (00- dependency) uncertainty, were 
~onsidercd in this study to explore the uncertainty·based approachesforlhe FTA, 
ETA and bow-lie. Another kind of uncerta inty ..... hieh may be defined as 
"rucmrolorcom"leten<!.uorqualilyur>Certaintysubje<:tC{ltolhei""'~lness 
and inapproprialene'" of structuring a f. ult tree or bow_tit (or an unwanted event, 
can also be considered in future resea.-.;h 
iii Thcdnciopcd unccl1aintybascd formulations in fuuy and cvH:icntial npproachcs 
was c~plon:d only for the "AND" and "OR" logic gates of FTA and bow-tie 
analysis, In future research, lhe", formulations can be ful1h~r e~lende<:l towards 
develop ing the form ulations for lheOlhertypesofgates, such as,"Exci usiveOR". 
" I'RIORITY AN D", "INII ABIT". "hieh " ill [)artly he lp to madcilhe Slruf.'lurai 
uncertainty whilc performing risk anal)'sis using FTA and Bow-tie a ""lysis 
iv T"'odistinct approaches, namely fuzzy-and evidence thc'<Ir)'-baSl.-d approaches, 
weredevelope.r in this study to handle subj«'tive and ineomplctenessunce rtainty. 
In future, both kinds of uncertainties can hccnnsidered together usin~ hybrid soft 
computing methods such as l'uuy·lkmpster·Shafer is required. 
An infe .. """ forupdalingthe prior knowledge of interdependence is requ ired 10 
be de,'eloped in future in order 10 comprehend the applicabil ity of developed 
approaches for FTA. lOT A and oow_tie analysis 
vi. DifTcrem conditional PDf. such as wciboll. lognormal. normal may also be 
considen.-d tocxplore a more robust fuzzy-Bayesian updalingapproach. 
VII. Analylical Hierarchy Process (AHP) can be considered in future to determine 
,,-eight of expen's knn"le<lge in aggregating the fuzzy numbers from difTerem 
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